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Epistle Dedicatory to Tom Bottomore 
Why did I see coffins where Manet saw pale figures? Your question 
regarding my pamting Perspective: Le Balcon de Manet implies its own 
answer. The image my painting reveals where the decor of the 
“Balcony”1s suitable for placing coffms. 
The “mechamsm”at work here could serve as the obiect of a 
scholarly explanation of which I am incapable. The explanation would 
be valuable, even irrefutable, but the mystery would remain und1min 
ished 
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Ethics, whether as prudence or as art, is nothmg but the scientific 
application of doctrinal norms to contingent problems; right doing or 
making are matters not of the wil, but of conscience, or awareness, a 
choice being only possible as between obedience or rebellion. Actions, in 
other words, are in order or inordinate in precisely the same way that 
iconography may be correct or incorrect, formal or informal. Error is 
failure to hit the mark, and is to be expected in al who act mstinc-
tively, to please themselves (or others) .
Where there is agreement as to the nature of man’s last end, and 
that the 、•Vay by which the present and the paramount ends of life can 
be realised ts that of sacrifiにialoperation, it is evident that the form of 
society wil be determined by the requirements of the Sacrifice; and 
that order (yathii rthatii ) and imparttahty (samadre!i) wil mean 
thateverym叩 shal be enabled to become, and by no misdirection 
prevented from becoming, what he has it in him to become. 
I Perplexed and Guideless in a Disenchanted World 
In a famous statement summing up his relentless analysis of the 
concept of society, Durkheim declares：“Between God and Society lies 
the choice. ”Immediately after this uncompromising formulation of a 
radical choice, Durkheim proceeds to show how, after al, there ts no 
real choice：“一日 Imyself am quite indifferent to this choice, since, I 
see in the Divinity叩 lyso口etytransfigured and symboltcally express-
ed.吋〕
Durkheim’S indifference evokes, obliquely, an episode in Proust (1871-
! 922); 
“Placed for the first time in her life between two duties as 
incompatible as getting into her carnage to go out to dinner and 
shewing pity for a man who was about to die, she could fmd nothin呂
田 thecode of conventions that indicated the right line to follow, and, 
not knowmg which to choose, felt it better to make a show of not 
believing that the latter alternative need be seriously considered, so as 
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to follow the first, which demanded of her at the moment less effort, 
and thought that the best way of settling the conflict would be to deny 
that any existed.“You’re joking，＇’ she said to Swann.“It would be a 
joke in charmmg taste，＇’ replied he 1romcally.“I don’t know why I am 
telling you this; I have never said a word to you before about my 
illness But as you asked me, and as now I may die at any moment… 
But whatever I do I mustn’t not make you late; you’re dmmg out, 
remember,'' he added, because he knew that for other people their own 
social obligations took precedence of the death of a friend, and could 
put himself in her place by dint of his instinctive politeness. But that 
of the Duchess enabled her also to perceive in a vague way that the 
dinner to which she was going must count for less to Swann than his 
own death. And so, while continuing on her way towards the carriage, 
she let her shoulders droop, saying；“Don’t worry about our dinner. It’s 
not of any importance！”∞ 
We have here a profoundly revealing portrait of modernity and a rare 
insight into the inner stance of contemporary sociology which, 
ironically, often claims Max Weber as its major inspiration as also one 
of its greatest masters. It seems to me, however, that Weber himself 
would have been deeply repelled by the high society ethos of post war 
sociology The spirit of Weber’s later thinking moves beyond the 
Comtean heritage, stands firmly agamst the Marxian orthodoxy and is 
sharply distinguished from contemporary academic soc10logy. Weber is 
not so much a“bourge01s Marx" as he is an ultra-sociologist一 a
radical Marxist; his quest for umversality (and hence his soc10log1cal 
system) is of a significantly different order.印
Though a thmker of encyclopaedic scholarship, at home in the history 
of most of the Western and Eastern religions and cultures through the 
ages, Weber's central concern is not any umversal philosophy (or 
sociology) of history. In this he differs greatly from both Comte and 
Marx. Nor did Weber regard the construction of a historical sociology 
as his major task As a sociologist and an mst1tutional economist, he 
wanted to use his vast erudition m world-history for constructing a 
formal system of sociology which, by virtue of its historical range and 
Mox ¥Vobe< and tho End of Comt"n Sociology 5 
depth, would be of universal validity. This is one of the most important 
forms in which Weber’s quest for universality has found positive 
expression仰
He has created a system of theoretical sociology by constructing 
comprehensive typologies of Social Actwn, Social Relat旧nship,Groups, 
Authonty, Power, Corporations, Domination, Rationality, Market, etc. He 
has given formal, systematic definitions of the basic concepts of 
economy and society; and together with the careful formal historical 
analysts of the fundamental typologies, this is designed as a powerful 
system which, with appropriate modification, would be universally valid 
and relevant for the analysis and understandmg of any society at any 
time. Most of Weber’s theoretical and historical thmking and researches 
do, in their deep structure and dialectical logic, presuppose the 
evolutwnary perspective and the postulate of the unity of history. It is 
important to note this in connection with Weber’s universalism because 
he made elaborate studies of some of the major non-Chnsttan and non 
Western religions. However, not being an avowed evolutionist, Weber 
does not attempt to arrange these civilisations expltcttly in any 
evolutionary series; hts analyses do not presuppose any Social Darwinist 
(or quasi Darwinist) perspective Weber's universalism is based on the 
histonco universal process of Rationalisation which is integrally paired 
with Charisma-Routinisationも'leber'suniversalism can thus avoid the 
absolutisatwn of modernity and Europeanisation of earth while yet 
positing a radical discontinuity between tradition and modernity.伺
Like Comte, Marx and Durkheim, Max Weber also devoted a major 
part of his work to the analysis of modern cap1tahst society which, he 
thought, represented a form of society to which universal history had 
been leadmg; but unlike Comte, he broke with evolutionism and its 
optimism without wanting to give up his Enlightenment universahsm. 
Accordingly, Weber is uncertain and in despair about the future of 
modern society：“In Weber, a philosophy of struggle and power of 
Marxist and Nietzschean inspiration is combined with a vision of 
universal history leading to a disenchanted world and an enslaved 
humanity stripped of its highest virtues. ’哨
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It is this dark picture and the consequent uncertainty, bordering on 
anguish and despair, that sets Weber apart from his predecessors and, 
curiously, from most of his successors as well. 
In the hie and thought of Weber, the crisis of sociology finds an 
expression unique in its noble profundity and tragic heroism. Indeed, 
Weber’s intellectual b10graphy is the drama of his encounters with the 
core dilemmas of modernity. 
The central dilemma of which al others are but variations一 is
constituted by the problematics of man as an intellectual and man as 
an existing person Differently formulated, it is the tension between 
anthropology and autology-"' This problematic ongmates m the 
displacement in our age of the idea of the intellectual as metaphysician 
by the notion of the intellectual as scientist. (Or, m a general way, man 
as a profess10nal, however, the paramount, par excellence profession is 
that of the scientist.) In spite of same unavoidable overlap, we can, for 
convenience of analysis, hst the following an!Ithetical duaht1es which 
generate the constitutive dilemmas of modern civilisation: (a) Science 
and Religion (b) S口enceand Values (c) Science and History (d) Science 
and Sociology 
Science and Rehg10n 
Weber saw science as the paradigm of rat10nality, which reaches its 
culmination in our times as a consequence of the process of rationalisa-
tion which is characteristic of modern Western societies. Religion, 
according to Weber, is man’s concern with the ultimate meaning of 
life. Max Weber made profound and extraordinarily learned studies in 
the sociology of world religions. However, for al the encyclopaedic 
range of historical studies and the conceptual sophistication of his 
systemic thought, Weber did not advance beyond Rationalisat10n and 
Disenchantment as the (twin) master concepts for the comparative 
study of World Religions and the understanding of the modern Western 
civilisation. His refusal (not to cal it a failure) to transcend Rationalisa 
!Ion (and Disenchantment, which the former implies m a historicist 
context) meant that the dichotomy, Rationality/Irrationality would turn 
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antithetical and remam irreconcilable. In consequence, there occurs, 
1ronically, an absolute relativisation of Reason: a result that compromis 
ed the logical validity and functional efficacy of the concepts of 
Rationahsat10n and Disenchantment. 向
The sociologist’s dilemma, then, is this: 白山町 heexcludes religion 
altogether from his discipline, in which case he deals only with the 
present age and even then only partially and thus seriously compro→ 
mises the generality of his discipline: or, he studies the rehg1ous 
traditions of the world with conceptual tools not only admittedly 
inadequate but demonstrably inappropriate to and destructive of 
traditional thinking and religious trad1t1ons (which are anachromst1cally/ 
falsely called “pre-modern”） 
(This is not to deny that Weber did obtam some very valuable 
results ) 
In an address given at the University of Munich two years before his 
death, Weber himself gives the clearest formulation of this dilemma: 
“The capacity for the accomplishment of religious virtuosos the 
’intellectual sacrifice’一一isthe decisive characteristic of the positively 
religious man. That this 1s so is shown by the fact that in spite (or 
rather m consequence) of theology (which unveils 1t) the tension 
between the value-spheres of ’science' and the sphere of 'the holy' is 
unbridgeable.”｛制
In another address given in the same year (1918), Weber argues that 
“The age old problem of theodicy .consists of the very question of how 
it is that a power which is said to be at once omnipotent and kind 
could have created such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, 
unpunished mJust1ce, and hopeless stupidity. Either this power is not 
omnipotent or not kind, or, entirely different pnnc1ples of compensation 
and reward govern our life principles we may interpret meta 
physically, or even principles that forever escape our comprehension ”州
Weber goes on to pomt out that“This problem - the experience of 
the irrationality of the world has been the driving force of al 
religious evolution.叩＂ He then emphasises that "We are placed into 
various life spheres, each of which 1s governed by different laws”問
8 
Weber is perfectly clear that neither the natural nor the histoncal 
science can ever find a universal theoretical framework which would 
log1cally encompass these different laws. 
The simple but momentous corollary that Weber suggests is that 
theologies (and theodicies) can be neither refuted nor debunked nor 
made irrelevant. No science, no sociology, no philosophy can take their 
place. A layman or a scientist can only make his personal or collective 
ch01ce. 
The act of choice, however, wil remain ultimately outside soc10logy 
which thus remains essentially fragmentary, retaining, strictly speaking, 
only an aesthetic value. 附
The unresolved problematics of Science and Rehg1on appears in 
Weber’s sociology of modern society as the dichotomy between 
bureaucracy (Science) and charismatic leadership (Re!ig10n), and it is 
well-known that Weber, who attached a central importance to 
bureaucracy in the on～going development of modern society, was quite 
pessimistic about its possible redemption by charisma. 
Science and Values 
Essentially the same tension, 1.e. that between science and rehg1on 
which, towards the end of his life, Weber came to see as unresolvable 
except by crucial existential decisions, appears again in his sociology of 
values. He devised a method for studying and comprehending values 
with the help of his famous distmction between value judgement 
(affirming a value or choosing between alternative values) and value-
reference (selection, analysis and understanding of parts of historical 
reality with reference to the values manifest or implicit m them). The 
logical adequacy of this methodology is doubtful; but here we are not 
exammmg Weber m any narrow professional context. Our concern is 
with Weber as an exemplar of his age. It is clearly recognised m his 
later work that values are an aspect of the total world-view of every 
age and their ful meaning and force could be analysed and understood 
only in that particular umverse Towards the end of his life Weber 
became increasingly convinced that a world-view is not amenable to 
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complete and systematic sc目立t1hc understandmg; accordingly, 
scientists qua scientists cannot underwrite one world-view truly so-
called. The acceptance of a world-view is a matter of ultimate ch01ce 
(that is, if an ultimate ch01ce is a choice at al) Weber tned to see the 
"rationality”of a world-view sociologically, in terms of its own basic 
postulates, but he became progressively clearer that these postulates 
are beyond the scope of scientific scrutiny and are neither verifiable 
nor falsifiable in terms of scientific methodology. They are intractable 
even for the cultural sciences as envisaged by Weber m the tradition 
of Windelband and Rickert. 
One may grant that, to a certam extent, a value system and a socio 
cultural system can be comprehended by the Weberian method of 
ideal typical reconstruction and analysis. Yet the crucial difficulty of 
comparing different world-views m terms of a common language would 
remain：“The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of 
knowledge 1s that 1t must know that we cannot learn the meamng of 
the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must 
rather be in a position to create this meaning itself ”附
“The frmt of the tree of knowledge, which 1s distasteful to the 
complacent but which is, nonetheless, inescapable, consists in the 
insight that every smgle important activity and ultimately life as a 
whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but 
is mstead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions 
through which the soul as in Plato chooses its own fate, 1 e.,the 
meaning of its activity and existence叩＂
The gap between the value-rooted nature of socio cultural reality and 
the nature of social science as an aspect of rat10nahsalion, thus remains 
unbridged 
Science and History 
The question of value leads directly to the third dilemma: Science 
and History. Weber sees human history as the process of creation and 
maintenance of values by man：““Culture＇’ 1s a fmite segment of the 
meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human 
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beings confer meaning and significance.”＂邸 Weberhad accepted the 
d1stmctive nature of soc10logy as a cultural and histoncal science; he 
did not want to construct a natural science of sociology or history; even 
so the very idea of a histoncal science 1s a contradiction in terms, for 
science aims at establishing propositions of universal validity (Weber 
always adhered to this minimal explication of science), while history 
essentially is the realm of contingency 
Weber thought that this contradiction could be overcome. For this 
purpose he invented his famous method of ideal typical reconstruction 
and analysis of histoncal reality. To the same end he established the 
distinction between causal adequacy and meaning adequacy. However, 
there are three basic difficulties m transforming historical contingency 
into histoncal necessity - a transformation implied by any sociology 
of history."" Firstly, a theory of histoncal causality aims at aロdoften 
succeeds in isolating a set of factors given which the happenings of 
certain events becomes inteligible, or rationally comprehensible; 
however, it cannot be generalised in the form of: If‘X’then ’Y’. For 
this reason such a theory remains quite partial and defm1tely fals short 
of the paradigm of scientific causality. Moreover, it cannot be held 
adequate even otherwise, for it does not say，“smce X, therefore, Y，” 
that is, fals very much short of givmg the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the historical phenomena being studied In the Weberian 
framework, the sociologist can only say“Smce X', X'. x’therefore, Y is 
the most probable event” 
The second difficulty arises from the fact that there could be more 
than one ideal -typical reconstruction of the “same”phenomenon. The 
choice between two divergent ideal types cannot be made on any 
scientific basis. The fact that Weber does not believe m the existence 
of a universally valid hierarchy of values, eliminates the possibility of 
discovenng the true or fuly warranted ideal～type of a histoncal 
phenomenon. Another difficulty arises from the fact that in view of the 
Weberian thesis of the mutual incompatibility of certain value systems, 
the continmty between the ideaトtypesof different socio-cultural 
systems cannot be posited. But if this continuity is not assumed, only a 
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chronicle (if even that) would be possible - no“science”of history. 
In the light of this analysis of Weber’s response to what he 
considered to be his major challenge as an mtellectual, it seems that 
ultimately there could not be any resolution of the antithesis between 
the natural and the social or cultural sciences: an ant1thes1s rejected by 
Comte and Marx and bequeathed to Weber by Dilthey, Windelband and 
Rickert and the neo-Kantian tradition. 
Science and Soc1ology 
From this failure arises the fourth dilemma・ Science and Sociology. 
Weber defined sociology as a science which attempts an“mterpretive 
understanding of social action in order thereby to arnve at a causal 
explanation of its course and effects. In ’action' 1s included al human 
behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a 
sub1ective meaning to 1!. Action in thIS sense may be either overt or 
purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a 
situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention or 
passively acquiescing m the situation. Action is social in so far as, by 
virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual 
(or md1v1duals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and 1s 
thereby oriented m its course.”“旬
Now this celebrated defm1tion of sociology which includes Weber’s 
formal definition of “action”and “social action”gives nse to the 
following problem: If the aim of science is to arrive at universally valid 
propos1t旧国， andat the same time, the social sc1ent1hc propositions and 
generalisations are probabilistic, how is a science of “subjective 
meanings”at al possible? And if one does allow the possibility of a 
science of human action in terms of“subjective”meanings, do the 
meanings remain subjective in any significant sense of the term? 
Alternatively, and at a more general level, the dilemma 1s. If human 
action and social action and hence society are defined in natural terms, 
then the value creating role of man emphasised by Weber cannot be 
given any essential place in the soc10 cultural system, and, if social 
action and society are defined as value-rooted or value centred 
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phenomena, then no sociological theory of value is logically possible; 
and, if this be so, sociology is possible only as a metaphysically based 
hermeneutics. 
Weber based his definition of sociology on the distinction between 
Natur山日senschaften (which are supposed to be nomothetic) and 
Geisteswissenschaften (which are supposed to be idiographic)."" He 
naturally hoped that by developing a special logic for the historical 
"sciences”he could solve the above dilemma, it is doubtful if ultimately 
he had the satisfaction of havmg achieved the hoped for higher unity 
of the sciences of the spirit For Weber is aware that the distinction 
between the two sciences is not meant as an ultimate antithesis and 
hence a generic (minimal) meaning of science has to be common to 
both the 'sciences’（of nature and of spirit). 
Science, for Weber is an aspect of the process of rationalisation 
which is characteristic of modern Western societies In his great 
lecture，“Science as a Vocation”， there 1s a masterly and forthnght 
analysis of the nature of scientific work：“Sciemific work is chained to 
the course of progress.. ・・剛“Inscience, each of us knows that what 
he has accomplished wil be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years That 
is the fate to which science is subjected; it 1s the very meaning of 
scientific work ...叩＂ Weber goes on to observe: “Science today 1s a 
‘vocation’organized in special disciplines in the service of self-
clanf1cation and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of 
grace of seers and prophets d1spensmg sacred values and revelations, 
nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers 
about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the inescapable 
condition of our historical situation羽Tecannot evade 1t so long as we 
remain true to ourselves And if Tolstoi's question recurs to you: as 
science does not, who is to answer the question: 'What shall we do, 
and, how shall we arrange our livesγor, in the words used here 
tonight: ‘鴨川ichof wamng gods should we serve? Or should we serve 
perhaps an entirely different god, and who is he？’ then one can say 
that only a prophet or a sav10ur can give the answers If there is no 
such man, or If his message is no longer believed in, then you wil 
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certainly not compel htm to appear on this earth by havmg thousands 
of professors, as privileged hirelings of the state, attempt as petty 
prophets in their lecture rooms to take over his role. All they wil 
accomplish is toshow that they are unaware of .the decisive state of 
affairs: the prophet for whom so many of our younger generation yearn 
stmply does not exist. But this knowledge in its forceful significance 
has never become vital for them. The inward interest of a truly religi-
ously’musical’man can never be served by veiling to him and to others 
the fundamental fact that he ts destined to live ma godless and proph 
etless time by gtving him the ersatz of armchair prophecy The inte-
gnty of hts religious organ, it seems to me, must rebbel against this."1＂】
The deep pessimism, the near despair of the man who chooses to be 
a social scientist is unmtstakable here. That this implies the utter 
futility of (modern) sociology 1s clear to. Reflectmg on the essentially 
mcomplete nature of al science and its infinitely self-cancelling 
“progresstve”telos, Weber observes: “Every scientific 'fulfilment' raises 
new’questions', t asks to be ’surpassed' and outdated. Whoever wishes 
to serve science has to restgn himself to this fact. Scientific works 
certamly can last as‘gratifications’because of their artistic quality, or 
they may remam tmportant as a means of training. Yet they wil be 
surpassed scientifically - let that be repeated - for it is our 
common fate and, more, our common goal. We cannot work wtthout 
hoping that others wil advance further than we have. In principle, this 
progress goes on ad infinitum. And wtth this we come to inquire into 
the meaning of science For. after al, it ts not self-evtdent that 
something subordinate to such law is senstble and meaningful in tself. 
Why does one engage in doing something that m reality never comes, 
and never can come, to an end＇”問
Few statements could be more powerful or more unambiguous. Here 
Weber rejects both the autotelic and the aesthetic concepts of science. 
(The aesthetic is really a form of the autotelic.) Is Soc10logy then a 
policy science? By no means. It can never be the task of an empirical 
science, declares Weber，“to provide bmdmg norms and ideals from 
which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.＇剛
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Is Soc1ology then a“pure science”concerned only with the “truth” 
of a given socio-cultural reality? Perhaps; but certamly not on Weberian 
presuppositions. If, as Weber holds, values and meanings are human 
creations (and not transcendentally given), if truth represents only the 
ultimate choice of an ind1v1dual, 1f al comprehension is relative to a 
standpomt that.Is validated only in terms of a personal choice - then 
there can be no hope for sociology as a pure or formal science, m any 
case, not in an age of shattered and conflicting value-systems and al-
envelopmg anomy. (And yet sociology is the science of and for our 
“modern”age.)'"' 
It can now be seen how the antinomies of Science and History, 
Science and Sociology are simply major variations of Weber’S Core 
Dilemma: the one between the Intellectual as Sc1ent1st and the 
Intellectual as Metaphysician: or, to formulate it at another level, 
between Science as Anthropology and Science as Autology. 
Towards the end of his hfe Weber no longer believed that social 
science could ever resolve or transcend this dilemma, the ultimate 
predicament of modern man In one of his last lectures, he was 
thinking not of any future advances in the social sciences or in science 
and technology, but of a Kierkegaardian either/ or: not science but a 
new stoicism could be the solace, If not salvation, of the younger and 
commg generations. 
“羽Telive as did the ancients when their world was not yet 
disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. 
As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to 
Apollo, and, above al, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, 
so do we stil nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchant-
ed and denuded of its mystical but mwardly genuine plasticity Fate, 
and certamly not 'science’， holds sway over these gods and their 
struggles One can only understand what the godhead 1s for the one 
order or for the other, or better, what godhead is in the one or in the 
other order. With this understanding, however, the matter has reached 
its limit so far as it can be discussed m a lecture roam and by a 
professor Yet the great and vital problem that is contained therein is, 
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of course, very far from bemg concluded. But forces other than 
university chairs have their say in this matter. 
“What man wil take upon himself the attempt to’refute scientif1ca! 
ly’the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount? For instance, the sentence, 
’resist no evil，’ or the image of turning the other cheek? And yet it is 
clear, in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic of undigmfied 
conduct, one has to choose between the religious dignity 、叶1ichthis 
ethic confers and the digmty of manly conduct which preaches 
somethmg quite different; 'resist ev!l lest you be co-responsible for 
an overpowering evil.’According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is 
the devil and the other the God, and the mdividual has to decide which 
is God for him and which is the devil. And so it goes throughout al 
the orders of life. 
“The grandiose rat10nalism of an ethical and methodical conduct of 
life which flows from every religious prophecy has dethroned this 
polytheism in favour of the ‘one thing that is needful. ’Faced with the 
realities of outer and inner life, Christianity has deemed it necessary to 
make those compromises and relative Judgments, which we al know 
from its history. Today the routmes of everyday life challenge religion. 
Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and 
hence take the form of impersonal forces. They stnve to gain power 
over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one 
another. What 1s hard for modern man, and especially for the younger 
generation, is to measure up to workaday existence. The ubiquitous 
chase for ’experience’stems from this weakness; for it is weakness not 
to be able to countenance the stern senousness of our fateful times. 
“Our口vilizationdestines us to realize more clearly these struggles 
a呂田n,after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years -
blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive onentation towards the 
grandiose moral fervor of Christian ethics ”剛
With this clear and powerful statement made at the end of the First 
World War, Comtean sociology comes to an end. Weber shows that 
sociology cannot replace theology, it cannot provide a secular theodicy 
for the (Western} industrial-technological man, 1t cannot underwnte any 
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new system of morality designed for the needs of the new society 
Weber undermined the Comtean hope that sociology could eventually 
do for the First and last (true) universalism of the relativistic and 
realistic modern society what Thomism did for the Chnstiamty besieged 
as it was at this time, internally, by the increasing antithesis of Reason 
and Revelation and, externally, by the power of Islam and other 
Oriental religions His theory of science makes it very clear that any 
autotelic (or aesthetic) concept of social science wil not be self 
consistent and hence bound to break down sooner or later"" 
And yet in his personal hfe Weber continued to believe in the world 
historical destmy of the European Man. And this implies the 
universalism of the industrial-technological society. Perhaps he did 
accept this universalism, perhaps he did not believe in it; in any case, 
it was with resignation and not with any reassurance and enthusiasm 
that he thought of the future. Indeed, it was with the deepest anguish 
that he saw the double face of rat10nalisat10n and he could not but see 
the anomic and dehumanising forces as central rather than peripheral 
to the modern socio cultural system. 
If the encyclopaedic scholarship of Weber thus failed to provide a 
scientific kerygma and a positive sociological summa, it does not mean 
a personal failure, no, not by any means. It means simply and clearly 
that so口alscience henceforward could only be social cnt1c1sm （“Cntical 
Theory』’）， if even that, for sound so口alcriticism assumes an accepted 
(or a projected unanimous) philosophy. The days of “positive 
philosophy”are over (that is, if it was not still-born) 
More ominously, Weber's pessimism reflects the progressive 
weakening of the e Ian that had sustained so long the social science 
W eltanschauung agamst its mner contradictions and strains 
More than half-a-century separates Weber’s time from our own. And 
these decades have been the time when sociology has steadily and 
rapidly grown，“matured”and, accordmg to many of its protagonists, 
has, indeed，‘come of age’Except for the last decade, any talk of a 
crisis in sociology (to say nothing of its end) would have sounded 
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eccentric, even crazy. In fact, in 1970 Gouldner talks only of the 
coming crisis of Western Soctology and he is mainly concerned about a 
minor system, the Parsonian. 
The anguish of Weber's later thinking left no significant trace on 
mainstream sociology as it developed m America and England in the 
post war (1918) period. Only faint echoes, if any, survtve of the 
disenchantment and despair, of the insensittVtty and excess of a sensate 
culture, of the schism in the soul of man Latter day soctologies 
reflect, m various direct and oblique ways, the litle personal faiths of 
Weber, Sorokin and Toynbee: recovery of the greatness of Germany, of 
a renaissance of creative altruism, of the renewal of Chnstiamty and a 
new communion of Saints al variations of old, faded Comtean 
motifs. 
The development of sociology between the two明1orldWars and 
particularly after World War I is a strange phenomenon. The utterly 
shattering expenence of the War tself, of Hiroshima, of its forgetting 
and principial trivialisation; of Auschwitz, of the Cold War and the race 
for asymmetry of nuclear terror, of impending ecological disaster -
nothing finds a central or structural expression in mainstream 
soc10logtcal thinking There are, of course, technical discussions of 
nuclear symmetry and the balance of terror, of“post-modern”and 
“post industrial society”， of “post -culture”，“counter-culture”， of 
“consciousness three”， of “genetic revolutton”， of the “passage to the 
solar age”一 andal that. No thinking, no human concern; only a 
Guermantes politeness叫
Indeed, sociology systematically underplays, regularises and domes 
ticates the terrifying, world des(roying novelty of nuclear technology, in 
spite of ts faith in the absolute uniqueness of modernity. Huge 
academic and journalistic energies are bent to assimilate the rise of 
cosmocidal nuclear power to previous technological revolutions: the 
invention of the gunpowder, the discovery of agriculture! Ecocatastro-
phe? But that is only a transitional (and believe it or not a 
transient) problem. “I suggest that we are m the midst of a transition 
phase to an ecological age, characterised by an ecological world view, 
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the outlines of which are being articulated in the natural sciences, the 
social sciences, and in philosophy and religious thought. ”＂＂ What more 
could one desire? We are m the best of hands, mdeed, in omnipotent 
hands: so we must stop worrymg and start living agam. 
The deliberate barbarity of wanton, indiscriminate nuclear bombing, 
the diabolic nonchalance of the destruct10n of a whole city and the 
maiming of untold generations of survivors・ the sm of Hiroshima is 
forgotten rather quickly by the “victor”and the victim alike. Is there a 
subtle even obscene collusion between the two' Or is it that Mammon-
and-Modernity must ride roughshod over our humanity? 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima, it is true, cannot be brought within the 
realm of speech and reason. But what we experience is not beyond the 
reach of memory Perhaps we do not want to remember, we like to be 
deaf to the dire warnings which 'would’dwell around and within us 1f
we did not exorcise, with professionally perfected tnv1alising strategies, 
tormenting wailings rising from unremembered necropolises. 
“The sin of Hiroshima": but no such phrase is perm1ss1ble: the idea 
and the word‘sin’are under an inviolable tabco under the regime of 
modernity: it wil have to be erased by the reader. And if the holocaust 
of Hiroshima cannot be named in any other way, so be it. It shall 
remain nameless. (And no sm, no wrath, no mercy）剛
The end of formal and pohtical imperialism and the emergence of 
America and Soviet Russia as nuclear superpowers made the success 
of modernisation of the under developed “third world”the major 
(perhaps the only) concern of Euro-American sociology. This is no less 
true of the peripheral, parasitic, subordinate copybook of Non Euro 
American social sciences. They are wholly dominated by development-
modernisation (or “scientific” socialist revolutionism) and show, 
accordingly, a vehement, overweening concern missionary at its 
best, mercenary mostly for “emancipation”from trad1t10nahsm. The 
importance, if any, of this vernacular social science is confined to their 
possible use as“ethnographical matenal”by the European or Amencan 
social sc1enlist. 
Even Europe has to“modernise”itself; and the question whether this 
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means the “Americanisation of Europe”assumes great importance in 
the context of Weber’s prognosis of our times.“Modernisation”is the 
mode m which modernity’S 1mpenal universalism finds its latest 
expression. It works as a substitute for the lost e Ian of Western man 
and helps him to falsify his experience of the War and blunt the tragic 
sense of the “progress”of modern civilisation.叫 Atdifferent levels and 
in various ways. sociology to-day reflects and reinforces this “new” 
modern1smg consciousness 
If our analysis of Weber’s paradigmatic dilemmas is reasonably 
sound, it would, by no means, be far fetched to claim that Weber had 
been aware of the paradox, the irony and the huge 1mpenal violent 
implications of the fact that the life line, the sustenance-system of the 
theory and practice of modermty was constituted by the imperial 
practice and ideology of progress-modernisation. It is from this progress 
ideology and the global domination of the practice of modernisation 
that modernity gained its “moralぺ“intellectual”andpoht1cal energy; 
1ust as it built its cybernetic immunity system against internal 
contradictions on the global "success”of its modernisation pro1ect. 
Weber was keenly sensitive to the depth of the fals1fication of 
consc旧usnessthe paradox of modernisation engenderd. A calm and 
uncanmly clear sighted, eminently responsible thinker, a prophetic 
master of sociological thought, it was Weber’s fate to preside over its 
demise. He died an unhappy man at the height of his powers. 
The development of the idea and the institution of the welfare state 
after World War I isclosely connected with the character of recent 
sociology, especially the directions and forms it takes after World明far
I. The welfare state creates for the sociologist a situat10n m which he 
has to make a radical decision・ either he works for the destruction of 
the (liberal) industrial technolo耳目alsociety, in which case the whole of 
modern sociology becomes irrelevant and has to be renounced; or he 
works for the strengthening of the welfare state, in which case he 
becomes essentially a“social engineer", or more correctly, a public 
relations expert for the state. Placed m this situation, we, the 
sociologists of the post-Weber time are like litle proletanan Orianes. 
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Aren’t we？叩
I Darkness Descends upon a Floodlighted World 
It is time to see the truth. We, so口alscientists, are litle proletarian 
Orianes; indeed, rather worse: unlike society ladies and aristocratic 
hostesses and the members of their salons whose masks are nearly 
transparent, ours are dense, dark, sinister. 
It is not, however, a question of our littleness, the malady is far 
deeper: it is an aspect of what may be seen as the Second Fal・ the 
Advent of Modernity which founds itself on the abolition of sin and, 
accordingly, the ehmination of the very distinction between good aロd
evil. Advent proclaims the certainty of the rising of modern man to 
Innocence through the self-mediated project of man achieving 
“scientific”omniscience間
We ignore that“Man has not been able to describe himself as a 
configuration in the episteme without thought at the same time 
discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in 
its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert 
density in which it is embedded, an unthought which it contains 
entirely, yet in、vhichit is also caught，。均
An earher source is Soren Kierkegaard (1813 1855) who in his own 
way was drawing on traditional wisdom：“The supreme paradox of al 
thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot 
thmk. This passion is at bottom present in al thmkmg, even in the 
thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in 
something transcending himself. But habit dulls our sensibilities, and 
prevents us from perceiving it.”＂＇〕
Kierkegaard’s thinking here is, of course, theo-philosophical and 
contra-modernity, while Foucault (1926-1984) wntes as a philosophico-
historical scholar and thinker He is an archaeologist of knowledge 
(whatever that may mean) critiquing modern civilisat10n from within; 
however, by virtue of the syntax of his situation he does not escape 
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the metaphysical echoes of his language and style. Yet it is important 
that he decides to remain within the confines of modern hubristic 
homocentric thought Let us then return to Kierkegaard who rightly 
notes the mighty indomitable force of habit; at this point, Foucault, 
perhaps in spite of himself, meets his predecessor with his "an 
apparently inert density”， m which thougth "is embedded” 
This deadening of our sensibilities, this habitual non perception of the 
other, the “unthought”， this dogged, mag1stenal obliviousness to the 
darker side of man, that which remains non-manifest in al existence: 
this insens山vityarises from the betrayal of our gift of reflexive 
intelligence; a betrayal that is one of the cardinal virtues of modernity 
In consequence, our age is founded on the trivialisation of the Other, a 
kmd of systematic underground operation which is the precondition of 
the nse and development of the natural sciences as also of the so-
called so口alsciences. The trivialisation of the Other (the interim form 
of the abolition of the Other, and the construction of a monist1c 
universe) takes the form of dem1urgic science (that is oriented to 
omniscience and omnipotence) and, at the level of口vilisation,of social 
“science”and the imperial mission of modernity: Europeamsat1on of the 
Earth/ globalisation of scientific socialism. (Globalisation of Euro-
American modernity／“scientific”revolutionary s凹 ialismis an internal 
necessity, the entelechy of modern man following from the theory of 
“autogenesis”of (modern) man which implies the elimination of the 
Other. The rise of Hitlerism, the c.ontmumg tnv1ahsat1on, even silence 
on the Holocaust and Hiroshima are some of the aspects of the wilful 
and proud self-alienation of man from his Source alone and afraid m a 
world he never made. No, modern man wil make a new world eo ipso 
free of al darkness, without an Other.）＂匂
The abolished Other, however, does appear in the social sciences as 
the twin problematic of (a) Reas叩パJnreason(Thought/ Unthought), 
and (b) Rationalisation and Disenchantment. But given the abysmal 
conditions of its ongm, it is a doomed problematic. 
In SainトSimon(1760-1825), Comte (1798-1857) and Durkheim (1858 
1917), it is not centrally themat1sed. This is, firstly, because of their 
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evolutionism and, secondly, because of the pseudo kerygamat1c 
evangelical perspective of their sociology and philosophy of history 
which, of course, is mconsistent with their evolutionism (unless 
evolutionism be a surrogate for denied Chnstianity). The problematic of 
the sentimental aspect of man (a pos江ivisationand psychologisation of 
the problem of irrationality) in Samt Simon and Comte (and the 
corresponding cal for New Christianity and the proclamation of the 
Religion of Humanity) are problems and pathologies of their central 
problem, viz. the foundation of social solidanty. They are thus only 
indirectly concerned with the profounder aspect of Unreason, the 
problem of so口alsolidarity itself having been reduced to the discovery 
or invention of a new basis of homogeneity, a new level of interde-
pendence of the parts of a plurality. This comes out more clearly in 
Durkheim who sees anomie as the central malady of modernity and 
industrial society and proposes organic solidarity as a replacement for 
the lost mechanical solidarity based on likeness. 
While devoting substantial attention to what he cals non-logical 
conduct which he sees as of the greatest importance to sociology 
-Pareto (1848 1923) defines it only negatively as a residual category 
with logical conduct and logico experimental theories officially in the 
centre Furthermore, it is not conduct （“action”in Parsons' terminolo 
gy) itself that Pareto analyses; he studies “：nductively”non scientific 
and non-logico-experimental theories and analyses them into a constant 
and a variable part called Residues and Derivations The non scientific 
theory itself is called a Derirative. (One may question this formulation 
on the ground that there are several statements in Pareto supporting 
the view that sentiments or subhmmal psychic states are at the root of 
both non-logical conduct and the various non-scientific theories 
supportmg and Justifying them: these psychic states, later given the 
technical name of Residues, are the constants remaining mvariant as 
the matrix of the various forms of non-logical conduct and non-
scientific theones (Derivations). The present interpretation too has, of 
course, ample textual support m Pareto It is preferred here (though the 
occasion excludes documentation) because, as wil be shown, it accords 
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better with his scientific credo and methodology.) 
A theory of so口etal eqwlibrium (and its disturbance) is then 
constructed mainly in terms of the political dynamics of Residues with 
Force and Fraud (manipulation) in the role of mediators and an Eltte 
class, founded on the natural mequality of man, using it in a perpetual 
power game, the rules of which and the conditions of victory or defeat 
therein Parettan sociology explored m great detail. 
Pareto certamly postulated non-logical thought and conduct as 
central to social and historical existence and accordingly he based his 
scientific universahsm (almost al posトscholasticEuropean universalisms 
have been scientific-technological) on the non-logicality of human 
“nature”， the psychic states (which are seen by Pareto as infra-
rational) determine, simultaneously and in a complex dialectic, bath the 
variety of non logical forms of human conduct and the different forms 
of non-logical thought that accompanied them pretending to be both 
their cause (or motivating force) and justification. These psychic states 
are constants that can be scientifically inventonsed. The scientific 
gaze, Pareto clarifies, can never observe the “psychic states’， 
themselves in any direct manner, scientifically they are primitive 
postulates justified by their manifestation in both conduct and thinking 
neither which, again, can be faced directly by science (logic and 
experiment) as they are in themselves. That is why m order to save 
the central distmction between science and metaphysics Pareto in his 
more formal exposition has to make Residues the invariant components 
of non scientific theories the unobservable psychic states have to be 
precluded from a causal role in order to steer clear of a metaphysical 
ontology. Non logical conduct, residues and derivations can be brought 
within the scope of science as“residual”and only under pam of a 
double paradox: (a) that it is a science not of what and how things/ 
phenomena are but of what and how they are not an historical form 
of human Reason being the measure of al things: of those that are and 
those that are not; and (b) that to this science of the observable 
phenomena of non logical action and thought the never-observable, 
forever incomprehensible “psychic states，” arbitrarily so named, are 
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absolutely indispensable; it is not a question of a hypothesis that can be 
tested, nor can the Paretian concept of residues/psychic states be 
seen analogically as catalysts that can be discarded after the theory of 
non-logical conduct has been formed. In other words, in the name of 
science Pareto is founding a“counter science'，’ a descnpt1on Foucault 
proposes for psycho analysis, ethnology and structural linguistics. (It is 
being used here, perhaps, in an opposite sense, to refer to a Discourse 
that damages itself while doing v10lence to its objects; however, it is 
not impossible that Foucault uses“counter-science'' with an irony 
raised to the second power.) 
VIifredo Pareto cultivated a scientist’s (and perhaps personal as well) 
insensitivity to these fatal paradoxes. It seems there was an impelling, 
if not an imperial, need for him to be steadfast m mai叫ainingthe 
centrality of log1co-experimental reason unperturbed even by the 
sacrifice of invention, innovat10n and a good part of technology to the 
domain of residues (of combinat旧n);worse even, the very i Ian vital 
of modern scientific research, viz., the quest for knowledge for its own 
sake (the Christian sin of idle curiosity) wil have to be given over to 
the realm of the non logical (agam, residues of combination) His whole 
“scientific enterprise”culminates in the theory of societal equilibrium 
constructed on the basis of the theory of residues together with a few 
other theses: social stratification, circulation of the elite and cyclic 
relationship between the rise and fal of the bases (residues) of socio 
political power. Not surprisingly, the theory of so口etaleqmhbnum is 
founded on Pareto’s “demonstration” of the organic (or more 
accurately, the socio logical) necessity of force and fraud in society and 
history Indeed, given Pareto’s cratology or the general theory of atelic 
(or autotelic), cyclical nature of socio political power, given the 
subordination of the economic realm to the political, the realm of 
rational social action becomes empty. If yet the fa江hin the centrality 
of scientific Reason remains intact, 1t is indeed a non-logical phenome 
non, for the proletarian, apolitical persona of the scientist as a supra 
mundane observer is too thm, too powerless to save the situation. 
Be that as it may, it is not in the inventor of a sociology, or more 
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accurately a“logtco experimental science”of non-logical conduct and 
of the role of force and fraud in society and history that one finds a 
responsible, professional sensttivity to the “unavotdable quality”of the 
zygotic pamng of Reason and Unreason That sensttiv1ty 1s to be 
found, perhaps for the first time in modern soctology, in Pareto's much 
younger contemporary, Max Weber (1864 1920) who finally comes to 
realise that the triumphs of Rationalisation in world htstory by no 
means succeed in marginaltsmg “Irrationality”and he sees this truth 
not m spite of hts undisputed sc1entiftc temper and wil but because of 
them. 
In Weber, the Reas叩パJnreas叩 dichotomy,in truth, Irrationality, 
becomes crucial, 1f not central. lrrattonaltty 1s stil not granted a fully 
independent, equal and coeval status in relation to Rattona!tty. And yet 
Weber is prepared to face the problem of History as if Unreason were 
the key to the htstorico-analyt1cal understanding of the Present One 
finds this in Comte, Durkheim and Marx too, a major difference, 
however, is that unlike Comte and Durkhetm, Weber did not aspire to 
be the pope or the “Grand Rabbi”of the Present as the Future; and 
radtcally departing from Marx, he did not believe that he could and 
hence ought to break the code of the Future in a grand mateutic 
enterpnse towards the birth of the Revolution as the demiurge: indeed, 
as an intellectual Weber convincmgly declined both the prophetic and 
demiurgic vocations which define modernity and Marx. This refusal 
explains Weber's stoically resigned stance towards modern European 
口vilisationand its universalism and definitively distingutshes him from 
Marx and his (pseudo) kerygmatic eschatology. 
This flows directly from Weber’s concept of Rationalisation as the 
basis of his analytical-interpretative history of the Present (capitalist 
modernity). In Weber’s theory of history, of whtch the history of world 
religions 1s a substantial and most important part, the process and 
procedure of Rationalisation is at the same time a process of 
disenchantment of the world and the loss of freedom and meaning for 
the citizens. His encyclopaedic survey and penetrating analyses reveal (a) 
that the scope and competence of the processes and proceedings of 
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rat10nahsation are hmited to external relationships, in other words, 
rationalisation is effective in the domain of relationships between man 
and nature, between man and artifacts, between thmgs and things, and 
between man and man, insofar as the relat旧nshipscan be completely 
functionalised; (b) that this leaves out the spheres of human relationship 
as such and also, far more importantly, man’S relationship with the 
Divme (the Transcendent, the Absolute, the Atemporal) as a residue, 
with no officially recognised science equipped or designed to thematrse 
them. Thus the spheres of meanmg and value and man’s affective life 
represent the ultimate resistance to rationalisation It follows that the 
unique or specific coherence of the realm of values is outside the 
coherence of a scientific system, that is, outside science itself, 
including Geisteswissenschaften (for it is outside Rationahty), in other 
words, it cannot be fully understood and explamed. If, therefore the 
realm is “incoherent", science qua science cannot bring about 
coherence: “The elder Mil, whose philosophy I wil not praise 
otherwise, was on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from 
pure experience, one arrives at polytheism. This IS shallow m 
formulation and sounds paradoxical. and yet there is truth in it. If 
anything, we realize again today that somethmg can be sacred not only 
m spite of its not being beautiful. but rather because and in so Jar as 
it is not beautiful. You wil find this documented in the fifty-third 
chapter of the book of Isaiah and in the twenty first Psalm. And, since 
Nietzsche, we realize that somethmg can be beautiful. not only m spite 
of the aspect in which it is not good, but rather in that very aspect. 
、Youwil find this expressed earlier in the Fleurs du mal, as Baudelaire 
named his volume of poems. It is commonplace to observe that 
something may be true although it is not beautiful and not holy and 
not good. Indeed it may be true m precisely those aspects. But al 
these are only the most elementary cases of the struggle that the gods 
of the various orders and values are engaged in. I do not know how 
one might wish to decide’scientifically’the value of French and 
German culture; for here, too, different gods struggle with one other, 
now and for al time to come.”問
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There are other sources of irrationality: Nature and, more specifically, 
the contingency inherent in al reality; man’s affective life; and, the 
reality of power and the individual’s relat10n to it (Weber sees power as 
the ability to impose one’S wil over the other/s). The most disturbing 
working of irrationality is certainly to be seen in the heteronomy of the 
realm of values, and Weber is acutely aware of it. And no les 
important, there 1s what Weber calls ethical irrationality which 
appears, firstly, in the form of antinom1es arising from pursumg both 
justice and equality or, within the realm of justice, where commutative 
and distributive justice may not necessanly harmonise; and secondly, in 
the form of an antagonism the possible incommensurability between 
an ethical intent10n and the ethically undesirable consequences following 
from the realisation of the mtention. This, of course, is a profound 
dilemma not confined to any specific realm of human action, for al 
action initiates an infinite and irreversible chain of consequences and m 
a means end model of action the (purposive) rationality of human 
action fails to be more than a matter of chance and pragmatic 
decision Since ethical conduct is a part of the general human action, 
the heteronomy of values and possible irrationality of ethical action are 
bound up with each other. However, since human action, qua human, 
presupposes an ontology, the value 1rrationality is perhaps more 
fundamental; in other words, what is really disturbing for Weber is 
ontological irrationality; that is why Weber sees man’s expenence of the 
Irrational as the driving force of al religions. Julien Freund is, 
therefore, certainly right when he says：“Despite the superficial progress 
they have brought about in al fields of human act1V1ty, rationalization 
and mtellectualization have made no inroads on the empire of the 
irrational. On the contrary, as rationalization increases, the irrational 
grows m mtensity. This 1s a key idea of Weber’s, and, although he 
never stated it m so many words, it dommates his entire philoso-
＂”。 ηpny. 
In a remarkable msight Professor Freund tels us not only about a 
dilemma central to Weber’s thought: 1t is the unresolved dilemma, 
antmomy, (appearing under many different guises) in al modern 
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Western thought, especially in the social scientific d1sc1plines The issue 
1s this: For the intellectual appropriation (and mastery) of the world 
(man, society and history), its totahsat10n is a sine qua non; or else the 
un mastered wil be a constant threat to the mastered segment of the 
world both in thought and practice. Smce the world is structured m 
unavoidable, antithetical dualities and doubles (both m time and space), 
almost the only method for modern scientific intellectuality-rationality is 
to treat. at the level of theory the other (in this case the negative) of 
the pair as a residue; and at the level of praxis, to repress, oppress, 
ehmmate it. Indeed, the method of residues is a theory (and practice) 
of domination eventually of poht1cal totalitarianism. I thmk there are 
strictly logical grounds why any such theoretical and historical 
programme and process must fail. If the Other is a Residue what is 
its raison d’S tre' This question IS never asked by modern science 
because the descriptive term "residue” is a deliberately misleading 
elhpSis, more plainly, a deception. A residue 1s (a) what has been 
apparently successfully, residuahsed, or (b) what will be successfully 
residualised (that is why Weber saw the process, especially the 
programme of rat10nahsation as essentially utopian and hence the well-
known paradox of the built-in progressive obsolescence of al 
rationalisation and science）.間 However,1f the programme of residuahsa-
tion succeeds, eventually al dualities and doubles would be eliminated 
(whatever that may mean) for in a scientific system a residue, when 
not programmat1cally thematised, must be eliminated: either as a 
residual concept or as a phenomenon. Thus the very structure of 
reality, the constitution of the umverse would stand fundamentally 
altered. However, it is a strange triumph: the science and technology 
creating this new earth and new heaven would thereby be rendermg 
itself irrelevant, obsolete; for the new transparent, shadowless universe 
may need a new science; or may not - who knows! If, as Weber 
insightfully notes, the triumphs of rat10nalisation have not and cannot 
necessarily diminish the scope, power and quality of the irrational; if, in 
other words, the domains of Reason and Unreason are related but 
neither dependent nor inter-dependent with reference to each other 
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a Foucauldian insight anticipated but not followed by Weber - and tf 
this is odd, distressing and problematic (not to say actionable), it is 
surely because of the ma)Or but not always explicit assumption of the 
Plenitude of Reason (and Science) the most talked about self 
awareness of science of its own limits (mark, limits not limitations) is 
just irrelevant, for without the presumption of its Plenitude, scientific 
research could never have its great programme of contmuous raids on 
the !national. Again, it is not only the instrumental but al Weberian 
rationalittes that are in question here including value rationality. 
But human reason does not have unbounded scope; 1t 1s not a 
Plenitude (a clumsy expression which may be forgiven). The angst and 
awe, the alienation and remembrance ansmg from the awareness of 
this Absence have been man’s perennial source of his quest for 
knowledge and love, 1t 1s modern science that shor卜口rcu1tsand 
idolises this quest by displacmg Plenitude in favour of omnipotence 
(and omniscience). Though not synonymous, Plenitude, Omniscience and 
Omnipotence belong to the same idea fam!ly They are al self 
contradictory; or, in any case, unintelligible. Traditional thinking, in the 
last analysis, acknowledges this and accepts these ideas in their 
incomprehension Using them centrally and indispensably, modern 
science does not offic1ally acknowledge them thematically and hence 
can not confront them methodically. Modern science substitutes the 
tdea of Plenitude by omnipotence (also by omniscience) because it is 
more plausible to use the omnipotence idea in an incremental 
cumulative sense for it can be backed up by the glamour of technolog 
犯alwonders and triumphs The syntax and logic of Plenitude make it 
far more difficult to operationalise it in programmatic terms. (The 
epistemological imperative for this displacement arises from a perverse 
acceptance of the otherwise valid Vico Principle. This will not be 
discussed here.) 
Between the present of the triumphal march of increasing power of 
technology (matenal and social-cultural, e. g，“computerised”，“electron 
icぺ“cybernetic”society)and science (natural mathematical and social 
and cultural mcluding Foucauldian counter-sciences), and the future of 
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projected and incomprehensible omnipotence (and omniscience) fals the 
dark, menacing shadow of omnivorous, polymorphous violence. The 
unwarranted unreal residualisation of irrationality necessarily turns the 
process and plan of rationalisation into a collision of two irrationalities, 
the teleology of Rationalisation and Scient1f1c Research as a programme 
of omnipotence and omniscience on the one hand, and Nature, human 
Irrationality and structural social contradictions on the other. Peace 
between the two ts out of the question as long as we are unwilling to 
see the truth of Reason and Unreason: as coborn, brothers behind the 
scene, the double face of the Uncreate as Manifestation. Except we 
face this transcendent truth, we can achieve only the kind of victory 
modern man has won over Nature with al its miracles and super 
benefits, man’s conquest of Nature culminates m the deepening 
imminence of total cosmic destruction via ecological and nuclear crises. 
Scholars of Weber acknowledge that Weber became increasingly 
convinced of the hopelessness of modern civilisation and the irrelevance 
of established social sciences.“ his deep belief, which he expressed 
more than once in his studies“The ObJect1v1ty of Knowledge”and 
“Politics as a Vocat旧n，” wasthat life and the world are fundamentally 
irrational.吋＂ Habermas is no less clear that Weber saw the master 
historical process of rationalisation culmmatmg destructively：“If one 
represents the systematic content of the Z山ischenbetrachtungin this 
way, it becomes clear that Weber’s intuitions pomt m the direction of a 
selective pattern of rationalization, a jagged profile of modernization. 
Yet Weber speaks of paradoxes and not of the partial character of 
societal rationalization. In his view, the real reason for the dialectic of 
rationalization is not an unbalanced institutional embodiment of 
available cognitive potentials, he locates the seeds of destruction of the 
rationalization of the world in the very differentiation of independent 
cultural value spheres that released that potential and made that 
rationalization possible. 円叫
Weber's understanding (or maybe, we should say awareness) of the 
prevalence of Irrationality m life and the world was clear and profound 
he saw it not only as historical prevalence, as a kmd of quantitative 
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balance against Rationality, but as one of the most s1g即日cantaspects 
of the ontology of human history (the sphere of meaning and order he 
saw as an island in an ocean of chaos); he was fully aware of the 
essential failure of the process (or plan) of rationalisation, its impact on 
the domam of trrattonality being margmal More radically, he saw the 
emergence of modern culture with a supposedly autonomous domain as 
a consequence of the displacement of the domams of religion by the 
modern project of inaugurating and consolidating the rule of science 
and Rationalisation and he viewed this development almost wholly 
negatively: “Science has created this cosmos of natural causality and 
has seemed unable to answer with certainty the questton of ts own 
ultimate presuppositions. Nevertheless science, in the name of 
’mtellectual integrity,' has come forward with the claim of representing 
the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world The mte!Iect, 
like al culture values, has created an aristocracy based on the 
possession of ratwnal culture and mdependent of al personal ethical 
qua!tties of man. The aristocracy of intellect is hence an unbrotherly 
aristocracy. Worldly man has regarded this possession of culture as the 
highest good. In addition to the burden of ethical guilt, however, 
somethmg has adhered to this cultural value which was bound to 
depreciate it with stil greater fina!ty, namely, senselessnessー－ifthis 
cultural value is to be judged in terms of its own standards. ”山
This is the end (both culmination and death) not only of Comtean-
Durkheimian but of Marxian sociology as well, for the latter is sustained 
precisely by those combmat1ons of positivism and eschatology, evolution 
and revolutton, history and science, chemistry and alchemy that Weber 
has shown to be so unscientific, ilogical and unhistorical; in any case, 
they are re1ected m his thought. Here I do not wish to raise the 
question of the lessons modern man is expected to draw from the 
second grand disenchantment (indeed, disenchantment raised to the 
second power) announced (kerygmatica!ly?) by Weber. I wish to raise a 
more immediate though perhaps no less important question: How is it 
that from his insight about the non residual nature of irrationali旬、;veber does not go forward to a Kierkegaardian or, at the least, to the 
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Foucauldian insight (quoted at the beginning of this Part)' Surely he 
cannot be unaware of the positive form of the truth he chose to 
formulate in a negative or neutral form. 
One could perhaps say that the question, as far as Weber is 
concerned, rs unimportant if not already answered. With the Whole 
ruptured and fragmented once for al, it is a matter of an ultimate 
choice; given the reign of the New Polytheism, which god one worships 
rs entirely one’s own choice: as Freund puts it, ultimately one has to 
choose between Prometheus and Epimetheus. But this rs hardly 
helpful・ between two absolutes or ultimates there is no real choice, 
mdeed, the logic of choice precludes this. Weber rs not unaware of 
this, nor is it very likely that he failed to see the schizophrenia both 
logical and existential built into hrs celebrated theory of value 
neutrality (wertfreiheit); one could even go so far as to suggest that 
the irony of the proposal was not unintentional. The methodology and 
pedagogy of value/ethical-neutrality can be seen as a protective 
device against acute schizophrenia Perhaps, its prophylactic efficacy 
wrl depend upon whether it makes sense to speak of personal ch01ce 
of convictions which are against 叩 e’s own rational/ scientific 
views (convictions?) and whose grounds are either unstable or 
incommensurate with rationality This is apart from the theorem 
defended in the note on Durkheim showing that the concept of choice 
(and choosing) does not apply to ultimate situat10ns. In any case, the 
crucial practical question remains: can the method - or shall we say 
the ethics of value neutrality effectively insulate the theoretical and 
the practical domams from each other and thus successfully keep the 
man and the scientist almost wholly apart? And if it can, what could 
possibly be the secret of rts power, the ground of the ethics of value 
and ethical-neutrality? Perhaps the question cannot be asked for the 
SC町rtist/professormust already be“a moral person”（or, shall we say, 
moral entity) before he can stnve for value and ethical neutrality. 
Or else scientific value-cum ethical neutrality would only too easily 
serve the modern scientist -"intellectual” as an ultra -powerful 
ideological weapon for al manner of high and low opportunism, 
Max Web" and the End of Comtean Sodology 33 
enabling him at the same ttme to ignore truth at wil - even when it 
is his own discovery. Again, under the disguising and “dtgmfted”shteld 
of pure value-neutral science, he can be an accomplice in any kmd of 
violent and deep explottattve plans of the powerful. Now it is of 
central importance to see that in subtle subterranean way sctenttfic 
“objectivity”and value cum ethical neutrality has been ilicitly, 
indefensibly, transformed into a meta value; into an Absolute (indeed, 
mto an omnipotent, all-forgiving God). 
In Reason and the Rationalization of Society ( Vol. I of his two 
volume work, The Theory of Communicative Action) Habermas 
concludes his erudite and ful length study of Weber’s theory of 
Rationalisation with what is perhaps intended as a definittve cntique of 
Weber’s theory of modern civilisation along with that of Horkheimer 
and Adorno who, m an important sense, contmue the Webenan 
tradition. Noting that Weber speaks of paradoxes of societal rationalisa 
tion rather than of parttal rat10nahsatton, Habermas observes: “This idea 
retains a certain plausibility only so long as Weber does not take mto 
account, with respect to the moral practical complex of rationality, a 
form of the rehgtous ethic of brotherlmess seculanzed at the same 
level as modern science and autonomous art, a communicative ethic 
detached from its foundation in salvation religion, that is, so long as he 
remains generally fixated instead on the relations of tenston between 
religion and the world.”山
Secondly, Habermas pomts out that“In Weber’s theory of rationaliza-
tion the development of law occupies a place as prominent as t is 
ambtguous. The ambiguity consists in the fact that the rationalization 
of law makes possible or seems to make posstble both the 
mstitut旧nalizationof purposive rational economic and administrative 
action and the detachment of subsystems of purposive rational action 
from their moral-practical foundations，山 Habermasgoes on to observe 
that whtle t could be argued, as Weber did, that “m consequence of 
the shaking of religious faith, ethical action orientations can no longer 
be rehably reproduced”， it would not have much force in the case of 
modern law which arose“from the start in secularized form”.＂ To 
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obviate this diff1cu!ty, Habermas thinks, Weber reinterprets modern Jaw 
in a way that it is “detached from that evaluative sphere and can 
appear from the start as an mstitutional embodiment of cognitive-
instrumental rationality”・＇＂＇ 
It is not possible to go into the details of Habermas’argument 
designed to show why Weber’s almost completely negative verdict on 
modern science and civihsat1on is not meluctable and can be explamed 
as the culmination of crucial misdirections in his analysis Proceeding to 
Adorno who was a major - almost a father figure of critical theory 
一Habermasmakes the following fundamental pomt against what can 
informally be called the Weber-Adorno theory：“The reception of 
Weber’s theory of rationalization from Lukacs to Adorno makes it clear 
that the rationalization of society has constantly been thought of as a 
re1fication of consciousness. The paradoxes to which this leads show, 
however, that this theme cannot be adequately treated with the 
conceptual means of the philosophy of consciousness . Whereas the 
problematic of rationalization/reification lies along a“German”line of 
social-theoretical thought determined by Kant and Hegel, and leadmg 
from Marx through Weber to Lukacs and crilical theory, the paradigm 
change that interests me was prepared by George Herbert Mead and 
Emile Durkheim. Mead (1863-1931) and Durkheim (1858-1917) belong, 
like Weber (1864→1920}, to the generation of the founding fathers of 
modern sociology. Both developed basic concepts m which Weber’s 
theory of rationalization can be taken up and freed from the aporias of 
the philosophy of consciousness: Mead with his communication 
theoretic foundation of sociology, Durkheim with his theory of social 
solidarity that interrelates social integration and system integration ”柵
Freeing Weber’s theory of rationalisation from the aporias of the 
philosophy of consciousness along with restoring critical theory after its 
ruination by Adorno is of course the indispensable negat1ve-histoncal 
aspect of the grand messianic task Habermas has assumed with the 
new Kerygma of the communicative model for the Phoenix-like 
resurrection of modern Western civilisation. It 1s a measure of 
Haber mas’intellectual stature that he realises straightaway that 
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Comtean-Durkheimian sociology ts the modern soc1ology, that it be呂田S
to be destroyed in Weber and that the destruction is completed by 
Adorno with reference to Marx and critical theory; and finaly, that if 
modern Western civilisation along with its supportmg tdeology ts to be 
saved and renewed, nothmg short of a revival of Durkheimian sociology 
renovated with the latest language philosophy and ling山stictheory wil 
do. By the same token it is a sign of the darkness of our time and the 
poverty of our mainstream social-scientific tradition that those who 
have the greatness to see the true nature of modern civilisation and 
realise that its fate is sealed, do not have the magnamm1ty to offer 
somethmg better than a long drift with stoic resignation; or anything 
more positive than an interim melancholy science; or more honest than 
an ironic archaeology and an even more ironic cratology; or more 
straightforward than a theory of ironic culture, second secularisat10n 
and a shipwreck sociology. 
Those whose faith m the future of modern civilisation remains intact 
in spite of the most radical, irrefutable critiques, see salvation in a 
paradigm shift一basingthe new paradigm on the modern epistemolog 
ical dogma that truth is a function of cumulative knowledge and that 
the latest is the best bet: Indeed, it is virtually a compulsion not to 
say, obsession of our civilisation to reject and discard the canonic 
and to cling to the 'contemporary’persisting m ignormg its irredeema-
ble rottenness, however ugly m its death. At the micro-historical level 
Habermas makes two closely related pomts against Weber (a) Weber 
sees the detachment of culture from its matrix in religion and the 
resulting autonomy of “cultural value sphere”as completely destructive 
of societal rationalisation because he remams fixated on the tension 
between religion and the world; accordingly, (b) he fails to see the 
effectiveness of secular substitutes for moral practical rationality: the 
most important case in point being modern systems of law. 
もl/eber'sbasic typology of rationality appears, firstly, in his fourfold 
typology of action and, secondly, m his distinction between formal and 
substantive rationality. Habermas’elaborate and careful reconstruct10n 
of Weber’s theory and typology of rationality is largely based on the 
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above two classifications. The four types of action are: Rational goal 
oriented (Zweckrational) action, rational value-oriented (Wertrational) 
action, affectual (af fektuell) action and traditionalist (traditional) 
action. From the viewpoint of an histoncn-analyt1cal survey, this is an 
excellent typology, virtually exhaustive. However, I do not know why it 
has only rarely been noticed that it is a l凶 oftypes or modes/levels 
of human action which are al discontinuous with each other: even the 
first two which are both called rational by Weber are not on the same 
level: value-rationality is not distinguished from the goal oriented by 
the end bemg a value; it is one to which the means end schema does 
not apply: it is, in the end, oriented to the Immeasurable, the 
Incalculable, while the other, Zweckrational (purposive rationality), 1s 
oriented to the measurable, mappable, calculable, and the conquer 
able, the destroyable: dem1urgic violence is built mto it. Hubris and fal 
of man 1s the natural. internal temptation of the Wertrational, but this 
hubris is not remorseless and presupposes forgiveness The Wertratio 
nal is the only human rationality (and trad_it1onal action 1s its form of 
expression) for a being who is gifted with self-reflexive intelligence and 
reason but who is not present eveロretrospectivelyat his birth and is 
not a witness叩 tohis death, that is, does not survive his death. Man 
thus exists only as a middle and always in the midst of men and 
thmgs not al of them bemg his creation, some of the things exceeding 
his origin and end; this being so, you and I could not but live towards 
the Immeasurable which is negatively expressed every moment of our 
humdrum life as our impatience with ti加e.The two rationalities are 
already related to another Weberian distinction viz, that between ethics 
of responsibility and ethics of absolute commitment; again al this may 
not be unconnected with the formal/substantive duality the latter 
via its rootedness in man’s central existential situation could lead 
towards the Formless (via W ertr叫 zonal).Max Weber is deeply, acutely 
aware of al this: could a citizen of a self-made island of meaning and 
order in the midst of an immense vastness of an ocean of chaos ever 
forget the Immeasurable, literaly, and in every other way, the very 
ground of his existence? Purposive rationality, moral practical 
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rationality, cognitive instrumental rationality and aesthetic-expressive 
rationality elaborated by Habermas on the basis of Weber’s fourfold 
typology (and the d出inction between formal and substantive 
rationality) are al pseudo rationalities; Weber does not perhaps see 
affectual and traditional action-forms as rational: the traditional is the 
concrete historical form of the Wertrational, the value-oriented 
rationality Zweckrational is the modern Western civilisation’s form of 
rationality following the defeat and displacement of the Wertrational; 
the affectual is a permanent possibility of human action and as a 
surveyor of history Weber gives it a place in his exhaustive typology 
of vita actwa but as a social sc1ent1st ignores the fact that 1t has 
seldom been regarded as a form of action proper to the d1gmty of 
man. In the same way, Weber includes purposive rationality alongside 
value-rat1onahty because the former 1s the overwhelmingly dominant 
form of rationality for the modern civilisation: so much so that the 
techmcal logic and nature of other forms of rationality - value, moral, 
aesthetic are always bemg reduced or sublimated （“ra tionahsed", 
“modernised”） to purposive or instrumental rationality. Weber’s 
argument against culture autonomy (in fact, against the autonomy of 
al the subsystems economy, politics, etc. the new polytheism, m a 
word) is derived from his discovery that without an orientation to a 
supreme value, that 1s, without the backshining of Eternity, the 
Immeasurable, rationality and total domination would be inseparable. If 
this perception is sound, it follows that purposive or instrumental 
rationality wil, while replacing it, arrogate to itself the nature of value 
rationality-or else it wil not survive; just as science after displacing 
traditional metaphysics and piety, after denying or rebelling against the 
Immeasurable, is impelled to move towards omniscience and omnipo 
tence. The rat1onahty of our times ongmates m and is sustamed by 
hubris; and it is both remorseless and precarious: dependent for its 
huge prestige on its mask of value rationality which, paradoxically, 
must function under the imperial sign of value neutrality. Once this 1s 
seen, Weber cannot be faulted on his refusal to acknowledge law or 
autonomous art or humamsm or secular morality as an authentic, 
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effective substitute for the spirit of reli呂田nand religious ethic That is 
just not possible by the very nature of modern rationality. 
No, Weber 1s not fixated upon“the relations of tension between 
religion and the world”， between the Immeasurable and the measur-
able, 1t is his intellectual act of remembrance of the Immeasurable 
which, not surprisingly, appears as a fixat10n to those who cannot get 
over a necrophilic attachment to modern civilisation In this list one 
may have to include Weber himself1"'・ as has already been pointed out 
in the first part of this paper, Weber’s fundamental dilemma (which he 
could never resolve) was constituted by the necessity of “choosing” 
between the hie of an mtellectual as scientist which demands the 
exclusion of the intellectual/scientit as man; and the life of an 
intellectual as metaphysician which would not tolerate any separation 
between man and his specific spheres of thought and action: the 
intellectual has to be a whole man - in other words, a holy man. 
At the macro theoretical level Habermas’argument 1s that the 
repeated degeneration of rationalisation into different forms of 
reification of consciousness which is the despair of Weber and Adorno 
1s by no means mtrins1c to rat10nalisation; 1t is叩 effectof understand 
ing its 、，vorkingin a philosophy of consciousness perspective. Once this 
paradigm is discarded and the communicative action paradigm is used, 
the problem of reification wil be resolved. Habermas works this out in 
the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action. An 
adequate review of this new paradigm and its merit is not possible 
here. However, a few general remarks may perhaps be useful 
Ignoring for the moment the complexities of the concept of 
reification, we may say that reification, essentially, is the sin against the 
Unthinkable, the Immeasurable. Re1frcation (or the more fam1har, 
“objectification＇’） is the natural way of the working of man’s cognitive 
faculties. Knowing or any other operation upon a phenomenon, if not 
constitutive of 1t, makes it, ipso facto, an “obJect”， something 
“thrown before" the cognitive faculty, that is, something that human 
cognition throws before itself. More specifically, the act of knowing 
withdraws the to be known phenomenon from the flux of time (and 
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change) and freezes it by fixing tl in a preg1ven framework: a 
framework which the to be known always exceeds. Again, al acts of 
apprehending and knowing implicitly define and distinguish the to be 
known from other phenomena related to it, thus disturbing tis ongmal 
embeddmg. In its own existence, however, the phenomenon is, of 
course, both distinguished from and related to others: but not 
necessarily in the way a given act of apprehending appropnates it. Its 
relational、modeof existence is non-numerable at least during its 
ongoing existence, but in human knowledge this appears as enumerated 
or numerable. When Adorno sees the rational-scientific process of 
modern civilisation as intensifying the reification of consciousness, what 
is meant is that a particular mode of existence ts imposed upon the 
to-be-known by the cognitive and other intellectual processes and acts. 
It is the mode of a manipulable obiect which does not or ought not to 
have any purpose, ratson d’e tre, of its o、vn This“ought-not”， this 
imperial proletarianisation, instrumentahsation of the Other-the to be 
known一 isthe secret essence and power of rat1onahsation 
Adorno suggests that it is the capitalist mode of production of goods 
that has infiltrated into al intellectual hfe and once this has happened, 
the transition to the soc1ahst mode of production cannot make any 
appreciable difference because the technology, the habit and the telos 
of production do not fundamentally change under socialism. Re1f1cat1on 
of cons口ousnessdeeply damages our personal and social-political life 
- eventually leading to our own deadenmιIn Weber，“reification”is 
seldom used; his paired concept of charisma-and-routinisat1on comes 
closest to Adorno’s "reification”Charismatic thinking and acting is not 
reifying, routinised thought and action are. 
All thinking is reifymg in one manner or another; the redemption, as 
Kierkegaard points out, is through thought’s own passion to reach -
even collide with - the unthought (Foucault’s word, and Kierkegaard's 
idea, inhented from tradition). What is crucial in this controversy -
say, between Adorno and Habermas 1s not whether modern thought 
is unduly reifying but whether it has any (internal) redeeming power 
The implicit argument of Weber, which becomes thematic in Adorno, 
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shows that by its very nature and habit (striving towards“objectivity”） 
as also by virtue of its telos (mastery of the Other and pleasure of the 
self the one requires the other), modern “thought”has lost its 
redeeming potentiality I do not know how the communication paradigm 
would impart to modern thought a power it is not in it to receive. This 
and other points made here against Habermas’superb口alitiesand 
unjust charges against Weber and Adorno require an extended 
refutation which I cannot offer here. I do wish, however, to submit the 
following for the meditative !airplay of my readers. 
Language ever and everywhere exceeds man It is not man who 
speaks through language but language, at every level, that speaks 
through man (Heidegger). Language as such is not an evolute, product 
of a process; for man to say this is to construct an impossible (and 
hence false) htstory of language: for he is within language and always 
involved m every use of language. There simply can be no evolutionary 
theory of the origin of language for it does not originate in time 
Evolutionism v10lates the Vico Principle even on a demiurgic reading 
This is not a mystification nor a reification of language, sign systems 
or communicational media It is obviously the other way round: a level 
of reification is inherent in language except at its two highest levels 
This is clearly implied in Coomaraswamy’s aphorism: the primary 
reference of al language is to things. 
Language is essentially neither a system nor a medium for 
communication or for anything else. To see it par excellence as a 
medium is to see it as a manipulatory mechanism No language is 
merely a system of coding and decoding not even the artificial ones. 
An aspect, a part, of the power of language can be coded (and then, 
of course, decoded). There is no residueless decoding. Man himself is a 
sign (Peirce). 
One of the essential modes of the funct旧ningof language through 
contemplating, thinking, reading, writing is repetition (remembrance and 
hope bemg aspects of backward and forward repetition). As repetition, 
language is always moving towards origins and the Origin.“The origin 
of contemplation is the contemplation of the Ongm.”州 Languageis the 
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backshining of the Uncreate, the Unmanifest1ble and the “meanest”use 
of language could reveal this. 
The powers of language are mexhaust1ble m pnnc1ple Human 
understanding is not communicational: for language being one of the 
pre eminent shadows of the Unmanifest, it speaks ambiguously, 
ambivalently, falsely, truly, it reveals as naturally and honestly as it 
conceals; it leads as easily as it misleads. 
A communicational model of understanding 1s a Joke (when not a 
prelude to violence). Truth is not a relation within language, between 
language and reality or between language, reality and society. It is the 
ep1stem1c form of the manifestation of the Non Mantfestible. Man 
ascends to truth via the ascending levels of language from V aikha門
to Madhyama to Pasyanti to Para. Our relation to knowledge and 
truth 1s that of ft!iation. Language itself 1s a comc1dence of opposites: 
silence and speec_h, apophasis and kataphasis, abstraction and 
re1fication. 
No model of action, no theory of language wil have a savmg power. 
Elaborate concern with the theory or philosophy of language is not an 
exclusively modern development; however, unhke the modern concern, 
traditional thinking on language is generated and governed by 
metaphysics. It never uses 1t as a surrogate for metaphysics. What we 
need is a return to the language of th,oria. 
The way Weber responded to his own theory of Disenchantment-
Rationalisation, Charisma-Routinisation; and to his perception of the 
huge, overwhelming power of trrationahty of the world and life should 
have led his thmkmg to the ontological metaphysical level Perhaps this 
did not happen. It is, I think, not impertinent to inquire how he stopped 
where he did: for he really did go quite far; which is not to say that he 
was a traditional thinker. As for Marx, his problematic was of a 
different nature. Marx started by positing a discontinuity between the 
contemporary capitalist' industnal and the coming socialist society. For 
example, irrationality appears in his system as systemic contradiction at 
given stages of socio-economic development and is internal to the 
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mode of production. Or it appears as the unmastered part of natural 
forces, or as the residue of organic internalisation of nature by man; or 
again, as the survival of capitalist institutions during the transition to 
socialist society even though it would be mediated by the Socialist 
Revolution He recognises only structural forms of unreason there are 
fairly difficult problems at this level too but, by and large, Marx 
responds to them in terms of the alchemical powers, of the Revolution 
in him the strange alliance of positivism-materialism with an 
eschatological orientation finds its definitive and most destructive 
theoretisation. 
This line of thought is not available to Weber who rejects the 
Marxian discontinuity between the present and the future on the basis 
of his analysis of the rise and development of capitalism which 
diverges and conflicts with that of Marx on several highly significant 
points 
Irrationality is a substantive issue for him, a constituent part of the 
world: he grew increasingly restless with seemg it as a defect, failure 
or residue of rationalisation. But he did not arrive at something like a 
Foucauldian theory, perhaps simply because he began with Reason and 
Rationalisation in the Enlightenment tradition. 
He could have gone on m a Kierkegaardian direction, for irrationality 
raised for him, and quite rightly, the problem of an adequate theodicy. 
He nearly found one：“The third form of theodicy which we are going 
to discuss was pecuhar to the rehgiosity of Indian intellectuals. It 
stands out by virtue of its consistency as well as by its extraordinary 
metaphysical achievement: It unites virtuosoーlikeself-redemption by 
man’s own effort with universal accessibility of salvation, the strictest 
rejection of the world with organic social ethics, and contemplation as 
the paramount path to salvation with an inner worldly vocational 
ethic.叩＂ The statement is a marvel of brevity and reveals a profound 
msight into an alien thought form However, it is not a question of 
gomg the Hindu way. What is important is to see that a radical 
ontology is involved here and that it follows from 明／eber’sown 
analytical studies of Eastern religious traditions: it is a modal ontology, 
Max Webec and the End of Comtean Sodology 43 
one of antithetical wholeness in which the Dragon and the Dragon-
slayer, the Good and the Evil, appear as twins behind the scene - to 
be transcended ultimately. To move towards this truth, Weber would 
have to return not to exoteric Christianity whtch had long exhausted its 
spirit,"" but to mystical Chnstianity, say, to the tradition of Meister 
Eckhart. Again, it ts not a questton of Weber’s personal religiousness, 
and his interest and attitude to esoteric traditions; more importantly, 
the questton ts whether we can gtve a socio poltttcal form to an 
esoteric tradition or to“new religions” Even if Weber did not feel 
daunted by it, esoteric tradtttons are ever reststant to social acceptance 
and it is quite likely that Weber could see through and would not trust 
any such enterprise: 
“The fate of our times is charactenzed by rattona!tzation and 
intellectualization and, above al, by the ’disenchantment of the world. ’ 
Pre口selythe ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from 
pub!tc !tfe etther into the transcendental realm of mysttc !tfe or into the 
brotherliness of dtrect and pers叩 alhuman relations. It is not acctdental 
that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental, nor is it 
accidental that today only within the smallest and mttmate circles, m 
personal human situations, in pianissimo, that something is pulsating 
that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in former times 
swept through the great communities like a ftrebrand, welding them 
together. If we attempt to force and to ’mvent' a monumental style in 
art, such mtserable monstrosities are produced as the many monuments 
of the last twenty years. If one tries intellectually to construe new 
religions without a new and genuine prophecy, then, in an inner sense, 
something similar wtl! result, but with stil worse effects. And academic 




The French school of soc10logy is very nearly nght in the social 
explanation of religion. It only fails to explain one mfinitely small thmg; 
but this infinitely small thing 1s the grain of mustard seed, the buried 
pearl, the leaven, the salt. This infinitely small thing is God; it is 
mfm1tely more than everything. 
All that 1s needed is to place it at the centre of life, whether of a 
people or of an individual soul Everything that is not in contact 、.v1thIt 
should be, as it were, impregnated by 1t through the med1at1on of 
beauty. This very nearly came to pass in the Romanesque Middle 
Ages, that amazing epoch when men’s eyes were refreshed every day 
by a beauty which was perfect in s1mphc1ty and purity. 
The difference is infinitely small between a system of labour which 
leads men to discover the beauty of the world and one which hides 1t 
from them. But this infinitely small difference is real, and no effort of 
the imagination can bridge it. 
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Notes 
(t) Durkheim, Emile: Sodology and Philosophy, tr. by D. F. Pocock, London, Cohen 
and West, 1953, p.52. 
If Durkheim's offer of an ultimate choice between God and Society is plainly a 
rhetorical one its immediate withdrawal makmg it plamer-what, one may ask, is 
the use of this stylislc device' Why does Durkheim employ the language of choice in 
a no chmce Sttuallon' Normally it should be to make the pomt al the more 
effectively the pnmt, namely, that for the modern man the die ts already cast m 
favour of Soctety as the ultimate reality In thts case, however, perhaps the rhetoric 
of choice functions ambivalently to suggest that there is, in the last analysis, a 
Sttuatwn of 'choosmg’， a kmd of imperattve chotce, if so, the dialecllc of this 
ambivalence suggests deeper and dtsturbing tssues Let me not attempt here a direct 
analySJs of th凶 problemallc,some p問hmmaryobservallons towards an appreciatwn of 
the paradigmallc Stgmftcance of Durkheimian socwlogy may, however, be ""ful 
Except m the untenable case of reducmg choice to caprice, whim, waywardne" 
- m a word, to idiocy - there can be no choice between two ultimate and/ or 
absolute “alternallves”an unmediated relation of the chooser (k『wwer/actor) wil 
either annul the act of choice or else compromise the absoluteness/ultimacy of the 
alternatives Or, if the chmce (chnosmg) ts exerctsed on certam well-understood and 
acknowledged grounds then・ (•) it establtshC' a supenor-mfenor (or at any rate, more 
and les preferable) relationship between the two (or more) alternatives and thereby 
comprom1s田 theirultimacy/absoluteness, and (b) since chmce, m thts context, ts ex 
hypothesi a function of the ground(s) in terms of which it is exercised, the latter 
cannot Itself be cho'°n it must be a logico eptstemic given - if not an ontological 
one. 
Thts argument ts mdependent of some serious difficullles that anse immediately 
from the idea of two (or more) absolutes or ultimacies, for, apart from other 
difhcullles, if the alternallves are mutually mcommensurate, the question of choosmg 
between them cannot anse for preference presupposes commensurabihty and 
continuity：，』fthey are commensurable, they cannot both be absolute (though each 
may be ultimate within a specific universe) 
Durkheim’s reason for wllhdrawmg hts offer of an ultimate chmce between God and 
Society deftly circumvents al the foregoing analysis and argument by declaring God 
and Society to be really the same (not quite: for Durkheim sees in God not society 
s.mpltcit-' but Society“transfigured and symbolにalyexpressed" Thts ts not a trivial 
but a tremendous difference but here it may be ignored: for at this point what 
Durkheim is suggesting is that Divinity is nothmg more than a mystificallon of 
Society and is ehminated once the mystification is seen through and rejected. 
4B 
Thus w>th God ehmmated, no chmce cemams since one only candidate cemams m 
the field. 
Thus whether the alternatives are real or only apparent (as in the Durkheimian 
choke’L the present analyS>s shows that as between two (or more) ult,mates or 
absolutes the questwn of chmce (choosmg) does not arne An ult.mate or absolute can 
only be accepted (or rejected); is this accept or reject situation one of ultimate 
choice? The answer depends on whether the rejection of an absolute by itself 
consututes or creates the “other”which " thereby chosen There凶， ofcourse』 a
well known theological P°'ition which holds that man is given only one choice 
between acceptance or defiance of the Wdl of God; in other words, between 
obedience and rebellion. （“If I must choose the lesser of two evils,' said Karl Kraus, 
”I wil choose neither.”Did Kraus have a choice' w., his refusal to choose an act of 
choice' ) 
The act of accepting an Absolute is one of originary participation and is 
macrm,ble to any rev>ewmg eye If the rauonale of al one’s hfe’s chrnces " 
grounded m and follows, in vanous degrees of directmn and mdirectwn, from a 
primordial act of acceptance-obedience/refu,.l/rebellion (that is, participation or, if 
one insists, immediate choice of an ultimate Reality, be it God or Society, Love of 
God or Love of self), it does not follow that the mediate, contingent series of choices 
consututmg one’s hfe are real chmces-except m the sense that (.) the actmg man 
by virtue of this acceptance of (participation in) the incomprehensible ulUmate Reality 
（“God or Society”） knows that he could always be in error, and he thus acts in fear 
and trembling; or (b) that there i• always the possibility, which he can“choose’l to 
actualise, of bemg perverse and following a wrong course of action perhaps, m th>S 
case, w>thout“fear and tremblmg” 
Thi• is the point crucial for the founding of modem明Iestem civilization on 
which Durkheim fundamentally rejects our analysis, though understandably, he does 
not choose to face the problematw of ultimate chmce, of chmce between absolutes, m 
any direct manner. His attitude of indifference to choice between God and Society 
which he himself posits is a strategy of evasion. Even when God has been in effect 
eliminated as a kmd of ign。rantlyexalted Double of Society, the nature of man’s 
relation to Society remains to be understood and explained. It is clear that whatever 
may be true of pre modem man's relation to Divm>ty, Durkhe'm would not, mdeed, 
cannot, agree to see modem man’s relatwn to Soqety as a mysUc parUcipatwn, for 
then it would be ultimately incomprehensible to both man and sociologists. 
It follows that Society is a universal that must be chosen by man even though 
on Durkhe'm’s own showmg >t '5 external and greater to man (or at any rate, m 
relation to individuals). If the difficulUes of a concept like “chosen universal”do not 
obviously bother D"Tkheim, it is because he hopes that social science would, in the 
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coucoe of advancmg knnwledge, make •t po>'•hle foe man to achieve a total 
cnmpcehension of Society and Histocy and then his celation to Society, wh"h always 
exceeds h•m. would, cetrnspechvely, be a cho<en and catmnal one In th>S fa•th and >ts 
accompanymg m>SS>on Duckhe.m " loyally canymg focwacd the hentage of Comte, 
hece he has a fundamental kinship with Macx to, except that Dmkheim does not see 
the necesS>tY of a rnd"al umvecsal Revoluhon as the med>atoc between ahenated man 
and h>S wholesome futuce He " content to leave th>S to mdustnahsatmn and >ts 
•deology』 v>Z, socmlogy 
It '5 also one of the dec•<>ve pomts of d.vecgence between Duckhe>m (1858 1917) 
and Webec (1864-1920). As some of the texts quoted in the ficst pact of this papec 
show』 Webeccemained prnfoundly sensitive both to the loss of a gifted Absolute and 
to the d>Stucbing, almost self destcoying •mphc•tmns and consequences of modem 
man』S meluctable quest foe a constrncted and “chosen" umvecsahsm, unhke Ma目 he
could not beheve m the akhem•cal powec of the commg sc.entd.c sロc>alistRevoluhon 
noc, of coucse, in the prnphehc prnm>Se of the omn'5c.ence of man In add>tmn to 
those in the text of this papec, the following often quoted pmage from The 
Prote,,ant Ethfr and the Spirit of Capitolism (New Yock, Chades Sccibec’s Sons, 
1956, pp.180 82) would be helpful in highlighting Webec’s rndical depactuce from both 
Duckheim and Marx: 
“One of the fundamental elements of the spmt of modem cap>tahsm, and not only 
of that but of al modem culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the 
callmg, was born一that" what th'5 d>Scussion has sought to demonstrate一 from
the spmt of Chnst>an ascehc>Sm For when ascet•rnm was carned out of monashc 
cells mto everyday hfe, and began to dommate worldly morahty, >t d•d •ts part m 
bmldmg the tremendous cosmos of the modem econom" order Th" order '5 now 
bound to the techmcal and econom>e cond•hons of machme productmn which to day 
determme the lives of al the mdividuals who are born mto th>S mechamsm, not only 
those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. P"haps it 
wdl so determ問eth•m until the last ton of Jo.ml>zed cool '5 burnt In Baxter’S view 
the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light 
cloak, which can be thrown "'ide at any moment”But fate dmeed that the cloak 
should become an <ron cage 
“Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out •ts •deals m the 
world, matenal goods have gained an mcrea凱ngand fmally an mexorable power over 
the hves of men as at no previous penod m h>Story To-day the spmt of rehg•ous 
ascehc>Sm whether fmally, who knows' has escaped from the cage But 
v.ctonous capual>sm, since " rests on mechamcal foundations, needs •ts support no 
longer .
“No one knows who w•ll hve m th>S c•ge m the future』 orwhether at the end of 
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th!S tremendous development entirely new prophets wdl anse, or there wil be a great 
rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embelfahed 
with a sort of convuhive self-•mP,,tance For of the last stage of th!S cultural 
development, it might well be truly said：“Specialists without spirit, sensualists 
W>thout heart, th!S nulhty >magmes that it has attamed a level of m>h,,tmn never 
before achieved”（Emphases added). 
(2) Proust, Marcel: Remembrnnce of Th問gsPast (translated by C.K. Scott Moncrief) 
Vol. I. The Guermantes Way, New York, Random House, 1934, pp.113日40(Original 
French edition, 1913-27). 
(3) I am not sure if I know what pree>sely is meant by seeing Weber .，“bourgeois 
Marx" Weber shared with Marx a radical critique of capitalist >0ciety, but that is al: 
his analysis of the genesis and devel。pmentof capitalism is thoroughly non-Marxian 
even though m h!S own way Weber too g.ves suf!>e>ent weight to the economic 
interests of different sodal classes. I cal him a radical Marxist because Weber does 
not stop at the mode of production of capitalist society. He sees the problems of 
cap1tahst society not Simply as problems of the prmnt smety, he examines their 
roots and mtnnS!c nature at a deeper structural and ideological level and, hence, 
comes to see their unavoidable continuance m the ”posトcap!tahst”asalso m a 
communist and sociahst society He, unlike Marx, does not arrest his dialectic nor 
implicitly freeze history twice; once at the pre revolutionary stage and again at the 
post-revolutionary stage. Accordingly, he is more radical than Marx: he does not 
believe m revolutionary change nor in the alchemical quality and potentiality of the 
RevolutiD" (nor，。fcourse, in the mysticism of violence implicit in the Marxian theory 
of the Revolution). He, in effect, wholly undermines the foundation of socmlogy. 
Hence I cal him an ultra socmlogist I avoid the term“counter sociologist”， Weber, 
for good rea>0ns, did not care to formulate any“new sociology" Nor do I find him 
anu-socwlogy or anti-social science, he dロesnot develop any systematic and radical 
critique of modern social science, nor of modernity, though the fundamentals of any 
such critique are present m h!S work and they are not mconspicuous Rather, he was 
wntmg an epilogue to modernity and the social sc>ences In effect, If not m h!S 
design, Weber is the necrologist of modern Western civilisation. 
(4) Unlike Marx and Comte, Weber, insofar as he believed in univer5'lism, did not 
do so m terms of evolution progress, nor in th。seof (scientific revolutionary) 
alchemy. Again, though he believed in the Enlightenment, or at any rate never wholly 
reiected !I, he did not accept any non Chnstian universal sotenology Comtean, 
Durkheimian or Marxian. 
Indeed with Weber’s radical reservatmns about modern sc旭町e and lament on 
th巴 ironcage of consumer culture the fruit of modern technology - one could see 
him as a despairing univer5'1ist. Or, is it extrapolating too much? Was he just a 
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“cautious”umver8'hst - as, of comse, behooved the vocalion of a social sc.enlisげ
Let us hea< Habermas 
“Nmeteenth century research in Geistesunssenschaften and the cultural田1ences
had developed a sense for the vanabihty of social life forms, values and norms 
Histoncism had sharpened this basic experience of the relativity of traditions and 
modes of thought to the problem of whether even the standards of ralionahty 
presupposed in the empirical sciences were elements of a regionally and temporally 
limited culture, the modern European, and thus had to forfeit their naively raised claim 
to umversal valid>ty But h'5tonc'5m had made thmgs too easy m regard to the 
question of whether there resulted from the pluralism of cultures an ep』stemological
relativ1Sm as well Whereas m the Gwteswossenschaften which were essentmlly 
occup>ed with the trad>twns of wntten cultures - 1t was easy to gam an mtuit1ve 
impression of the equality in principle of different c1vili'3tions, cultural anthropology 
-which concerned itself with pnm1tive socoelies could not so ea5'ly overlook the 
developmental gradient between archaic and modern societies. Furthermore, m 
functionalistically oriented cultural anthropology there was never a danger of 
d1Sm'5song, together with evolutionary determinism, every form of nomolog1cal analy5's 
aimed at discovermg regulantoes and of drawmg relaliv1St1c inferences from thlS 
Max Weber adopted in this controversy a cautiously叩 iversalisticposition; he did not 
regard ralionalization processes as a phenomenon peculiar to the Occident, although 
the rationali'3tion demonstrable in al world religions led at first only in Europe to a 
form of rationalism that exhibited both particular Occidental features and general 
features, that凪 featurescharacter』sUcof modermty as such”（Habermas, Jurgen The 
Theory of Co附加n;cat;veActfon, Volume One, Reason and the RatfonaL;zaUon of 
Sodety, Boston, Beacon Press, 1984, pp.154 155). 
Given hiS scrupulous honesty, extraordmary penetralion and corcumspeclion, how 
umversnl1St1c (however careful and caulious) Weber’s thought would eventually remam 
can be gauged from the following further observations of Habermas himself・ “In 
phdosophoes of history science and technology served as patterns of ralio 1alizalion. 
There are good reasons for their parad1gmat1c character, which Weber did not deny 
However, to serve as models for concepts of progress, science and technology have to 
be evaluated m the sense of enlightenment or of po5'l!v15m; that IS, they have to be 
characterized as problem solvmg mechamsms with an important impact on the h1Story 
of the species. The bourgeois cultural criticism of the late nineteenth century, which 
had its most mfluential representalives m Nietz"he and the contemporary 
LebenspMlosophen, was directed agamst th15 surrogate metaphysical revaluation 
Weber too shares m the pes<om1Stoc appra1Sal of scienlifoc c1v1hzat1on He m1Strusts the 
ratoonahzalion proce5'es set loose and detached from ethical value onentatoons, which 
he observes m modern societies so much so that in his theory of rationalization, 
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"ienoe and technology fode1t their paradigmat10 status”(Ibid .• p. 155). 
Without wishing to minimise the Nietmhean influence on Weber’s thought, one 
may note that in his powerful lament for the flight of the spirit of religious asoetidsm 
from the “iron oage” a dmohmg. devastating metaphor －一、Nebertakes a oru01al 
and oourageous step beyond Nietzsche in not sharing his view of the asoetk ideal＇“It 
is absolutely impos'!b!e to disguise what in point of fact is made dear by every 
oomplete wil that has taken its directions from the asoet10 ideal; this hate of the 
human and even more of the animal and more stil of the material, this horror of the 
senses, of reason itself, th!S fear of happiness and beauty, thi' desue to get right 
away from al ilusion, therefore, growth, death wishing and even desiring al this 
means一 letus have the oourage to grasp 1t - a wil for Nothingness - a wil 
opposed to life, a repudiation of the most fundamental oonditions of life, but it is and 
remains a will - and to say at the end what I have seid at the beginning men 
W!Sh Nothingness rather th叩 notwish at al”（Nietzsche, Friednoh; G開 ealogyof 
Morals !1/28). 
Weber would certainly endorse the idea that “there does not exist a soienoe 
without its“hypotheS!s”j the thought of suoh a soienoe IS moonoeivable, 1log10al a 
philosophy, a faith must always exist first to enable sdenoe to gain thereby a 
direction, a meaning, a limit and a method, a right to existence (Ibid., III/24). And 
indeed he has most effectively used the idea that“. .in every department science 
needs an ideal value, a power which creates values”（Ibid., II/25). Neither Nietzsche's 
nor Weber’s relation to the asce山 idealor to the Will to Truth which the ideal 
generates in Nietzsche's thinking is amenable to confident exegesis; it may yet be 
suggested that Weber perhaps kept a safe d1Stance from Nietzsche’s almD"t wholly 
negative view of the ascetic ideal, nor, agam, would Weber see science as the 
expression of the ascetic ideal and the Will to Truth the ideal generates. Perhaps 
Weber din see the necessity of making a distinction between the self-mediated Will 
to total Knowledge that underlies modern science on the one hand, and the 
traditional religious quest for Truth which was not of this world, on the other. It is 
this maybe that saved the despair, the perplexities and paradoxes of Weber’S 
intellectual life (which, alas, is to be distinguished from his political life) from taking a 
patently Nietzschean turn of which Marxism is one of the historical variants. 
From Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim to Marx, from Mannheim and Parsons to 
Hab巴rmas,mainstream sociology has been an almost relentless effort to don the 
Kerygmatic and evangelical mantle.of Judeo-Christian theology: it was bound to be a 
kind of philosophy of History of the Present alone; stupid as this may sound to some, 
th!S holds true for empmcal socmlogy as well, which, by its very nature, remains 
subservient to the evangehcahsm of socmlogical theory Weber made vast 
contributions to sociological history but they do not culminate in systematic sociology 
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or philosophy of History; in other words, unlike Durkheim and Ma日， onedoes not find 
in Weber any sustained effort to construct an eschatology and theodicy (or 
anthropod<ey - to borrow a term comed by Ernest Becker) Th" sensitive, 
soph•st•cated reluctance tels upon h" project of a formahshc ep>stem<e umversahsm 
(or un>Ver5'1 socmlogy) m wh<eh Weber progre四 vely lost fa>th For however 
formahstJc or structural the truths of a sc.ence may be, they must, at some level, m 
some mode and measure, speak to the contempcrarγpresent, foe al umversahsm does 
mdude a grven hrstorrcal present though, of course』 rtmdudes, m some sigmhcant 
sense, al future presents too Essentrally, then, even a formal nr structural scrence 
such as Weber mrght have had m mmd (or tho'< the contemporary structurahsts 
have created) has to reconcrle a contemporary present wrth rts past and synthesise 
the two m a future, rts mrssron, m other words, " to make past memorable and 
ownable, the present enjoyable or sufferable and the future expectable (m a word, to 
make human hfe loyal to rts humanrty) Or to use one of the contemporary rdroms, 
even a formal system of knowledge must speak to the present so that Desue and 
Death can be reconcded (rt may perhaps be added, rt has to redeem remembrance 
from reification, memory from memorials). As wil be abundantly clear from many 
oft-quoted texts (some of whrch wrl be found m the present essay as well), Weber 
reiected on the ground of mternal contradictions the absolutely fundamental』
constrtutJve presupposition, mdeed, the credo of modern science, namely, that 
everything is knowable. ("What a curious attitude sαentists have “We stil don’t 
know that, but rt " knowable and rt " only a matter of time before we get to know 
M”As if that went without saying.”Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Cul!ure and Value, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, p.4Qe.) By virtue of this credo, ideology supersedes 
rehgron m modern crvrlisahon (see Dumont, Lou'5: From Mandevrlle to Marx, 
Chicago, The University of Chrcago Pre<', 1977; Midway Reprint, 1983, p.2). 
Reiectmg this postulate and credo of self mediated (or hrstory medrated) al-
knowability, Weber knew that no science and no ideology could replace religion and 
metaphysics. The credo is scientifically unintelligible, just as itぉbyother modes of 
thought, rt follows that (modern) scrence, rf not rtself a master rdeology, can get its 
life blood only from the one or the other ruling ideology. Marx firmly believed in the 
idea and project of al knowabilitY of the universe and, accordingly, foretold a 
complete supersessron of rehgron by sociahst scrence (or a unified scrence of History 
and Nature). In the succeg,or generation, Adorno follows Weber in rejecting this 
pseudo-dogma, but he takes the next step and has the courage to declare 
“knowledge has no other hght than that whrch shmes from salvation on the world, 
al others exhaust themselves m Po" facto construction and remam part of 
technology" (Adorno, Theodor W.: Mrnima Maralio, London, 1974, p.480). Weber drew 
back at the end of metanora It " sard he was an athe'5t If he was, he must have 
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been of that me kind who would understand Unamuno’s“God alone is an atheist.” 
Wheber could not forget Niet,,ch白“Hewho no longr fmds what is great in God 
wil find it nowhere - he must either deny rt or create it”Weber certamly knew 
that no 'either or' makes sense where (an) Absolute 1s m”queslion”there cannot be 
a”cho悶e”mextreme or ullimate existential situations For placed m a socalled 
cho1ce-s1tualion, a smcere person wil make his dec1s1on, but he wil not see 1t as his 
“chロice”， forhe wil not say he could have made another dec1s1on which is what the 
“chooser”must maintain. Unlike Durkheim, Nietzsche is offenng not an aesthete’s 
choice, but 1mphcat1on of 1magmmg that a chmce s1tualion exists where 1t simply 
does not and could never have except as an absurdity 
Adorno IS surely following a、Veberianinsight when he says that under the present 
cond1t1ons, social science must remam a“melancholy science”with no hope of leadmg 
to a“ioyful wisdom”However one may well wonder 1f m Nietzsche himself the 
“joyful wisdom”was not an mexpress1ble lament under the gmse of celebrat10n 
(s) Cf. Habermas, Jiirgen：“Among the classical figures of sociology, Max Weber is 
the only one who broke with both the premises of the philosophy of history and the 
bas>e assumplions of evolutionism and who nonetheless wanted to conceive of the 
modermzalion of old European scc1ety as the result of a universal historical prows 
of rationalization" (op. cit., p.143) 
My summary remarks on Weber’s attitude to evolutionism and progre'51v1st 
philosophy of History would seem to be mutually inconsistent. I, however, wonder if 
there is a way to state the pomt m a wholly consistent way It 1s pm1ble perhaps to 
see our statement of the pomt as an 1comc suggestion of the deep ambivalence 
running through most of Weber’s analyses; expressing obliquely the tragic ”pathos of 
his self-co出 ciousnessand the lonely yet undaunted rationality”（Adorno, Theodor 
W.: Prisms. Cambridge, Mas5'chusetts, The MIT Prm, 1981, p.37). 
The lack of a ful and coherent positive philosophy in Weber i' not his personal 
failing; nor is such a philos叩hyan internal requirement of the Weberian oeuvres. It凶
modernity which desiderates and promises itself a new and rational-sc1ent1fic world 
V抱w,based on a universal philosophy of History and way of日fe.It is an impossible 
necessily, a forlorn hope It凶 1mposs1blefor two reasons modernity founds itself on 
(a) ScienceーTechnologyand (b) Evolution-History （ ~philosophy of History centred in 
Progress1v1sm) (In other words, for modernity al knowledge must be scientific or 1t 1s 
not knowledge; and al reality is historical or it is subhuman.) In Weber's idiom 
modernity appoints or chooses two warring Gods to preside over its destiny, each God 
is invincible for the other and there is no Supreme God. 
There are compounded difficulties with both Science Technology and Evolution 
History. In the first place there is a built-in tension between both Science and 
Technology and Evolut10n-H1story. Science aims at a complete and certam knowledge 
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of universe, Technology IS problem sofvmg, its approach bemg essentially piecemeal 
whereas science 1s, m prmc1ple, holistic Science therefore has to be mdependent of 
technology However this cannot be so so long as technology develops autonomously, 
that 1s, m obedience to the mternal logic of contmual advance m terms of the given 
one Any number of times, pure sc1enttf1c advances take palce m re叩叩seto 
technolog1c needs as also growmg needs of men Sctence does not rule and govern 
technology as it should. 
As to Evolution History, by commonly accepted definitions』 evolution is 
mdependent of man, while history, m the modern view, 1s made by man m any case, 
it 1s made up of human-social acts while evolution 1s seen as a senes of events 
taking place independently of man, which have to be ordered and interpreted by 
sc1enlists. Under modermty, human history therefore should be mdependent of man; m 
fact, however, al modern historiography』sgoverned by an evoh』tionaryphilosophy of 
history (Socml Darwm1sm) Appearances to the contrary, this statement remams true 
from Spencer, Morgan, Taylor and Toynbee to Malinowski, Lev1-StrauS< to Foucault 
there has been no new basis for the continuity of civihsational and social history, and 
evolut10nism, open or d1sgu1sed, has provided 1t the ten,,on between immanent 
contmmty and transcendence-centred d1scontmuity has been openly admitted by 
Toynbee in his letter to Martin Wight who had charged him with disguised 
evolut1omsm; the structuralist failure 1s clear from its supersess1on by post 
structuralist movements the most powerful philosopher of discontinuous histonogra-
phy and archaeology of knowledge, Foucault, once agam, refusmg to embrace a 
transcendent metaphysical basis of history, could succeed only m dodgmg the problem 
of discontinuities in history by diverting his thought to genealogy of power 
knowledge, leaving history to its own evolutionist devices. The truth has to be faced 
even by the modermst 1mmanent1st ax1nmat1cs and d1scontmuous history do not go 
together. 
Perhaps even more important than the problem of mternal tension of Science-
Technology and Evolution H』storyIS the radical mcompalibihty between Science and 
History; stated in the briefest way, the problem is to reconcile the universality and 
certainty that Science seeks (nomothetics), and the particularism (id10graphy) and 
contmgency that cannot be overcome by History, in other words, compat1b1hty 
between History and Sciences is possible if and only if th0re could be a natural and/ 
or e蕊actscience of c1v1hsalional history 
No less momentous and disastrous 1s the irredeemable mternal apona both m 
Science and History The nature and telos of Science umversahty and certamty 
conflicts with its glorious methodology of endless corrigibility of al Scientific findings 
and theorems. History (its philos叩 hyand methodology）ぉ tornby the conflict 
between the modermty’s nature as a radically umque，間同uallya transmutatmnal 
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phenomenon (that is, a OIVllisation and a system of knowledge radically discontinuous 
with al p<eoeding 01Vihsot10"5 and knowledges) Mocecver, it IS th1S miraculous 
uniqueness that has been used to support the ideology of the manifest destiny of 
Europe and America to conquer and rule the whole world ("Europeanisation of the 
Earth” Husml). History is, strangely, glorified as both continuous and discontinuous 
m the same breath: thus rendering al search for a modern philosophy or science of 
HIStory a frustrat10n, a despair Here then, we come upon the crucial cosmocidal 
multi-dimensional apona, an abysmal antinomy of modernity and its citi,.ns.、,Yeberis 
acutely aware of thlS m1Sery at the centre of the grandeur of modern civ1h5't10n 
indeed he is despairingly troubled by the imminent fal and fatality of modern man. 
And this could be why he confronts this crisis only indirectly: his devastating and 
irrefutable analyS1s of the sαent1f1c vocat10n (as also, m a lesser way, of politics as a 
vocat10n) constitutes, m Its concentrated energy and profound impact, one of the 
most powerful denunciations and IS virtual砂atotal reiect10n of the contempocary 
Euro American civilisation. Weber's response to his doomed civili5'tion was one of 
resignation and despair: it would be difficult to imagine Weber responding at al 
hopefully町 evenexpectantly to post modernity as the Redeemer of the fallen Church 
Triumphant of Modermty noc even to any avant-garde counter-cultunst proposal of a 
reformed Church Militant for Modernity. 
It is in this context that one has to understand Weber's persistent reluctance to 
invent or adopt a philO'ophy of history based on evolutionary progressivism.羽feber's
problem was methodological: if he wanted to analyse and diagnose hlS age, the 
principal ideas and institutions and ideologies would have to be properly identified and 
understood m their own terms To do so - and there IS no other vahd way一one
would have to presuppose the founding philosophy of modernity, namely, Progms-
Evolutiomsm ; one has also to recognise the ineluctable reality of the ideology of 
“et,,nal" Euro-American global 1mpenahsm The key-concepts m、Veber’sanalym of 
modermtY are char1Sma routm1S•t10n , Rat10nahsat10n -D1Senchantment, value -
rationality, value-neutrality In hlS penetrating analytical expoS1t10ns of these and 
other concepts, Weber used, as a masteトideaand a tool of analyslS the concept of 
Rationalisation, from there he proceeded to use Rationallsat10n as the master tool for 
constructing a umversal h1Story. It is difficult to say if the choice of (Rationality and) 
Rationalisation was the best one，一→mdeed,It could be a trap It IS clear, however 
that Weber did not fal into it; what is more and of crucial importance is that in his. 
universal history, Weber e恒capedthe absurdity and the hubris of abrnlutising 
modernity and 1dolismg contemporary Euro American civ1llsat10n Indeed, as a modern 
scholar and man of thought, Weber escaped the inescapable: before him such 
absolut1Sat10n and idolisation had been Simply the given, the ax10matics of al modern 
historiography and philosophy of civilisation, indeed, a divine dispensation, the very 
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destiny of planet eacth. And a!tec Webec and Adorno, the absolutisation and 
•doltsatlon cemam as befme, the lattec cemfoccing and iustlfymg the focmec, howevec 
sophisticated the acguments and encyclopaedic the scholacship may be to day. (Thece 
ace exceptions hke Spenglec or Sorokm and they remam outstde the mamstream -
cntlcal or conservative Yes, mdeed, Weber does escape the mescapable of h" t•me 
And yet, he could not escape the magical cape of Rationa!tty Rationali,.tion in the 
co.,tructio l of his General History and the Sociologies of Knowledge and of Religion. 
How, w•th h.s vast profound eschatolog•cal v.s>nn of the nse and fal of modem 
civilisation, Weber allowed himself to fal into the trap of unive"alising Reason-
Rat>nnahsatton remams mexpltcable to me It " a huge fadure •t entads cnmm.tment 
to the theory of the modemisotion of the past; the theory by means of which 
modernity fals.fies al h.story before its own Advent, for it is perhaps the only 
“methorl”by wh>eh modem man can (m.s)appropnate the his臼ncaland “pre 
historical”past and justify his own time: especially in the f町m of the theory and 
practice of the development and modemioatlon of the non-white peoples of the 
world And for th.s h•ghly v>nlent and ruthle,,ly •mpenal enterpnse, a rad.cal and 
self serving falsification of the past (under the names of philosophy or“science”of 
History, ethnography or comparative sociology) is a sine qua nan as the ideological 
and moral bas.s and iusttf•cat>nn of th.s •mpenal pogrom 
(6) Aron, Raymond: Ma問 Cumnts in Sacialagical Thought, Volume Two, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1970, p.257. 
(7) The distinction between anthropology and autology is fundamental and one that 
separates the “modem”from the trad•t•onal The central quest.on of anthropology " 
What is man? that of autology, Who am I? They are two e<S田 tialydifferent 
questions: the latter alone ts authentic and extstent>ally vahd Thts pomt cannot be 
explicated here, but we may say the following: The grammar (and syntax) of the 
anthropolog•cal questmn opens an unbndgeable gap between the eptstem•c and the 
ontlc levels, presupposes man to be an object of conceptu•lt5't>nn and thus poS>ts an 
irreconcilable subject-object duality; further it makes the obvious and internal identity 
of the quest>nner and the obiect of his quest>nn an extrapolation. The autolog,cal 
quest•on has a reflexwe syntax and presupposes the umty of the epistem•c and ont>e 
levels and precludes, by virtue of its grammar, the object character of man. 
(8) The relatlvtsat•o l of the concepts of rat>nnahsot•on and dtsenchantment would, m 
any case, be unavoidable m view of the mcurable mcapac•ty of morlem thought to 
cope with the Other-the darker side of universal existence. This crisis of modernity 
and •ts ideolog>es ts foreshadnwed by Weber’s dehmt>nns of soc>al action, social 
relationship and power in terms of the other. The Weberian definitions are based on 
Mead's (1863-1931) theory of the “generalized other”In Erving Goffman (1922 1982) 
thts and cognate lmes of thought reach the>r culmmat>nn wtth human act>nn reduced 
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to performance and so01ety to a show (These concepts have, however, nothmg m 
common with traditional images of the human world except as lame perverS1ons) 
The far-reaching implications and the hidden ironies of Goffman’s work makes 
Parsons (1902-1979) obsolete It does more; 1t shows the vast, gothic, labyrinthine 
edifice of Parsonian theoretisations a symptom of a tired and decayed civilisation. 
Goffman’s own work IS an epilogue to“post-modermty”. No wonder thereぉ todaya 
tendency to neglect Goffman's work and demgrate hiS mtellectual emmence 
(9) Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C. Wright (tr and eds.); From Max Web肝 Essays問
Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, p.154. 
ua Ibid .p.122. 
QO Ibid., p.123. 
Q~ Ibid., p.123. 
自~ 'Aesthetic is used here in its original meaning; We are peculiar people. I say 
this with reference to the fact that whereas almost al other peoples have called their 
theory of art or expreS<10n a“rhetonc and have thought of art as a kmd of 
knowledge, we have invented an“aesthetic”and think of art as a kind of feeling. 
“The Greek ongmal of the word “aesthetic means percept10n by the senses, 
especially by feeling. Aesthetic experience is a faculty that we share with animals and 
vegetables, and is irational. The “aesthetic soul”is that pact of our psychic makeup 
that "senses”things and reacts to them m other words, the senhmental”part of 
us. To identify our approach to art with the pursuit of these reactions IS not to make 
ar.t "fine”but to apply it only to the life of pleasure and to disconnect it from the 
active and contemplative lives”（Coomaraswamy, A.K. －”A Figure of Speech or a 
Figure of Thought＇”in Selected Papers, Vol.I, edited by Roger Lipsey, Prmceton, 
Princeton University Press, 1977, p.13) 
This is essentially the basis of Kierkegaard’S illuminating distinction between the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious stages or dimensions of life. He defines the 
aesthetic life m terms of unreflected immediacy, pleasure for the sake of pleasure and 
the attitude of non-commitment“hvmg for the moment and for the moment’s sake 
only”The aesthetic celebrates the fragmentary on prmciple. 
At its logical eminence, however, the aesthetic attitude is that of a totally 
dismterested witness, hvmg in the moment and the moment叩 ly,not m despair 
which Kierkegaard says is, in general, the path of the aesthetic life, but without 
nostalgic memory or fervent hope It, then, IS a form of absolute transcendence and 
comcides with the highest level of intellectual spiritual life. Except in such 
transcendent aestheticism, the aesthetic level is one of self mdulgence and 
entertamment and bereft of al meanmg what perpetually threatens the aesthete IS 
boredom. When I talk of objective, value neutral "scientific”sociology as only of 
aesthetic value, the pomt』 preCtsely,IS tha1 such a“science” IS “founded on 
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meanmglessness, " '"'tamed by •mpenal or paroch.al旧民＇＂＇ and harbourn d"pau 
Despite h≫ rather amb.valent attitude to what he called autonomous art (the "me as 
aesthetic“art" which is more vulgar entertainment than art), Weber did see the 
medeemabfe los of human d>gmty, the dire despa>r at the heart of modern Western 
culture and c.vH≫atmn He could never fel comfortable w>th hvmg on ersatz to 
which modern life is largely reduced and to which it is enthusiastically devoted. 
Feelmg (or taste) " the arb>ter of truth and excellence m the aesthehc way of hie; 
but however refo阻止は re-entersthe realm of aesthehc’Judgement’only as ersatz 
Aestheticism (as rightly defined here) and ersatzism are kindred. Weber is keenly 
aware of th.s“ the tensmn between the value spheres of 'sc>ence' and the sphere 
of 'the holy' is unbridgeable. Legitimately, only the disciple offers the 'intellectual 
sacnhce' to the prophet, the behever to the church Never as yet has a new prophecy 
emerged (and I repeat here deliberately this』magewhich has offended some) by way 
of the need of some modern intellectuals to furnish the>r souls with, so to speak, 
goaranteed genume antiques In domg so, they happen to remember that rehgmn has 
belonged among such antiques, and of al things religion is what they do not possess. 
By way of substitute, however, they play at decorating a sort of domestic chapel with 
small sacred •mages from al over the world, or they produce surrogates through al 
smts of psychic experiences to which they ascribe the dignity of mystic holiness, 
which they peddle in the book market. This is plain humbug or self-deception" 
("Science as a VocationぺGerthand Mills (tr. and eds.): op. cit., pp 154 5) This was 
written in 1918 but is no les contempo阻rytoday in 1992 th四 itmight have been in 
1919 22 when it was published：』 itcatches so precisely and insightfully the scene of 
Swam>-cults (Swamibazi as I cal >l) both m the West and m Ind.a today It凶
humbug, and humbug, self-deceptmn, " the very form of aesthetic≫m however 
highbrow. Indeed, it is crucially significant that Weber’s critique of modernity 
cmncides wrth that of Coomaraswamy on the central pomt, namely, that modermty rs 
aestheticism gone mad. The central point of Weber’s despairing critique of modernity 
is the staggering absurdrty of its self-grounding in absolute neutrality of human 
knowledge and unconditional acceptance of pas'>on and desrre as the foundation and 
legrtimallon of開taactrua, m other words, modermty founds scrence (knnwledge) and 
action (pohtics) on aesthetics 
It is rmpmtant to note that Weber frst examm., the natural scrences and then the 
medical scrences wrth rnlerence to therr almost axiomatic clarm that they are wholly 
neutral-ob1ecllve and need no presupposrtrons, and shows that they do make cruc,.l 
presupp"'rllons whrch srmply cannot be proved wrthm the natural and medrcal 
scrences Ha vmg shown th rs he exammes aesthetics“Cnnsrder a discrplme such as 
－ 
aesthetics. The fact that there are works of art is given for aesthetics. It seeks to 
fmd out under what condrtrons thrs fact exrsts, but rt does not rarse the question 
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whethe< o' not the 'ealm of a≪ ;, pe,hap' a 'ealm of diabolical g<andem, a maim of 
th" wodd, and, thmfme, m >ts me, hD't>le to God and, in its mne,most and 
adstocrntic spi<it, hostile to the brnthe,hood of man. Hence, aesthetics does not ask 
whethe' the'e sho叫dbe wo,ks of a≪ ("Science as a VocationヘGe<thand Mills (≪ 
and eds.): op. cit, p.144). 
Wehe' then prnceeds to show the same autotehc "pos1tiv1st1c”叩tihuman, 
mespons1ble on印刷ionm Junsprndence, m h1stoncal and culturnl sciences, philosophy 
of histmy, philosophy of cultu,e, in sociology, histo,y, economics and political science. 
The crnc1al 1mpo<tance of Webers concise, penetrntmg cntique of wthetics can be 
seen in mo'e ways than one Ffrstly, though genernlly seen as a“science”。f"t and 
beauty, aesthetics can be seen as the essence of the modem “SC1entif1c”apprnach to 
the study of any sphe'e of life and knowledge: the dehumanised, mefied, value 
neutrnl meaningless wodd of the legal, histoncal, culturnl, economic, political, 
soc10log1cal d1sc1phnes have al as the pnnc1ple and foundation the aesthetic autotehc 
apprnach to knowledge which totalises the fragment"Y・ It is hm that I see a me, 
rnthe' su,pdsing but elm and mential kinship between Webe' and Coomarnswamy: 
“But it is not the function of a museum o' of any educato' to !latte' and amuse 
the public. If the exhibitio 1 of wo1ks of alt, like the 1eading of books, is to have a 
culturnl value, 1 e,if 1t 1s to nounsh and make the best palt of us grnw, as plants am 
nounshed and g1ow m suitable s01ls, 1t is to the unde1Standing and not to fme 
feelings that an appeal must be made. In one 1espect the public is light; it always 
wants to know what a wo1k of alt 1s“about”“About what,'' as Plato asked，“does 
the sophist make us so eloquent'" Let us tel them what these wo1ks of alt am 
about and not mmly tel them things about these wo1ks of alt. Let us tel them the 
pamful trnth, that most of these wo1ks of alt a1e about God, whom we neve1 
ment凶nm polite society Let us admit that 1f we a1e to offe1 an education m 
ag1eement with the inne1most natu1e and eloquence of the exhibits themselves, that 
this wil not be an education in sensibility, but an education in philosophy, in Plato's 
and Alistotle’s sense of the wo1d, fo1 whom it means ontology and theology and the 
map of life, and a wisdom to be applied to eve1yday mattm. Let us 1ecogmze that 
nothing wil have been accomplished unless men’s lives a1e affected and theil values 
changed by what we have to show”（Coomarnswamy, A K “Why Exhibit Wo1ks of 
Alt？” m Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art, New Yo1k, Dove1 PubliC"tions, 
Inc., 1956, pp.20 21). 
Fo1 me, thmf01e, the tiemendous 1mpo1tance of Webe!'s cntique of (modem) 
aesthetics (which, unde1 the 1eg1me of m。dem1ty,1eplaces the 1eiected disc1plme of 
1hetoncs) hes m its powe1 to lead us back (01“f01wa1d”） to Coomarnswamy’s museum 
militant It is, at the same time, a d1alect1cal 1emmde1 of God, man and the 
intellectual叩e1at1onm al human a1t whethe1 01 not Webe1 "was in fact making 
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an叩 ormousstatement for God and humamty”（Swatos, Wilham H Jr’and K1vtst。，
Peter: 
Riligion, !991, 3町4),p.360). 
In order to gain some deeper underst叩 dingand appreciation of Weber’s critique of 
modernity, the following extended analysis of aesthetictsm should be useful, especially 
in view of modernity’s exaltation of aesthesis to the status of a foundational principle 
。fmodern civ1hsat1on 
The central dilemma, the crucial aporia of unredeemed (immanentist, referential 
ltterahst} aestheticism artses from its internal incoherence 
Autotehc pursuit of pleasure constitutes aesthettctsm "pleasure-perd1tton”一
encapsulates the essence of the aesthetic stage of man’s hfe, the first stage in 
Kierkegaard’s analysis; in the hierarchically related three stages of life, the next two 
bemg the ethical and the rehgtous. Pleasure ts to be understocd as any sensatton, 
feeling-emotton, thought, activity, etc the experience of which ts sought, pursued and 
valued for its own sake, for the “reason”that is deliberately chosen by the aesthete in 
ful individual freedom in preference to others that are seen by the aesthetic chooser 
出 possibleand choosable by him/her. It follows that any experience, thought or 
activity, whether painful or pleasurable, beautiful or ugly, fearful or peaceful, cruel or 
merciful, is. indifferently, a valued aesthetic experience, a JOY (that is not for ever}. 
The decisive condition is that the mode, scale and level of the experience (or 
pleasure}, sought after, pursued and preserved and recollected should be the aesth-
ete’s own“free’I choice, the act or fact of “choosing”conferring upon the chosen an 
absolute value In other words, aesthetictsm ts constituted by the coniunctton of two 
internally non cohering elements: egocentrictsm and autoteltsm By virtue of thts 
dtsiuncttve coniunctin, the aesthetic expenencer or pleasure seeker has，問 truth,to 
turn himself into the witness of hts own experience of enjoyment except that the 
aesthete, no matter how sophisticated or crude, simply cannot turn him/herself into a 
witness without sacrificing the experience sought after; his chosen sensation, feeling, 
etc, no matter how reflexive the experience of the aesthete, witnessing ts not 
experiencing, observing, intuiting etc, 1t ts knowmg which凶 atone with bemg, 
transcending aesthetic cognition. The aesthete simply cannot ever realise the truth of 
aestheticism because as the witness he/ she should be absolutely free while the 
aesthete, by virtue of his/her egocentricity, is imprisoned in the iron cage of self 
willed, eccentric choice. The principl巴ofautotelism is thus radically contradicted by 
the pseudo principle of ego-centrに1ty（ ~a concentratton of eccentricity} The failure 
to be transformed from the expenencer, the enioyer 1叫othe witness of one’s own 
experience (and hence, ultimately of al-experience) ts the failure to redeem 
1mmanent1st literalist aesthetrnm by transferring vertically from the ammal to the 
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human level and from the lit町alto the anagogic. Thi' redemptmn of the mthetic ;, 
al'o the redemption of modernity; for it (modernity) " unque,tionably founded on the 
centrality of the ae,thetic （ ~the 'en,.te) at both level.: the individual and the 'ocial 
civili,.tional. 
Modern thought po,it' m叩＂＇ a bundle. a cnngerie' (not ,y,tem) of hi' de,ire' and 
need' which he him,elf h"' to '"ti,fy. by hi' own (or commanded/hired) labour and 
work. frαn the pre-ex1'ting fon" of al ,u,tenance Nature. and the mhented human 
world: Hi'tory. Thi' 'ituation of man wil remain 田＇entiallythe "me 'o long "' the 
human sustenance and mv1val sy,,ems remain as they always have been only 
partially cybemated. moreover. in a highly limited way. And this seems to be a wholly 
fixed aspect of human constitution the existing cybernetic system can be 
supplemented. assisted and enhanced; but in principle and substance. the human 
sustenance and survival system remains for al 1magmable time virtually non-
cybemated. 
There is. of course, the prevailing and subliminally powerful seductive idea that 
advances in modem science and technology wil abolish both Nature and History: 
Nature, by transmuting it into Industry; and History by reducing 1t to Technology 
through wholesale psychic and social engmeermg One has, however, to remember 
that modern man’s central project of complete liberation of the human spec陪sfrom 
both Nature and Hrstory involves not only the mega-magic of sαence techno ogy, but 
presupposes at the same time that by a species transmutation modem man wil 
become a completely cybemated system at al levels and modes of hrs existence: it is 
not clear 1f such a species-transmutation 路 expectedto occur naturally or would have 
to be brought about by huge advances in bio engineering. However, let us not digress 
to consider even briefly the undoubtedly important problematic of evaluating the 
pa.sib1hty of such rad1c•l and total b10 engmeenng （ニ“scientific”alchemy),or 
assessing the chances of a miraculous complicity between (modem) man’s fast 
changing d"ires (and ways of thought) and nature’s“teleology”such that the desired 
transmutation of the human species wil naturally occur, there IS mdeed a dec1'1ve 
objection against this，町 anysuch, project of 'scientific”alchemy. It is as follows: 
The 1mphe>tmns and log1co-dialectical cham-consequences of a spec1es-(trans) 
mutation cannot but be no les than of cosm10 d1mensrons, moreover, they would 
obviously be immense; that is, almost wholly incalculable; and, in truth, beyond our 
contemp"a'y 1mag1nat1on Now a project of wh10h the log10al 1mphcatrons and 
chain-consequences are not only beyond our reason but outstrip even our imaginative 
powers, IS not a human project, in any case, it is literaly non-sense without 
reference or sense; besides it would be wholly undesirable as a total and radical risk 
for humankind As for the “hope”or“expectation”of the desrred transmutat10n 
occurring naturally, that too would be precrsely without any reference or sense, for in 
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the normal human context, one cannot“expect”or“hope”for somethmg that one 
do" not know and cannot meanmgfully •magme What " pomble m the spmtual 
context " not nece沼田口Jyso m the >mmanent human and natural contexts 
Now g;ven that man’s v>rtually non-cybernehc conshtutm 1 stays as >t has been 
smce !>me >mmemorml (any future transmutation bemg ummag;nable to day), g;ven 
the centrality of the aesthetk ”prme>ple”m the “self-groundmg”of modermty, •t 
follows that only an adversary relat;onsh;p ;s poss;bJe between Man and Nature a 
relat;onsh;p of reckless expJo;ta6ono prax;oJog;cally th;s means that the conquer;ng, 
explm6ng relatmnsh>p of man to nature " a Jog>eally necessory relat>on under the 
reg;me of modern;ty. Ag叩 1.h.s rela6onsh;p w;th H;story must necessadly be one of 
host;J;ty: that ;s, one of intellectual misappropdation of the past （ ~modern;sation of 
the past; in other words, the wmful subjugat;on of al history to modernist categor;es 
of thought and ac6on). 
It should be clear now that modermty’s relatmn to Nature and H.story cannot be 
overcome, nor even changed m any s.gmficant way except on pa;n of totally and 
radically denouncmg and renoundng Modernity ;tself. 
Smoe the aesthet>c " the non-reflectmg, non rat>onal, ammal d;mensmn and mode 
of human life in ;ts wholenes" redemption of the aesthetic is the first task of man: 
modernity, when it does not ;gnore it, rejects the necessity of redeem;ng the 
aesthet>c, as of course, >t must, g.ven the centrality of the aesthet>c m modermty It 
has to go further and elevate the aesthetic as the central governing“principle”of 
man’s nature, life and destiny. Th;s ineluctable fals;hcaUon of human Hfe cannot・ but 
lead to genocide and cosmodde. This ;s a stunn;ng fals;f;cation of the reality of man's 
life and of the truth of his dest;ny. From th;s l;e in the soul of modernity follows a 
cham of ccntrad>etmns, fals>f>eations and pervers>ons To begm w>th, let us consider 
Man’s relation to Nature and to H;story for, as wil become clear ;n the course of the 
following analysis, th;s relationship凶 originaland constitutive both in Trad;tion and 
Modermty w>th, of course, the al important prov>So, namely, that m Trad>t.on man " 
constituted by a hierarch>eal tdadic relation: God Man; Man Nature (ecology, 
econom>es), and Man Man (polis, soc>e>ty-h>story), modern man demes and reiects the 
first relation undermin;ng thereby the ground of the very possib;lity of man and h;s 
;nhented relational world of nature and h;story forming a coherent whole. In truth, 
God (the D.v.ne, the T>meless Ongm）ぉ thesovere.gn who rules al other relat.ons 
(man-nature and man ma汽）， so any demal of man Absolute relationship would mvolve 
the groundlessness of both Man Nature and Man-Man relationship and make the very 
idea of a sound, just. honest or s;ncere relationship between man and his Other 
human or non human; for merely and wholly immanent horiwntal relationship would 
lack the prme>ple m terms of which the cntena of true and false relat.onsh•p could be 
formulated, discerned and applied to specific cases.“In connection w;th widespread 
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dormancy of psych巴 elements,>t " p>rticularly 1romoal that the nロlionof smcenty 
or rather the word, for 1t is scarcely more than that should loom so large m 
れ.ventiethcentury complacency, for smrenty, which implies an integral vigilance, is 
iust what modem man mo≪ lacks”（Lmgs, Martin Symbol and Archetype, 
Cambridge, Quinta Emnt1a, 1991, p.108). 
Bemg atehc, fragmentary and atom1Stic-aggregational, modernity based sooieties and 
dvilisations are wholly and radically incapable of seeing Nature and History as such, 
that IS, as each m its own way appears and ex1Sts m time and space for their ongm 
and end are beyond man’s "researches’and hence outside modem scientific 
knowledge: each is, for man, already alway• there. And yet modernity posits them as 
commg mto ex15tence and surv1vmg solely for serving man’s need• and purposes as 
felt and set by man himself (man~modem man) In takmg this poS1tion, modem 
thought obvioosly uses a universal suprahuman teleology whkh is dearly but ilkitly 
borrowed from certain schools of Christian theology and Christology. (An explidt 
version of thlS kmd of“sc1entifio”theology can be found m the work of Father 
Teilhard de Chardin.) It is a contradictory position: in al modem sdentific evolutionism 
(induding T eilhard’s) both Nature and natural history and “prehistory”long antedate 
the emergence of man. And yet their universal tel田 isdetermined timelessly by the 
late amvmg evolute, man, a position JUStlhed only 1f man were omniscient and 
omnipotent (The•e attributes man has never possemd as yet and can never do the 
concepts of omnisdence and omnipotence are humanly unintelligible as wil be dear 
from their logico一d1alectkalanalysis.) The contradiction lies in this: the logic of the 
concepts of Nature and History as they are used in modem thought makes them 
cosmological and man’s relationship to them hierarchical. At the same time, 
aggregational, atehc ax1omatios and empmmt testability and value neutral object1v1St 
methodology rule out al cosmological and hierarchical realities and their adequate 
analysis and understanding. Indeed the very admission of the originlessness and 
endlessness of Nature and History 15 radkally against the grain of modernity; but the 
adm1SS1on cannot be evaded, only ignored 
It follows then that Nature and History can enter modem thought only as a supply 
system and a surviving ethnographical material: each a staggering falsification of the 
reality experiential and logical - of Nature and History. From this falsihcat1on 
follows the perverted, self-serving relation of man and nature, of actor and h1Story 
sustained only by a smuggled, inadmissible teleology: an adversary relationship, one of 
conquest and reckless explmtation m the case of Nature and one of mcomprehen'lon 
and abolitio1 through what may be called the modemisatin of the past. 
Now as has already been shown, man has, ineluctably, to labour and work himself 
for hlS survival (and “for the progress' of h1S c1v1hsat1on) by extracting supplies for 
his needs and desires from the pre given supply system (=Nature in pre modem 
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thought) Labounng and workmg for surv.val becomes, unde< mode<mty-and there 
alone-his typal, parad1gmat1c mode of“be mg”It 1s, of course, clear but important 
to emphasise that Jabourmg and workmg, in the present context, mean Jabourmg and 
working successfully; that is, f，出＇lureto produce (=obtaining the desired g,pply for 
man to use) cannot count as Jabour or work It follows from this (pnnc1pial) analysrn 
that man is what he produces from the given supply system (homo labornns); and 
he is also what he produces from a given material by remaking 1t according to some 
given design for a given purpose (homo fab.r). Used as a definition of man this 
already implies the converse equation: the producer is the sum of his product•日 the
logical next step from the above premises, makes man iust a producer or nothmg, 
and the truth of producing 1s the end product(s). 
Now smcc, as we have shown，凹emay not succeed m producmg the desired, 
needed product even though labourmg and workmg for 1t, and smcc there 1s no way 
of counting failed labouring or working for anything, success (and victory) is built into 
al modern and Marxian anthropology and sociology (and indeed m al social science). 
And this must rcmam thus and so no matter what its nemesis may be And mdccd 
1t has been tcmble beyond our fears and anxieties 
Now with the crucial concept of success built mto the constitutive categories of 
modern human life labour and work a number of deeply significant results 
follow: To begin with, labouring, working and acting, each and al of these bask 
concepts of the active life （叫toactiva) have to be replaced by (if not, in fact, 
reduced to) a single concept, viz., achieving (to achieve). Labouring, working (to 
work) and doing: each and al carry the built-in possibility of failure as well as that 
of success in obtaining the desired results；“achieving (to achieve), on the other 
hand, has the idea of successfully labouring, working and doing built into it. The 
logic of this concept makes 1t non""" to say that somebody has been "ach1evmg” 
but has failed to bring about the desired results. Of course, it can be said that 
somebody failed to achieve what he/she wanted to. However』 thiswould be only an 
inelegant way of saying：“He laboured/worked/acted/tried to achieve 'X’but did n叫
succeed”here the mam verbs are 'to labour', 'to work', 'to act＇，ιto try', each of 
which is succe,,-neutral, so that “fa1lmg", m effect, apphes here not to "ach1evmg” 
but to the above success-neutral human procedures which could as well fail as they 
may succeed. The same semantic difference is reflected in the grammatical fact that 
usage wise one cannot soy labourable/ unlabourable: and though one does say 
workable/unworkable: docble/undoable (though the usage in the last case is rare if 
not impermissible), the meaning of the one is related to the strong probability of 
success and failure and m the other 1t IS an ax10 ogical use 1f and when pcrm1ss1ble 
Jn the case of achieving, there 1s a clear distmct10n between the achievable and the 
unachievable so that attempt問gthe unachievable again refers to the concepts of 
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“attemptingぺ“trying”andnot to that of achieving. ("Achiev" To finish, to carry out 
successfully; Of an end; To attain, to reach successfully. ”Shorter OED：，“achieve, 
v t to bdng to a successful JSsue, to end (obs i toperform to accomplish to wm” 
Chambm Twentieth Century Dictionory) Morlernity, 'true”to its“principles”j thus 
cannot see man’s bemg, his specif1c1ty and nature, m terms of makmg or domg (for』
to repeat, 1t cannot count failed making or acting as making or doing), 1t mu.<t, 
therefore, see man's being in terms of achieving, the semanlic structureロfthe 
concept precluding failure，“to achieve’IS to succeed Modernity defines man as the 
achiever; to be is to be on achiever. In the very title of his classic, The Achieving 
Society, and in his key concept“n-ach.”（need to achieve) McClelland has summed 
up the whole nature of modernity and its dire fate. It 1s, therefore, of the highest 
importance to see how the theory of man as essentially, (the) achiever; how, among 
so many human needs, the”n-ach”（need to achieve) 1s par excellence and 
preeminently the human need, let us see how the concepts“achieving”and 
“achiever”funclio' in the radically new context of modermty Firstly, in the context 
of trad111on which, unlike that of modermty, 1s almost always dialectical, man 1s seen 
at three levels; aesthetic, active (vita activa) and contemplative (with the crucial 
caveat that the aesthetic is a subhuman level of human existence). At the level of 
vita 町 twaman exists between ineluctable duaht1" which. m町eover,are often 
antithetical. Accordingly he has to cope with rationality as well as irrationality; 
pleasure as well as pam - for existing at the level of relativ1t1e" man cannot 
eliminate once for al either reason or unreason, either pleasure or pain In his 
purposive-rational lif.e, man has to cope with and live with both vにtoryand defeat, 
today the one, tomorrow, maybe, the other This umversal human condition 1s 
epitomised by Kierkegaard; at the aesthetic level, pleame-perdition; at the active 
level, victory-defeat; at the religious-spiritual level, suffering; for this is the level of 
transcendence and dualities now yield place to the absoluteness of suffering signifying 
the incommensurab1hty between man’s fimte, relat1v1st1c existence and the infimtude 
of the Transcendent, the Divine, the Absolute, the Zero (Sunya). 
In the undialectical monistic-absolutist world of modernity the relativities are 
banished without any act or knowledge of or belief in the Absolute or Transcend・ 
ence However, 1t 1s not easy to absolutise Reason, Happiness, Goodness, etc , the 
counterparts of each unreason, misery, evil, etc. are too powerful, too obstinate and 
universal to be abolished or ignored by discounting. It is success built into the 
concept of achieving that modermty absolut1ses by decreeing that the non-successful 
do not count to be manニ tobe ach1ever=the succe日ful,the v1ctonous 
This completely unrealistic and direly und1alect1cal pos山on makes ”success”， 
ach1evmg, ach<evement autotehc, that IS, success, to be successful, IS its own end 
This has to be thus and so; for otherwise one either accepts the dualities. the 
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ralat1v1t1as, tho contmganc.as of human axtstanca as ral and const•tut>va of human 
hfe m short, on• has to accapt suffonng as essential to human axtstence, an 
acceptance that •tself implies the nostalgia and the striving for transcending 
relatlv'1y; or conversely, the absolute reiectmn of transcendence entads the 
absolutisation of the relative. There can thus be no conditionalities for modern man, 
the achiever nor for the achieving society of which he (the achiever) alone is a 
member, the others are mere proletanat, hewers of wood and drawers of water 
The absolutisation of “ach>eving”permits only the intransitive use of the verb “to 
ach>eve" wh.ch, though grammattcolly perm•tted, ts a semantic perverS1ty, for, as a 
consequence of thts, •t does not, mdeed, cannot matter at al what the ach>ever 
achieves; his objectove, and the obiect to be achieved are both insigniftcant so long as 
the “ach>eving is such as can be plausibly glonfied, which is really a matter of 
commanding advertising skils and the required financial resources. The distinction 
between the tremendous and the tnvial_ is lost if one has the resources to glonfy 
whatever ooe cares to achieve however tnv1al The achievmg soc.ety ts necessanly, an 
adverttsmg society, a C>V•hsatton of med.a and commercials, and, naturally, one of 
consumensts and opportumsts for the achtevmg society abohshes eth.cs, pohtiC', 
economics, ecology by abolishing the very idea of mtnns.c worth and the distinctions 
between the worthy and the unworthy. 
W•th al thts, m叩 hasto“achieve”his life - sustenance and survival from Nature 
however heavily mediated by advanced technology and industrialisation. The point 
here is that the replacement of man the producer (and the producer by his products) 
by man the acl羽田町 doesnot abohsh or abrogate man the producer •t only 
superimposes upon him the modality，“achievmg”As our foregoing analysis of the 
semant悶sand 1mphcatmns of the concept of“achievmg”shows, the producer-
achiever's relatmnsh•p to nature would now necessanly be one of conquest and 
Vにtory seen m terms of greater glory of man There would follow many ways of 
achieving glory in Man-Nature relat•onship. The one that is most important here is 
that of over productmn and smce glory IS the conf>rmatmn and rad.ance of 
achievement, the autotehsm of "achtevmg’ts transferred to productmn m 
consequence of wh.ch •t ts delinked from al real needs and natural des•res it has to 
be prロducttonfor '1s own seke, that ts, for disposel consumers are now the 
counterpart of production and their needs are therefore manufactured and desires 
mduced and managed along w•th producmg commod•ttes and managmg the>r sale and 
d1Stnbutmn The achiever as the consumer has to mdulge more and more in 
Veblenian conspicuous consumption and ownership of goods in order to seek the glory 
of achieving (succ田s).
And here we reach the ultimate contradiction of aestheticism: a double edged one; 
besides its intrinsic constitutive one arising from the opacity of aesthesis. As 
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modernity m its desperate unreason tries to turn th!S opa01ty mto an autotehsm, 1t 
mvents aesthetics and aesthellc1Sm (and the aesthete) there thus arises the “trans” 
formation of aesthesis into aestheticism as the cult of enjoying and celebrnting one’s 
own sensat10ns, feelings, emot10ns, experiences, and thought and knowledge (and 
act10n) demoted to the level of aestheSls, also the momentaneous nature of ail hfe 
(and things) and, indeed, of aesthesis itself, requires of the authentic aesthete that he 
live his life in the moment and for the moment’s sake only: To be able to so live is 
to be transmuted mto a pure witness, a samt endlmly self reflexive, naturally 
ascending to the Absolute moment. The authentic aesthete then is a son of the 
moment, not himself but a pure witness of ail his selves. (This holds equally true of 
aesthetics or aesthet1c1Sm m its modern technical sense, viz, perception and 
appreciation of beauty of the world or in art and literature, the latter mimetically 
representing man and his relationship to himself and his world as the enjoyer. Here 
the transformation of the enioyer, the consumer, mto a pure witness abrogating 
himself/ herself by an act of transcendental contemplation IS obvious. The self-
destroying contradiction between enioymg and w1tnessmgぉ m the very nature of 
autonomous 1mmanent15t aesthetic1Sm 
Modernity denies m叩’S出tacontemplatiua and, reoongnismg only the aesthetic and 
the active life （叫taact山a)of man. founds the latter on the former. This incredible 
perversion leads log1co-dialectically as well as SOCIO economically to our present 
predicament where a small uncreative 1rresponS1ble but dominant minority controls a 
production system essentially and largely de linked from human needs, and reduces 
the overwhelming maionty to being mere consumers for the overproducing system 
whose needs too are manufactured by the dominant minority along with goods that 
are to be disposed of on巴wayor the other. It is NOT the private profit motive that 
IS the real evil of the modern system of production, 1t IS the achievement syndrome 
（“n-ach.”！） that must culminate NOT in a society of enjoyers but one of captive, 
abject consumers under the iiluS1on that It IS they who choose “consumerism”and 
decide what they wil consume, when they have, in truth, no choice whatever. The 
producing elite too IS a v1ct1m, a captive of the conquest glory syndrome Indeed, 
Mclleland calls his magic concept“n-ach.”（need to achieve) a virus, and holds that 
only those infected with this virus (or those who have been injected with it) can be 
modernised (or modernise themselves). 
Here then is the fate of the achieving man and his achieving society: promising 
himself a hfe of ch01ce enjoyment, he IS reduced to a helple田 victimof consumerism 
subliminally, when not openly, by a tiny minority which is itself a victim of its own 
necessity of self-glonficat10n Vita act!υa reduced to an achieving so01ety "nses”to 
be a society of victims of overproduction With the perversion of u.ta actwa by 
modernity, man’s humanity IS endangered ThlS IS the nemeS1s of a c1v1hsat10n 
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which founds itself on aestheticism. 
Aestheticism the natme, meaning and logic of which has already been briefly 
analysed-when exalted to the principle on which a new umversal c1vtlisatton founds 
itself generates a d1alect1c which, to, culmmates m the dental of man's transtempo 
ral telos, thus reducing him to a cog huge socio economic political machine. When 
man, re1ectmg the D1vme and the love and glory thereof, chooses to love himself and 
the glory of man; when he, accordingly, rejects the archetypal City of God and 
founds the City of Man on self love and self-glorification, it becomes imperative for 
him as an achiever that he concretise the glory of his conquest of Nature and the 
posmsion (by incomprehension) of al preceding history. This concretisation cannot 
but take the form of matenal goods and terhnnlog1eal wonders and monumental 
architecture. In order that the glory achieved by man may be confirmed and radiated, 
it has to be objectified in various forms, dimensions and modalities; the mD"t popular 
and substantial form would be material goods: their ownership and possession and 
consumption and display. Material goods now constitute man’s glory and his supreme 
Good And man now loves to be possemd by his possess10ns 
The foregoing is a shghtly extended commentary on Weber's penetrating and 
devastatmg critique of modernity especially as summansed m a masterly passage m 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. It is already quoted in Note (I), 
pages 47-48. For ready reference the following passage may be requoted: 
”In Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of 
the “samt hke a hght cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment' But fate 
decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. 
"No one knows who wtl hve m this cage m the future, or whether at the end of 
this tremendous development entirely new prophets wil arise, or there w•ll be a great 
rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished 
w>th a sort of convulsive self-importance For of the last stage of this cultural 
development, it might well be truly said：“Specialists without spirit, sensualists 
without heart: this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civihzatton never 
before ach>eved” 
Weber’s penetratmg and remarkably presc.ent cntique of modermty, so concisely 
encapsulated m what may be called the •ron cage passage, has saod al that needs 
saying to day more than a ful half century after Weber’s death. The purpn<e of my 
commenta[Y ts S>mply to amphfy and analyse not to add to >t 
Indeed, I find it rather strange that Habermas, a front rank Weber scholar, should 
fail to realise that Weber has already rendered obsolete his critique of instrumental 
rationality: this holds true of his (Habermas’） proposed redemption of instrumental 
reason by the theory of Communicative Action based on the so-called Meadoan and 
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Aust1man parnd1gm shift Indeed, Wehe<’S work renders nugato1y the whole cnt1c•I-
theoret1cal idea of emancipatory reason (v1de ’Science as a Vooat1on”among other 
such sources m Weber) 
Again, Habermas fuly shares, confra Weber, the modern faith that the failings, 
m1sunderstandmgs, excesses and misuses of modern Reason can al be redeemed 
Phoenix like by modernity itself. Obviously, Habermas cannot ever see that Modernity 
and Reason do not and cannot go together. Nor, apparently, does Habermas realise 
that his own theory of Communicative Action leads only to a Consensual theory of 
truth which, far from bemg emancipatory, mstrumentahses not only Reason, but Truth 
itself.“Communicative Action", which Habermas almost equate< to symbolic action, 
bemg honzontally onented can never reach the symbolic level which 1s vertical to the 
referential level and ultimately transcends the conceptual universe. ). L. Austin, a 
subtle, powerful, hon<'t thinker himself realised this and m the end gave up his key 
d1stmclion between the constalive and per!ormal!ve uses of words, and did this m 
the very lectures he wrote and delivered to propose and systematically develop it (H 
ow to Do Things with Words). 
A vast, incorrigibl巴differencein the levels of penetration, profundity and insight 
separates Habermas from Austin and Adorno; as indeed from any serious, sincere 
thinker. Thought-making, or encyclopaedi瓜 stupendocsscholarship is not，伊F se, 
thinking. 
0~ Weber, Max; The Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. and eds. by Edward 
A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949, p.57. 
or Ibid., p.1s. 
自由 Ibid., p.81. 
仰 Itmay seem that Weber’s approach to this problem in terms of probability is an 
exceplion I, however, thmk that such an approach 1s rather odd, particularly m those 
contexts in which the concept of probability is not really meaningful for instance, 
probab1hties imputed to a past period. It certainly dロesnot falsify my proposition 
because the noti叩 of”highest probability”makes sense only in the context of the 
notion of certainty. To deny this is to abolish contingency as a logical problem and an 
existential mystery 
自由 Weber, Max; The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. by A.M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons; ed. by T. Parsons, New York, Oxford Umversity 
Press, 1950, P.88. 
0~ The celebrated distinction between nomothetic and idiographic sciences raises the 
questmn if an 1d1ography 1s stnctly possible at al except as a history of 1d10syncra 
cies. In any case, an idiography which is not governed by a systematic ideography 
and idiography and ideography wil often be divergent and woげkat cross purposes 
can at best be “aesthetic”art (see note 13) and cut of from the active and 
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contemplative hves. The thee<y of 1d10graphic sciences. its illustrious sponsors 
notwithstanding, violates the Anstotelian rule against a science of individuals. The 
concept of “pure description”is in any case more dificult and complex than is 
usually allowed. (Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophtcal vocation as striving 
toward pure descript10n IS a case apart, and one must remember that Wittgenstein 
did not want to be a scientist nor was he a phenomenologist. See Wittgenstein, 
Ludwig; Culture and Value, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, pp.5e-8e and passim.) 
Marx rejects the antitheS!s between the sc>ence of m叩 andthe sctence of nature, he 
has a single method, inductive and historical-dialectical, for the study of both man 
and nature He rejects the view that human h!Story and nature requtre two different 
methods of study. This would, of corne, follow eventually from his belief that 
“Nature becomes one of the organs of his (man's) activity, one that he annexes to his 
own bodily organs, adding stature to himself in spite of the Bible”（Marx, Karl; 
Capital; A Critique of Political Economy, New York, Random House, 1906, p.199; 
parenthesis added). The social scienm of modern capitalist society do not reach the 
level and prestige of the natural and the tensions and methodological problems this 
fact generates are resolved escha tologically by the prophetic proclamation; “All history 
IS the preparat10n for “man”to become the obJect of sen.<uous consc10usness, and for 
the needs of“man as man”to become (natural, sensuous) needs H!Story itself IS a 
real part of natural history一ofnature’s commg to be man Natural sctence w.Jl in 
time subsume under Itself the science of man, JU St as the sctence of man wil 
subsume under itself natural science; There wil be one science”（Marx, Karl; 
Economic and Phifosophtc Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1959, 
p.103). This is, of course, only a consistent, logical development of the Comte-
Durkheim project of the “Science" of man and history and is admittedly founded on a 
demmrg1c anthropology 
Weber as a“scientist”steadfastly refused the prophetic mantle. If he was not too 
acutely aware of the demmrg1c (omniscience and ommpotence) telos of modern m叩，
it may be because he saw with extraordmary courage and clanty the reduct10 ad 
absurdum and the cosmic disaster and existential despair to which the principle of 
infinite comg1b1l1ty led. Again, if he did not reject idiography, it was only because he 
turned it into historico-analyttcal ideography (Ideal types). 
仰 Gerthand Mills (tr. and ed叫 op.cit., p.137. 
~o Ibid., p.13s. 
('A) ibid., pp.152 53 (see note 13 supra) 
帥 ibid.,p.138. 
01 Weber, Max; The Methodology of the Social Sdences, p. 52. 
関口nealso hears nowadays of sc陀nceas an aesthetic V1S10n, or as an mtellectual 
pursuit aiming at the achievement of a heightened consciousness. All such 
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conceptions are variations of the autotelic theory of science, whiにhis founded on the 
aesthetic syndrome. See note 13 suPra. 
~！ Gerth and Mills (tr. and eds.): op. dt., pp.148 49. 
的 Thoughmore than half-a-millemum separates Thomism and Comtism (the latter 
culminating in Durkheim and ending in Weber) there is an important sense in which 
they are contemporaneoos It IS nght to see the ongms of modernity m the 
Enlightenment (18th century); it wil be illuminating, however, to remember that 
before the philasophes who roughly started the Enlightenment, there arose in the 
thirteenth century what Gilson has aptly called philosophism. lt was advocated by 
Siger of Brabant and his circle around the last quarter of the thirteenth century. 
“Philosophism”means two things：，“first, the thesis that philosophising is in principle 
independent of and separate from theology and faith. For the first time in the history 
of Christendom the principle of uniting ratio and /ides, which had been established 
since the days of Augustine and Boethius, was formally abrogated abrogated, 
moreover, by clencal teachers at the most important academy of Chnstendom itself 
Secondly, this newly autonomous philosophy in defiance of the definition of its 
name ("search for wisdom”） which had been held valid since Pythagoras was 
considered wisdom itself, a doctnne of 5'lvation “There is no state supenor to the 
practice of philosophy”－such was one of its tenets”（Pieper, Josef An lntroduct10n 
to St. Thomas, L。ndon,Faber and Faber, 1963, p.127). lt should not be dificult to 
see that the moment of the autonomy of philosophy, that is, the moment when the 
love of wisdom is replaced by the love of one’s b10histomal selves-m other words, 
the displacement of phrlosoph1a by necroph1ha was the dec1s1ve moment of the deep 
split in the 、Nesternconsciousne" causing the more fundamental split between word 
and deed; thus making ethics out of bounds to science, social sαence and 
philcsnph1cal thoughts. Nor should it be difficult to see that this split would be 
repeated in the history of modernity again and again; indeed Siger of Brabant and St 
Thomas Aquinas wil be combined in the same figure. Comte, the pns1t1v1st against 
the negativism of Enlightenment, the prophet of the law of three stages proclaiming 
the Sovereign Rule of Scientists and Industrialists, Comte is also the soi-disant Pope 
of the Religion of Humanity: Durkheim eliminates God as nothing more than society 
transfigured and symbolically exprmed and then he does not operate with a 
demystified, liberal, empir悶alaggregational concept of society. No, he worked with a 
holisitc, magisterial notion of society: but having junked the Holy as an exalted 
surrogate of the power and maiesty of Society, who else but Durkheim has to bnng 
back the Holy by remystifying and sanctifying society as Collective Representations? 
Indeed, without a mystical behef m snc1ety and its Representations, his theory of 
organic solidarity wil scarcely work. Marx, the scientist of dialectical materialism, 
believing only in the intertwined powers of History and (Natural) Science, is also the 
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prophet of tho alchemy of tho Revolutionary fire. Weber, tho othnographe< and social 
scientist of Ratmnahsatmn and Disenchantment 1s also tho thoonst of Chansma 
without which ho soos no future for contemporary history. 
Thero is one decisive difference between the 13th and the 19th 20th centuries. The 
universalism St Thomas attempted to establish was a transcendental umversalism, 
going beyond Plato and Aristotle: he did not choose between Chnst1anity and 
Aristotle, but attempted to reconcile them in terms of a system not his own but of 
Truths revealed by God. Comte and Marx attempted to construct a universalism built 
m terms of Truths discovered by themselves, 1t was to be accepted by vutue of 
having been chosen. The concept of a constructed, chosen universal Reality is indeed 
the most novel idea and marks our“sc1ent1fic”age as unquest10nably umque 
There is perhaps an inescapable nemesis of challenging the Unchallengeable, of 
rebelling against Oneself. ”Made eternal, the transient is overtaken by a curse” 
(Adorno, Theodor W.: Prisms, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT press, 1981, 
p.252). 
IW See, for example, Etzioni, Amita1: Genetic Fix.-The Next Technological 
Revolution, New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1975 (Macmillan edition, 1973). The 
surest sign of the loss of e /an uito/, of the decay of a great civilisation is the 
weakening of memory. It 1s impossible to write poetry after Auschwitz, said Adorno: 
but even he forgot to suggest that 1t is hollow to talk about Western humanity after 
Hiroshima: ethnocentricity is sustained on a vast selective forgetfulness. 刷The
susp1c1on would then anse that our relat10nsh1p wilh men and creation m general was 
like our relalionsh1p with ourselves after an operation (under chloroform) obliv10n 
after suffering. For cognition the gap between us and others was the 5'me as the 
time between our own prmnt and past suffermg an msurmountable bamer But 
perenmal dommat1on over nature, medical and non medical techmques, are made 
possible only by a process of oblivion. The /o,, of memory is a tranmndental 
condit10n for science. All objectification is a forgetting”（Horkheimer, Max and 
Adorno, Theodor W.: Dialectic of Enlightenment, London, Allen Lane, 1973, p.230: 
emphases and p"enth.,is added). 
And today Professor Jiirgen Habermas contra Weber and Adorno represents a vast 
巴xercisein forgetting Auschwitz, Hiroshima and not only them. 
“Memory, taken absolutely, comc1des with ommsc1ence and 1s not a procedure”says 
Coomaraswamy ("Recollection, Indian and Platonic', Sefocted Papers, Vol. I, edited 
by Roger Lipsey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p.56). 
Does this imply that in a civilisation dominated by promised and projected 
omniscience, memory procedurely declmes? 
(28 a) Metzner, Ralph：“Age of Ecology" in Resurgence, No. 149 (19日1), p.4. Metzner 




A recent diustralion of the strategies of tnv1ahsmg the tremendous constantly at 
work is given by the New York Tim" in an editorial(March 6, 1992) which is 
reproduced here in ful: 
“N。tFunny" 
“There’s nothing funny about 200,000 human beings incinerated by 
nuclear weapons 
Ernest Hollings, usually a sensible Senator, shamed himself Monday by 
tastelessly quipping to South Carolina workers：“You should draw a 
mushroom cloud and put underneath it, 'Made in America by lazy and 
iliterate Americans and tested m Japan，” 
Senator Hollings says he wanted to show his exasperation with 
comments by Japanese politicians that disparaged American work habits. 
Such remarks are ignorant and provocative but they concern economic 
compe出ion,not wholesale death. Mr. Hollings’s riposte is totally out of line. 
A half-century after the events, there’s stil debate about the wisdom 
of President Truman’s decision to force a speedy end to World War I by 
dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A parallel debate 
recently erupted in Japan over the morality of Tokyo's surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbour. Such self examination honors both societies. 
Both countries are entitled to decent respect for the innocent dead. 
That's what Senator Hollings has lost sight of. Unrepentant, he glories in 
his callous joke. In contrast to the hasty apologies from Japan that have 
followed every high level msult made there, the Senator tels questioners 
“I'm glad I said u”Even a belated apology would be welcome.” 
The editorial is very right in pointmg out with admirable English understatement 
that the deliberate incineration of 200,000 Japanese citizens by il considered nuclear 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not at al a funny matter, but something in 
the most ugly taste. It also argues that it is highly improper and wholly unwarranted 
to transfer the conflict between America and Japan from the economic to a m1htary 
context, which 1s nowhere m the picture-at least m the near future 
The Ne明 YorkTimes editorial is m the right direction and is encomaging for al 
saner elements There are, however, aspects of the controversy to which the New 
York Times has paid no attention. 
The editorial does remind the Senator that President Truman’s w路domin 
deciding to atom bomb Huoshima and Nagasaki has always been questioned: 
implying perhaps that it is not yet a long settled matter in Truman's favour to allow 
the Senator to indulge his sick taste for wanton riposte. It does not notice that the 
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Senator mak" public statement of a fact which, though always known or 
suspected, has never yet boon oficialy admitted by the United States or any of the 
Allied Powers. It is the Senatorial admission that Hiroshima was chosen as the site 
for the first over real live-test explosion of the newly developed theory; by lending 
hts authonty to the test theory the Senator can scarcely enhance h指 roputatmnfor 
pat<iotism. lndood if the Senator’s preference for roaching for the bomb at the 
shghtost provocation porststs, he m•ght, m hts next r<Jmndor to some Japanese 
Mm出or,declare that the ste for the holocaustto oxpenment was chosen on othmr 
grounds一agama v"w long held by some exports 
By transferring the context of his rojomdor from economic rivalry to that of 
scientific experiment (and to military victory) the Senator powerfully illustrates the 
mternal depths of contemporary tnviahsatton of the tremendous Vtotory m war at 
any cost （“al ts faor in love and war”） is, m my v"w, an unacceptable dortnne (or 
slogan), testing a technological device (and perhaps, indirectly a scientific equation) 
at any cost however tremendous, ts a d•fferent matter, •t ts to rad•cally detach 
science from man and the world, not for the sake of truth and knowledge but in 
the name of universal knowability. To declare: what matters if millions of innocent 
people d", and generatmns upon generat•ons are m"med, let unknown and 
unknowable consequences take the>r unpredictable course “Man”must know 
whether the enormous dev•ces of destructmn forged by htm are effective or not, and 
tf so, m premely what measure 
If •t ts an argument from exponmental sc"nre, •t ts a strange one, for •t vmlates 
the bastc assumptmn。fexponmentahsm, namely, that al expenments can be so 
devised as to be practically harmless; and, m a町 case,the possibdity of irreversible 
damage has to be almost completely eliminated. 
It is at this point that the distinction between the experimental and actual science 
and act•on, botwoon terhmque and purpose, ts completely erased, and the “truth” 
•tself m terms of the mode and cost of >ts testmg ts rendered meamngless. Indeed, 
it is the very line botwoon the tremendous and the trivial that is being erased. The 
commensurability botwoon the measurable and the immeasurable in the oficial 
th田 'Yof Hiroshima and Nagmki, namely, that the nuclear bombing saved the 
estimated los of 70,000 American lives if the war continued, roaches its absurd 
limit. 
A further, higher order, twist in the procedures of trivialisation remains: implicit 
sancttf•cat,on of Horoshima for the greater glory of modern exponmental sc"nre and 
technology. Thu.s trivialising the rejected idea of sanctity itself. Cf. Hannah Arendt’s 
theory of the banality of Evil (Arendt, Hannah: Efrhmann in Jm salem, 




No les deplorable and destructive a<e a number of strategies which 
regularly operate m modem soc•et•es to scc,.hse the subhme (tnv,.hsatwn and 
destruction of the moral sphere). A current example is the South Korean women’s 
demand from the Japanese Government for compensauon to them fm havmg been 
fmced to serve as off•cml acmy prostitutes to Japanese lmpenal soldiers durmg 
World War I. Since these young girls, often under the most cruel and galling 
circumstances, were under the Army authority forcibly taken away from their 
families and homes and set up as prostitutes (oficialy called comfort women), they 
now demand apology and md.v•dual compensatwn from the present Government of 
Japan. 
It is obvious that the eruption of the long neglected scandal of“war atrodtyぺhas
been politically timed and coincides with Amencan hatred directed against the 
Japanese people. It is in the main and even essentially a political affair and is 
directed by both the Korean Church and certain political groups. The pohUcrnation in 
the form of compensatory iustトceof th.s scandalous •mmoral chapter of recent 
Japanese history is already a decisive step in the process of obscuring the moral 
d•menswn and thus tammg some of the huge issues mvolved 
'A group of South Korean women led by two former “comfort women” 
issued Monday an open statement directed at Prime Minister Kiichi 
M,y.,awa callmg for overall d<Sclosure of Japan's wartime explmtatwn of 
Korean women and compensation to the former comfort women and the<r 
families. 
In a five article request attached to the statement, Korea Church 
Women United asked that the Japanese g。vemmentreveal the “barbarous 
acts”taken by the defunct Japanese m•htary agamst Korean women forced 
to provide sex to soldiers during World War l. 
The statement sa<d that lookmg mto the comfort women .ssue was nロt
iust a matter of ”deahng w.th the past，” but rather cntical m recovermg 
trust between the Korean and Japanese people. 
"We should end the sense of animosity now，” s.,d Young Ae Yoon, 
general secretary of the group at a goodwill exchange gathering held at the 
Upper House building in Tokyo the s>me day. Her remark referred to the 
mistrust and hatred among Korean people toward Japan that are being 
passed down by former comfort women to their children. 
Pnor to Yoon’s speech, two former comfort women, Chim Mi )a and 
Hwang Kum Ju, both 69, gave emotional, and at times graphical, 
descnptwns of the<r gruesome expenence 
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"Why should Korean women serve as public toilets for Japanese 
soldiers'” Ch•m sa>d w"h a vmce close to a choke, recalhng how she felt 
when she had to have sex with more than 20 soldiers a day. Chim said she 
was focced to prov.de sex for s.x years m Fukuoka on the southernmost 
main island of Kyushu. 
Hwang claimed that she had been fooled into sex slavery when she 
applied for a factory worker's job. She said She was taken to Sakhalin and 
China. 
Yasuko Takemura an Upper House member of the Social Democratic 
Party of Japan, said in a closmg statement that efforts are bemg made tロ
pass a law to press the Japanese government for compensation to former 
comfort women.”（From A抑制EvemngNews, March 3, 1992) 
Before I analyse this case as a paradigm of the general triviahsation of the 
sublime, let me point out出atwhile in this case the South Korean “comfort 
women”are addre,.ing a former •mpenal power, the colomal context of the demand 
does not seem to be essential to the principles mvolved here The moral situat.an 
would be the same d these women were Japanese, though, of course, there are 
important political legal differences between the two situations. This particular 
aspect of the episode therefore does not figure in the analysis that follows; I do so 
because my purpose here " to see how the v.ctim.• are colludmg w"h the 
aggressors by trivialising the atrocities perpetrated against them. 
Three demands have been mad" (•) a ful oficial (but truthful) account of the 
whole 'comfort women”operatmn, (b) an apology to the people of South Korea, 
especially to the “comfort womenぺsurvivingand dead; and (c) proper monetary 
compensat.an to the sumvmg comfort women and to the fam•hes of those who are 
no more The fost " an emmently proper demand profoundly m consonance w"h 
the utter gravity of the offence against the dignity of womanhood; ultimately, it is a 
demand for a public moment of truth which the Government of Japan O¥Ves both to 
the people of South Korea and to its own. Its truthful and authoritative fulfilment 
carnes W•thm " great redemptive power, "s local •mportance hes m the fact that 
the Japanese Government’s immed.ate response to the opening of the shameful (or 
should one say, shameless) affair was to flatly deny the whole thing thus 
shamelessly using a well worn political strategy designed to marginalise the moral 
dimension of the episod•; if the denial works, that is the end of the matter; if it 
does not, the Government wil be given credit for the belated and ineluctable 
admission of its crime, rather than facing a fresh and icrefutable charge of teling a 
he to the people, (b) the second demand too " most appropriate for割nrereapologies 
alone are what can be offered now when the deed has been done for what is 
done " done, no power on earth or heaven can undo " except God for whom 
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nnthmg 1s 1mpnss1ble: an authentic apology h'5 tn be an act nf repentance which 
draws its energy from its reality as a prayer tn Gnd for the re凶rnnf the ''"'"' 
qua before the wrong doing. Though here the demand for apology from the 
Emperor nr the Government (nr both) is mainly in a secular polit巴alcontext, it is 
clear that the ful meaning of askmg for apology and its acceptance (or non-
acceptance) connot be accessible to us without prayer for forgiveness. (Hannah 
Arendt, it seems to me, does di5'gree with it against, I think, her own analysis of 
vita act山a,but that is another story.) And yet it may nnt be forgotten that some 
of the worst aponas m modern thought and many tormenting tensions and ironies of 
modern practice arise from the fact that the concept of sin has been almost 
universally discarded by our age, often with vehement contempt. This is strikingly 
illustrated in the third and the most important demand: (o) that the Government of 
Japan should award suitable compensation (for the atrociously forced prostitution of 
Korean girls by the soldiers of the Imperial Army of Japan) to the survivors and to 
the families of al those whn are no longer living. 
This is clearly the central and most prominently pressed demand. It is, of course, 
叩 establishedand perhaps unquestioned move in al such belated 出varenessof the 
wrong done to the afflicted party. In this case, the movement led by several church 
and political groups is likely to seek retrospective justice from law by filmg a case 
at an appropriate court of law, in addition to appealing to the United Nations. At 
home ton, leaders are pressuring the Diet to accept the compensation demand of the 
“comfort women” 
“It 1s my duty to testify pubhcly about the issue of comfort women，” Yoshida 
(78, a wartime oficial m charge of forced labourers from Korea) said, comparing the 
army’s violation of international law to the Nazi massacre of European Jews. 
“Yoshida insisted that some way must be found to compensate the victims. 
山 Afterthe war, Germany paid ¥ 8 trilion tロindividualsin compensation, so 
Japan should at least pay ¥ 1 trilion to a welfare foundation for North and South 
Korean victims”， he said.”（Asahi E"ning News, February 25, 1992, p.4; porenthesis 
added). 
It should be reasonably clear now that while the first and second demands are 
eminently appropriate and related to crucial n町msof democratic pohty, 1t is the 
third that is being seen as the central; and is being pursued accordingly at different 
levels. This would not be the serious matter that it indeed io, if this demand did 
nnt at the same time serve tn obscure the meamng and profound importance of the 
first two demands. 
In order to see how this has come about, let us note that the demand for 
compensation often, and especially m the present case where the Government 
through the Imperial Army acts as the pimp or procurer for the soldiers, IS possible 
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only if the st•te c•n apprnpnate the moral sphere to its own authority and thereby 
obscure, if not obliterate, the line between the moral and the political. This ;, of 
course, a well known and a much vaunted ach>evement of modermty The 
consequences of this virtually total arnm1lation of the moral mto the pohtic•l sphere 
are huge indeed: it begins with the separation of the church and the state which 
then leads necessarily and rather automatically to the complete appropriation of 
morality by polit"s the autonomy (seculansatlon) of poht1cs IS the utter profanation 
of morality (and ethics); for autonomous morality makes no sense, but with the 
abolition of theology and the elimination of metaphysics if morality is to make sense 
at al, 1t can do so only as the handmaiden of the pohtlcal system, that IS, not only 
public morality and ethics (ordered expression of the ethos of a people and a time), 
private morality too is necessarily so determined. (This is not to say that I myself 
believe in the ultimate validity of such a distinction.) The modernist emancipation of 
morality from religion, theology and metaphysics did not and could not make it 
autonomous (whatever it may mean if anythmg at al), nor scient1f1c or rational 
morality (ethics), by virtue of its emancipation from al direction from Above, fals a 
w1llmg, often enthusiastic, collaborator of the ruhng power and the dommant groups 
The vita activa is guided and governed by bios theoretikos. The realm of politic• 
and the realm of morality coincide by e>ch being the realm of human action: there 
IS no important modal difference between the two because the pohtlcal domam 
must necesrnnly be moral, for if political action ts non moral, then there ts no way 
for any human action to be imperatively, axiologically, moral. And thts explains why 
an "emancipated’l morality IS eo •Pso a morahty m the service of the dommant 
power-holdmg class or group 
What IS the nature of los or damage (or both) for which the “comfort women” 
demand compensation' Smce th!S compensation IS m terms of a sum of money to 
be paid to each survivor or the present families of the victims, the next question is 
how do these payments today fifty years after the barbarities help the victims 
specifically in the way of recompensing the loss or damage suffered decades ago. (It 
may be remarked here that whatever may be the general theory of compensation, in 
the present case the relation of a monetary payment to the guilt of the payer (the 
Government of Japan) and to the loss and sense of grievance of the victim must be 
clear, or else the demand (for monetary compensation) wil become qmte unrelated 
to the lo>S of the victims and the guilt of the aggressor.) 
The loss is the loss of chastity，。fthe honour of womanhood, of the honour of the 
family of man. It is compounded by the fact that this los has been forced upon the 
victims and their family by the Government of japan throogh the Imperial Army. It 
is assumed that the victims who had been forced to sel their honour had no way 
out for most of the victims could not get out of this shameful no exit situation; 
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perhaps even if some of them stubbornly refused to sel their favours, they might 
not have been shot to death but subjected to modern methods of breaking down a 
person 
Now what coo[d compensate decades later or even at that very time th1S 
los of womanly honour, this sin, this crime against humanity? Nothing, as far as I 
think, except prayer and penance. But in modern thought there is no place for the 
family of concepts of sm, expiation, prayer, forgiveness, redempt10n The S1tuat10n m 
our time IS thus a curious one while the concept of irreverS1ble loss of honour, los 
of or damage to intrins c dignity sorv1ves, If only m a hm1ted manner mto the 
present day, the way to redemption does not 
Compensation 1' a CIVIi law concept, even If cロmpensat1onor damages may be 
awarded in certain types of criminal cases to. In this context there is a closely 
related concept of reparation which too fals within the twilight zone between the 
cnmmal and the c1v1I law It IS mo•t often used m the context of war treaties where 
usually compensation in monetary terms for losses and damages caused by the war 
to the victor is to be paid by the vanquished to the victor. This could just be a 
euphemism for penalty imposed by the victor on the vanquished in addition, of 
course, to the damage already caused to the defeated; however，出ISdoes not mean 
that the money received as the reparation amount IS not a major (or mmor) 
contribution to the cost of repairing the damage caused, and indeed it may actually 
be so used. 
The demand for monetary compensation made by and in behalf of the “comfort 
women仰 belongsto a different category and it is important to be clear about it. The 
los and damage done to the “comfort women”has two aspects (•) 1t belongs to 
the moral; (b) it belongs to the modern political or civil sphere, which is seen as 
morally, axiologically and metaphysically neutral; it is the sphere of “pure power” 
一whateverthat m可 mean,1t IS even ut1hty-neutral 
Let me consider the second context first Smce 1t IS a war related matter it IS 
easy to see it as a kind of demand for reparation. But it cannot be so assimilated. In 
its specific techr羽田luse it differs importantly from that concept because it is a 
demand on the Government (in this case, a foreign government) by civilian victims 
of war, 1t IS not a pomt of negotiation between two wamng nations, also reparations 
are not only demanded but imposed on the vanquished by the victors to which they 
have to agree as defeated people. In the case of the demand by the comfort 
women, though war victims, their demand has no power or authority to be effective 
except through a court of law, which is not the case for a victor army 
Reparation IS a penalty, compensation, m prmc1ple, IS a kmd of weak q叫dpro 
quo, not a penalty. In fact, so far, this precisely has been the stand of the Japanese 
Government; al matters arising from the War have been settled by a treaty with 
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the South Korean Government which categorically agreed to a clause stipulating 
that no further claims of any kind wil ever be made hereinafter by 創出erside. It 
should thus be clear that as a purely political or legal demand, it does not bear any 
close scrutiny. It cannot be seen as any better than a demand that has powerful 
sentimental appeal and mobilising potential derived largely from its moral basis 
whiにh凶 beingsought to be capitalised for purely pnlitkal purposes whatever they 
may be. This can be easily seen at the non techmcal level: the compensation money 
can scarcely be used for repairing any damage arising out of the forced prostitution. 
Its only justil>catwn could be one can always use some additional money. 
It may be argued that the demand for compensation in addition to those for lul 
information and apology from the Emperor or the Japanese Government is a token 
or symbolic one The question now ts what does “compensation”betoken, what 
principle or reality does it symbolise' 
This bnngs us to the morality of this ugly episode whkh alone can reasonably be 
the basis not for monetary rnmpensat'°n but for openmg the issue even if 
belatedly. The case then would be that forced Governmental dishonour of woman’s 
very womanhood ts the highest and the cruelest atrodty perpetrated by a nation on 
wholly mnocent c1t1zens, an wholly wanton, dtre pumshm巴ntv1S1ted, with great 
violence, upon Simple mnorent women 
At this stage a crucially tmportant but highly inconvenient point: what is the 
mence of or the prmc1pl巴involvedm the complamt and the demands (mformatlon, 
apology and compensatio 1)? Is it simply the humiliation, the indignity of being forced 
to do what one may or may not want or agree to do fr"ly: or 1s the essential thmg 
the basic dishonour of prostitutional sex which is here terribly enhanced and 
compounded by the oficial sanction and its totally violent implementation? Now it 
may seem that it is not absolutely necessary to take a stand on the morahty of 
prostitutlonal sex to see the Justification for protest against state organisation of 
prostitution by wholmle force. But it is. If we delete the question of the morality 
of voluntary prostitution, this whole ugly episode becomes a uery different matter, 
namely, a form of conscnpt1on Conscnpt!On 1s not an uncontroversial nor a simple 
issue 1t became 針。 consequentialdurmg the American Vietnam War, 1t 1s clear, 
however, that the 15'ue m its present form cannot be raised as one of conscription, 
moreover, m fact, It IS not bemg raised as a retrospective protest against an ilegal 
(or legal) conscription. 
It follows that monetary compensation must be seen as a fake demand even on a 
purely politico-legal level: not on the ground that al claims whatsoever are barred 
by the provisions of the treaty concluding the war, but more importantly on the 
substantive ground that there 1s no material damage mvolved to conespnnd to the 
compensation claim in terms of q叫dpro quo In view of these considerat10ns, the 
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theory of compen5'tmn "' a 'Ymbohc demand al'o fail" for, ., our analy"' 'how,, 
if the general problem of the morality of pro>titution ;, kept out or held in 
abeyance, the ep1,ode become' one of con,cnpt1on in which the demand ;, 
referential, not 'ymbolic. (And even if it 1' 'uccmfully 'hown that there had been 
tacit and ilegal conmiption, the demand for individual monetary compenwion wil 
have no validity " 'uch except in term' of the award given by the authority that 
decide' th1' matter.) 
The most important thing, however, is that the very concept (and strategy) of 
compensation (which is almost always demanded and paid (when conceded) in 
money) is one that retrospectively legitimises the wrong done. At the political level, 
therefore, the demand for compensation 1s an expresS1on of the wil to be recon01led 
with wrongdoing. This may not always be sound politics even from the perspective 
of naked power-seekmg, m the present case, the demand for monetary compensat-
ion made by and m behalf of“comfort women”il-serves their mterests and 
compromises their obligations: for by getting reconciled to the war crimes, by 
closing, with monetary compensation, this profoundly ugly and politicaly wanton and 
irresponsible chapter, they remfocce the generality of corrupt and utterly msens1t1ve 
poht1cal systems; indeed it is nothing short of the victims' retrospective collaboration 
with their oppressors and tormentors, 1t IS moreover a betrayal by the surv1vocs of 
those who had strongly resisted such atrocious exploitation. To demand a price for 
the v10lence done to them, to their honour, IS m truth tantamount to voluntary sale 
of their honour and that too retrospectively 
We should now consider the purely moral aspect of this episode; in other words, 
we want to see how the rejected idea of honour is yet selected to appeal to tha 
people for acceptmg unacceptable processes and s1tuat1ons From the moral pomt of 
view, prost1tut10n, especially voluntary prost1tut10n, is the deepest dishonour, the 
most violent indignity and humiliat10n of the very womanhood of woman. This los 
of honour is irredeemable; it is beyond any compensation however high; only prayer 
can brmg d1vme forgiveness Forced prost1tut10n IS not the worst, for the force 1s an 
extenuatmg circumstance, though the sm IS not completely erased nor the smner 
exonerated or indulged. Precisely for this reason, the sin of those who force one to 
prostitute oneself is huge and humanly unforgivable. The demand of the victims for 
compensation is, at the level of morality, deeply immoral, it compounds the original 
smful state of the victim voluntary prostitution " a sm because the sacred, the 
divme m woman IS made a commodity to be sold for a price high or low determined 
by the seler or by market forces: those forced to sel themselves against their 
complete d1Smchnat10n, doubly compound the sm they demand a pnce for havmg 
suffered force; thus prostituting suffering. Worse, they free the hellish sinners 
(Government) of its到nof forcing people to sin and thus causing them irreparable 
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damage. The involuntary sinner by virtue of the demand for compensation thus now 
becomes doubly a sinner and voluntarily' by demanding a price (•) for suffering 
force; and (b) for offering to clear the conscience of the opprmion by charging a 
price to become reconciled to their profoundest indignity, to the total irredeemable 
damage to theu womanhood and thus dtshonourmg their honour a second time, now 
willingly and enthusiastically. In this way, the victims, collaborate with their own 
explotters 
If the moral order ts to have an mdependent authonty and ts own worth, t has 
to be metaphysirnlly grounded; the ideas of good and evil, of ought and ought not, 
have to be understood m terms of cnnformtty to and d凶cordance wtth or 
transgression, ultimately, of the cosmic order. Modernity rejects al this as pre 
modern trash, t founds tself on man made statute law based rather tortuous y upon 
the idea of human autonomy. The concept of crime which replaces that of evil and 
sin cannot then be other than political. governed always by pohtics of power and 
class interests It follows then that withm thts system there ts no space for any 
protest agamst anything that may look like an abuse of power, however serious it 
may be. This is why the compensation demand is always a legitimation of the ruling 
power structure and converts vにtlmsmto collaborators wtth the state, this become< 
a deeply damaging paradox in cases where the wrong done is undeniably of a 
nature that can in no way be recompensed compensation when g>ven not only 
legtt1mtses the state’s wrongdoing, t makes the victims compound their vtctlmtsatlon 
and ratse the mvoluntary ”sm”or“1mmorahty”to the second power, makmg it 
retrospectively voluntary One of the reasons for such strange, unintended and 
oppostte consequences ts that the reiected concepts whose foundations have been 
systematically eroded remain residually and subliminally alive and when allowed to 
surface implicitly or exphcttly, prove devastatmg Today. the victims’tactt 
collaboration with the victorious master is one of the strange powers behind the 
violent throne. Could one overemphasise the urgency of seeing the dialectics of our 
predtcament today? 
Weber’s time is not Kafka’s time. In one of his last lectures，“Politics as a 
Vocationぺheis, however, presciently aware of the due consequences of an 
autonomous polttics alienated from ethtcs and morality There ts a clear awareness in 
him of modernity as Kafka's penal colony. Separated by two decades from World 
War I, he did have a previsionJof its unprecedented horrors and the consequent 
systematic banaltsation of evil m the pD't-war world The uon cage, the long polar 
night are truly prophetic metaphors. Had he not broken down and died a lonely 
m叩， Weberwould certainly have asked: And in such dark times, why be a social 
scientist at al日
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自由 A P"t-war development marking the decline of the West is the rise of an 
叩 tagonisticdual leadership of the world. Before World War l, Europe was the 
leader of the world In the post war world, the centre of world-power, of‘cultural' 
influence, and other modes of domination move< to Amenca and Soviet Russia 
England, Europe and the rest of the world expe<ience the impact (influence, power, 
domination) of both America and Russia at many different levels some vastly 
ddferent from each other in d,f!erent modes and measures Th<S " what I mean 
by dual world一leadership.The duality has a twin basis: politico military power and 
the pul and influence and power of conflicting ideologies roughly called Liberal 
democrauc and Marx.an, or cap<tahst and commumst Amenca representing the 
hberal democrat<c, anuーcommumstand Sov<et Russ<a representing the commumst 
societies/nation states in Europe and other parts of the world. The nature of the 
leadership and hegemonic position and power of America and Sov"t Russia have 
been arguably but not unquestionably different. The supposedly radically opposed 
ideologies of the two universalisms are Europeanisation of the Earth or in current 
jargon modernisation of the underdeveloped peoples (Europe and America), and 
establishment of scientihc socialism throughout the world through Socialist 
Revolution (Soviet Russia). Much of the “intellectual”and ”moral”appeal and 
political energy of each super power was derived from the postulate of rad,cal 
chmce between modern,,atmn and Sc,.ntd'c Socmhst Revolutmn For Europe and 
America the success of socialist revolutionary mission would mean global 
enslavement, hkew<Se for Sov"t Russ<a the success of the Kerygmat'c fi'5'<0n of 
modernisation under American-European leadership would spell the setting back of 
the clock of humanity’s progress. 
Russ.an hegemomc power certainly got a huge setback w'th what may be called 
the unilateral declaration of independence by China; since then, there seems to have 
been a continuing weakening of RusS<a’s hegemomc power over the Commumst 
world or so it seems retrospecuvely until last year (1991) it collapsed. It would 
be plausible to argue that with the Soviet Union taking thrn plunge almost into 
dependency, Amenca’s leadersh'P and hegemomc power becomes und'v'ded and 
unchallenged. Again it may seem that what seemed to indicate a decline of the 
power and prestige of post-war world leadersh'P by v<rtue of '" bdurcatmn, has 
proved, again retrospectively, only a prelude to the recovery of unified leadership 
and unchallenged hegemonic power - after a long prelude of close to half-aー
century 
This prelude if one chooses to see 't as such一 has also been a long 
interregnum of “cold war" between the two hegemomc powers, though, of course, 
thrn hm'ts '" amorphous scope There '5, however, a far more consequenual 
”interregnum”， the overwhelmmg and sovemgn rule of the theory and pract<ee of 
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Deterrence under whose pacifist, benevolent sign the two superpowers ran the 
nuclear race and prepared for “star wacs”“The deterrence-idea brought the 
nuclear age mto bemg, and came to maturity with 1t as a programme for “massive 
retahat10n”m the event of an enemy attack”（O'Donovan，。hver Peace and 
Ceバainty:A Theological Essay on Deterrence, Oxford, Clarendon Pre5', 1989, p.55). 
No less fateful than the bringing about of the “nuclear arms race”， is the fact that 
the deterrence idea has been so far orgamsed・ 
(I} ln order to establish without another war (which may or may not be decisive} 
the dual, antagonistic hegemonic leadership, American and Russian, over the globe, 
It would be necessary to frem the status quo as 1t emerged m the post-war world 
that is, the spheres of influence and hegemonic power of each of the two super-
powers must clearly be recognised and accepted by both of them: accordingly, a 
dual world system must each be totahtanan ThlS, however, IS a S1mphficat1on for 
the self-description of the two worlds is the reverse of each othero from the Russian 
pomt of view, the Soviet-Communist world-sy.tem IS the only posS1ble free, 
democratic and non-expl01tative sy,tem, the Euro-. American bemg the unfree, 
pseudo-democratic and deeply exploitative. This makes the European imperial 
mandate (received from History} divided and apparently antithetical into (•} 
Europeanisation (modernisation} of the Earth （~ Euro American reading of the 
destiny of the Earth}; and (b} producing a new man and a new post prehistory time 
through the "ientiflc-socialist alchemical revolution ( ~ Marx>an reading of the 
de,tiny of world-history entrusted to Marx and transmitted to his self-proclaimed 
successors, agam, by H1Story} 
(2} The hegemonic power and ideological power of each (America and Soviet 
Russia} is founded on and sustained by (•} the promise to save the American way of 
life and the freedom of the rest of the “free”world and the humanity of man from 
being over powered by Russia; and (b} the promise to save the socialist way of life 
and the advanced, progressive sornhst people and the co mal non European 
countries from being oveト powered and enslaved by the capitalist decadent 
undemocratic bourgems way of hfe 
(3} Another proviso to the precondition of this dual antagonistic leadership is the 
following: that the boundaries of the spheres of the two worlds are determined and 
mutually acknowledged as the status quo post b<llum; their inviolability refers to 
use of war as a means of expanding one or the other sphere of influence Efforts 
towards extens10n by peaceful means are permitted 
(3.l}This is the opening for destabilisatmn and war; but this opening is unavoidable; 
without it the ideological basis of either leadership wil be lost 
(4} A fundamental, key presupposition of this post bellum ("new } world system 
and international order IS that the two "ideological”worlds are to co-ex1St 
84 
perpetually, except m case of failure to prevent nuclear war which alone can end 
this coexistence and perhaps al existence 
(4.J)This implies another presupposition that conquest by war can and wil establish 
an ideological system and subsequent defence capability can and wil sustain it. 
(5) These presuppositions, though inescapable, are not acknowledged on either side; 
they are not consistent with the idea that peaceful operations in favour of expanding 
the spheres of the two opposed idenlog1es are necessary. Yet it is not possible to 
omit any of the postulates or 1mplicat10ns of the post war mternalional order 
Thus logically (and in an important sense, politically as well) the most 
compelling argument for deterrence emerging from this analysis 1s that since there 
is no way of reconciling the radically opposed ideologies and ways of life (as seen by 
the leaders of each），釦neethere JS no cure of the other’s disease, each must 
concentrate on preventing the other from imposing by war an alien ideology and 
ehmmatmg once for al the nval ideology That the “prevention”refers more 
importantly and most urgently to the prevent10n of near-total destruct10n of man 
and the earth is untenable both logically and historically. Logically; if one did not 
proceed on the maxim“better dead than red”and believed, instead, m the inherent 
power of one’s belief, nuclear defence or attack need not be necessary and 1f one 
unconditionally ruled out total destruction, the probability of nuclear war, on the 
given assumptions of deterrence theory would be extremely low, if not altogether 
eliminated (for some buttons could be pressed inadvertently). In other words and 
this is the crucial paradox the“rationality”of the deterrence "theory" arises from 
the readiness一 albeitm extreme circumstances to tolerate the 1mmmence of 
total nuclear destruction of the world. 
This is the structure of the context of one of the strangest developments in the 
contemporary world, namely, the establishment of the “theory”and praclice of 
deterrence as the grand, central organising and sustaining “principle”of the super 
powers global rule. 
The aura of necessity，“the only alternative”and a kind of opaque plausibility 
surrounding the concept and theory of Deterrence make analysis dificult. Let me, 
however, begm with the begmnmg the relat10n between nucleansm and deterrence 
I have already stated that deterrence promotes nuclearism; the atomic bomb was 
speedily developed to beat Nazism and win the War for the Allied Forces. However, 
the relationship of nuclearism and deterrence is far more complicated for the kind 
of analysis and argument often used; that is to say, if nuclear warheads are 
developed in response to the needs of the theory and practice of deterrence, it could 
also be argued with equal plausibility that given the nature, declared purp°'e and 
logical structure of the theory of deterrence, 1t could not be formulated except in 
the context of an mcreasmg threat of a nuclear hロlocaustand a general climate of 
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nucleansm In other words, rather than use a cau"I or means ends perspect>ve on 
the relatmnsh1p between nucleansm and deterrence, it would be better to see thts 
relatmn m dialecttcal terms that is, the two (nucle町tsmand deterrence) cal for 
each other and readily respond one to the other. 
Deterrence IS a strange idea its “Jng1cal”structure ts nddled with dire 
paradoxes or with plain and huge inconsistencies. And yet its plausibility remains 
unaffected. That is, to me, the whole thing is just bewildering. But let me now 
return to the idea”and strategy of deterrence more directly. Simply put' the 
deterrence strategy for global peace keeping by preventing war between the two 
super powers ts to continuously mamtam the threat of total anmh!latton of the 
aggressor super power on the twm assumptions that the mere threat would be such 
a huge deterrent to the other party, and that it wil never actually launch a nuclear 
or conventtonal attack apamst the party, and hence neither super power wil ever 
have actually to carry out the threat It is, of course, of the essence of this strategy 
that the threat should at alHim田 beactually backed by the stock-piling of the 
latest nuclm warheads duly tested, and that each super-power should know thts 
about the other even though the preparatory operations of each are to be kept top 
secret. The strategy fails (.) if the threat has to be carried out either to preempt 
what ts seen as an immment attack tn unbelievable dtsregard of the threat, or, (b) m 
the case of defensive couter attack in response to an actual attack by the other 
super po、ver
There are four ideas her" (.) the threat must be actual (backed by physical 
stockpiling adequate to the desired nuclear strike capability) but it must never be 
actualised for therem hes its success as a deterrent, (b) the actuality of the threat ts 
to be kept top secret but should be known to the rival super power; (o) the 
potential of the nuclear strike threat should be near total destC"ction; and (d) since 
the nval super powers wil be competmg m the stock-p1lmg of nuclear warheads for 
mutual deterrence, there automatically develop internal built in accelerators of the 
stock piling. The whole deterrence operatton is, by its logic (illogicηand design, 
unending and infinite. 
A central and cnttcal contrad1ctmn in the theory and practice of deterrence, of 
far-reaching S1gmf1cance, has already been pomted out, namely, the twin 
presuppositions on the one hand, the ideological and political conflict between 
Russia (Communism) a"d Europe and America (Liberal D巴mocratic)cannot be 
settled except through war; on the other hand, war, because it would be al-
destroying, must be prevented at al costs. 
There are other no less far-reaching presuppostttons and implicattnns of thts 
“idea”of deterrence, an idea that has solidly and sovereignly dominated the post 
war mternatmnal world-order, rationalising and legitimating the most weird, abysmal 
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developments 
“Deterrence .s about how the behaviour of nations can be subjected to 
management, by taking the infinite into our threats and by deploying the calculated 
prospect of human action and react10n as an instrument to ensure predictabu1ty 
The idea of deterrence was in our minds before it gave rise to nuclear weapons; it 
could continue to be there when nuclear weapons have been rendered ob,olete by 
the advent of some more economical deterrent”（0’Donovan, op "', p 21) 
”If we take ultimate disproportion into the category of eligible means, we can do 
so only at the cost of rev1Sing our conceptions of the eligible end. The justification 
of nuclear war creates its own scale of values It regards the destruct10n of Western 
civilisation, with its unforeseeable attendant suffering possibly lasting for centuries, 
as preferable to the subiect10n of Western C1V1hsatton to alien political cond1t1ons 
Whatever may be said in favour of such a judgment, it can claim no continuity with 
the liberal tradition of thought. It has invested a political order with sanctions 
appropriate to an ultimate value, and "hberahsmヘ1f1t meant anything, meant a 
political vision which treated al political orders as r.lative values”（0’Donovan, op. 
cit., p.94). 
“Mankind now thinks himself in a positioo to promise, on the basis of an absolute 
disproportion of force to the political good, the abolition of war”（O'Donovan, op. 
cit., p.51). 
It is clear then that deterrence, the exemplary strategy in place of political action, 
undertakes the Husserl1'n infinite task of European humanity and ends up with the 
enterprise of usmg, m a central way, the 1rat10nal, the crazy, as the foundation and 
the means of bringing order into the anarchic international order of our times. Its 
deeper meaning lies not m its deterrence function but m the power of its insanity to 
make millions of people believe in America as the super leader and the foremost 
champion of the freedom and dignity of man. 
With the collapse of Soviet Russia, the hegemonic lead巴rsh1pof the world has 
come to be endangered, both in theory and practにe
Soviet Russia and the United States of America were to each other not only the 
mortal political enemy, at the same time, and much m町eimportantly, each to the 
other represented the darker side of modernity and a drag on, a huge impediment 
to, the true progres• of mankind. Each for the other was the vilain, a satanic giant 
which had to be kiled; and each super power cost itself in the role of the giant 
kiler, the other being cast in the “image”and role of the giant. The Cold War, 
though fuly political, has been, at the sameれme,no less completely an ideological 
war, each advmory claiming to be on the Side of truth, righteousness. justice and 
peace Indeed, according to the se!f-adve<t1Sement of each Hero, polit1c1Sat1on was 
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'imply a noco田aryin,trumontal a>poct of what wa> really a wholly moral war. Each 
wa> fighting for it' own people (tho Euro Amori"n, and tho Ru,,ian and tho 
Marx,,t), however, no lo" important and oven“more”imperatively roqmrod w" tho 
"ving of tho A'ian" African" and South American,. 
It >eom' to mo that tho unavD1dablo, oven 1! porvorno, ocho0> of a poronmal 
mythical and folktale motif in thi' contemporary 'tory of tho imporiali'm of 
modormty do, 'ubhmmally, provide 1t a ''°''t >eurco of power and appeal and 
enable it to ride rough,hod over i" huge untenable pro,uppn>ition' and glaring 
contradiction' and paradox0>. 
The collap>e of Soviet Ru,,ia and the eclip>e of the Communi" ideology are too 
'udden and recent and too complex phenomena to admit of any m'tant 
undmtandmg It " po,,ible however to make >ame prohmmary ob>ervatmn' It " a 
de fin山vefailure of apparent!甘 theMarxi" ver>ion of modern economy (and 
oconom1C'), but mentially 1t " a剖gnof the failure of the entire modern economic 
'Y'tem and economic theory, both of which are b"ed on the magical powm of 
modern technology and the unacknowledged but clear mumption' of infinity and 
atemporality. It i' the working out of an internal contradiction between the economy 
of production for plenty and more plenty, and the liberty -equahty-fratermty 
rovolutmnary democratic 'Y"em Modern economy and economic theory, capitali" 
and commun"t alike, are poverty neutral; the latter i' a political concept for the 
modern econom惜し eventhough he may be workmg profm!Dnally for poverty-
ehmmat!Dn profec" of the State The nature of modern econom10> h" it' impact on 
the contradiction between democratic ideology (in it> liberal and Marxian vmion') 
and the overwhelming reality of hegemomc power 'tructure f1r>tly, mternat!Dnally m 
the very concept of two global 'uper-powern (and al>a the big five”， or big“four” 
or big“throe”k and >0condly, m the mternal power->tructur0> of many A'1an and 
Afn"n democracie" and, la>tly, the ex,,tence of patently ant1-democrat1c regime. m 
different part> of the world: in relation to thm the two 'uper powm have alway' 
failed to follow a uniform p。licycon'i'tent with their declared prmciph The break-
up of the internal Soviet empire may thu' be a highly important cau>0 of the fal of 
Communi" power. The Soviet collap>e go0> to prove the long held v陪wof >eholm 
about the wholly artificial and political difference> between the liberal-market and 
the >acial"t controlled economic" both being high technology bmd economie" no 
important differenc0> can be ,u,tained. It >0em' to me " if the ma"er' of the 
Soviet economy believed that the 1deolog1cal 'uper-"ructure of >acial"m wil 
transform the 0>sential properties of technological mfra structure 
The main point that the above brief observations are intended to make is that 
fundamental contradictions mheront m the theory and practにeof modern c1V1l1Sa t!On 
are now, one may say, matunng and the recent turn m the Soviet IS only the 
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begmnmg The econom悶 costsof the long cold war between the two super-powers 
were from the start unsustamable, it W田， inits own terms, a huge programme of 
the production of the most costly waste at the expense of civil economy. This has 
been masked m various ways and means, some easy to locate, others rather opaque 
The current economic situation of the United States may perhaps not be simply the 
usual cyclic phenomenon 
Does the present situation leave the Umted States as a united - at least, smgle, 
unchallenged - global leader' Our concern here 1s d1ffmnt assummg that the 
U.S.A. is likely now to emerge as an unchallenged world hegemonic leader, can she 
carry this huge burden' It 1s not a quest10n about the leader's competence and 
capability or maiesty and power, 1t 1s one about the structure of the contemporary 
global leadership and the sign under which it prooiaims and sustains itself as the 
number ooe leader of the globe entrusted with the burden of Europeanisation of the 
Eacth (=modernisation) so that the destiny of the Earth is fulfiled (Husserl, 
Edmund: Th' Vi.,na Lecture, 1935). Does the structure and the spec1日c,even 
unique, modality survive the lo" of the Cold 、／｛ar, the fal of the arch enemy 
(whether to be fought against or pacified in the name of autonomy and nationalism) 
of (modern) man and the crackmg up of “mternal”or European and Amencan 
“domestic”1mpenahsm' 
It is most unlikely that it would come out of such massive change without almost 
total damage: to emerge as the one world leader, unchallenged and without a 
comparable rival is not an enviable position, for challeng1bility and an actual 
challenger have been, and, I think, would continue to remain the staple sustenance, 
the rmson d'e tre, the unquest10nable leg1t1mat10n of world leadership m the 
contemporary s1tuat1on Deterrence bases itself upon a cunous situation 1t 1s 
emphatically advertised as predicated upon urgent, tmible realities, which, however, 
are overlaid with playacting (a threat that must not or wil never have to be carried 
out by virtue of its very enormity), but the playacting wil be seen as real by the 
other hero of the deterrence drama, never mmd ifhe knows the script by heart for 
it is his script to. 
The structure, being that of a new modern genre of the dramatic art, cannot 
survive after al its poss1b1lit1es have been exhausted 
A new genre of the drama and a new villam are wanted that 1s, 1f we 
continue the old, failed deterrence thought which would be a pity. It seems to 
me not very helpful to consider Japan eventually being cast into the role of the 
Soviet for the Soviet was at once a nuclear power, a political reality and a bearer, a 
living embodiment of a rival ideology: Japan is a power, though a non nuclear one, 
an mternatJonal reality, but bearer of no nval ideology, worse, m terms of an 
important distinction, a distinction valued by Europeans, Japan is not an originally 
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modern nat10n (or people), they are denvatlve-1m1tat1ve, though no longer 
transitional like many other Asian people. 
To repeat, 1 IS too early at least for one who 1s not at al knowledgeable in 
mternat10nal affairs - to take m the post cold war situation m al its complexity 
and far reaching implications. With reference to what is said here about Japan's 
ineligibility to play the role of the vilain hero, it may be added that the newspapers 
are providing us everyday with clear evidence for the fact that currently Americans 
are frantically in search of a surrogate for the fallen arch-enemy' "With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, American politicians loH an enemy, and now they fel 
lonesome，” wntes the renowned Japanese colummst Yuk10 Matsuyama, quoting a 
H町田rdauthonty on mternat1onal 1ssu" Matsuyama adds，“It 1s not 1mposs1ble that 
U.S. firepow町 wilnow be concentrated on Japan. The time 1s past when Japan.,e-
American relations were guar叩 teedby the security pact, or could be set right by an 
increased cash contribut10n”（“Frankly Speaking”in Asahi Evening News, March 2, 
1992). 
It seems to me that a people who can contribute 12.45 percent of the total 
budget of the United Nations (Britain' 5 percent, Chin., 0.5 percent) and take, in 
their modest stride, non membership of the Security Council are unlikely to take the 
bait implied m the rather high pitched Japan-bashing currently going on in 
America. 
The main point may not be the U.S.-japan relation at al. The羽Testneeds a new 
script for a wholly different play which alone can give the dramatis personae now 
requued 
The Russian transformation, it seems to me, leaves the West's global imperial 
leadership unnval!ed, maybe, unchallengeable and weakened, mdeed, m a quandary 
Weber died (1920) a couple of years after World、.varI一morethan a quarter of 
a century before global leadership passed out from Europe to its younger kin, 
America. Weber’s analysis of Western history and the rise of modernity and his 
d1agnos1s of the sickness of European modermty remains mtact and contemporaneo 
us. He had clearly seen and acutely experienced the misery of the no exit 
predicament in which the aporias of modernity had impris叩 edWestern civilisation. 
He knew that the terrible ineluctable dilemmas and the acute aporias were working 
away steadily at the very core of modern European c1vt!rnat10n which was thus bemg 
irreversibly corroded at a fast speed. But Max Weber firmly refused to don the 
prophetic mantle for he could see that the time of the prophets was not yet 
Indeed, 1t is highly doubtful if he believed in the social science officialese of 
“prediction and-control" as the motto - 1f not the telos of the social sciences 
He hardly ever went beyond reading the consequences of present realities which is 
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logico一dialecticaland not a !uturolog日lexercise. Weber hated matz. For him the 
medeemable declme of the 、•Vest was a matter not of foreseeing but one Simply of 
seemg 
Max Weber’s great discovery was modern man’s and his own disenchantm 
ent with a world his ocly world that had been ruthlessly, relentle田ly
dispossessed of al its enchantment from which al spirit had been studiously 
exorcised. That is, he was discovering a deepenmg disenchantment with the 
disenchanted world of modernity, that living with disenchantment was virtually 
impossible especially when disenchantment had been rnised to the second power. Of 
course Weber was awm出atthe negation of a negative 1s a pos1t1v1ty九＼＇as1t then 
“re enchantment”？ No; he could no longer think in those terms. Weber hated 
ersatz, his earher“sc1entlsat10n”of ch町民mamay not be overlooked, towards the 
end, he certainly knew bettero he stopped at double negation His insight is 
penetrating, mc1s1ve, but transcendent' Perhaps not 
Weber's time IS not Kafka’S time 
GO The pomt involved here 1s not our httlene5' as soo1olog1sts or even as natural 
sc1ent1sts一 rememberthe fate of the greatest physicist or b10log1st m relation to 
political power-holders (McCarthyism). The case of social scientists is only more 
ViSible and rather pitiable釦nceeven as scientists they are not their own masters 
The important point noted thematically by both Weber and Marx is the los of the 
idea of vocation which has been replaced by careensm, job holding and job-
satisfaction This 1s, however, a logical development from the idea of “choice”as 
the basis of human action (and morahty). The Theory of Communicative Action with 
its feeble, emaciated, provincial notions of understanding and truth is not likely to 
help the situation. 
自由 Here we come to (.) one of the crucial aspects of the nature, ongm and destiny 
of modernity; and (b) the essen!ially and necessarily maskmg mission of the SOCJal 
“sciences”Let us hope the following parable of Kafka (1883-1924) wil illuminate 
our predicament at the profoundest levels and give us access to some rare apertures 
opemng us to mmages from Above 
PARADISE 
The expulsion from Paradise is in its main significance 
eternal; Consequently the expulsion from Paradise is final, 
and life in this world irrevocable, but the eternal nature of 
the occurrence (or, temporally expressed, the eternal 
recap1tulat1on of the occurrence) makes 1t nevertheless 
possible that not only could we live continuously in 
Paradise, but that we are contmuously there m actual 
fact, no matter whether we know 1t here or not 
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Why do we lament over the fal of man? We were not 
driven out of Paradise because of it, but because of the 
Tree of Life, that we might not eat of it. 
We are sinful not merely because we have eaten of the 
Tree of Knowledge, but also because we have not yet 
eaten of the Tree of Life. The state m which we find 
ourselves is 凱nful,quite mdependent of gmlt 
、•Ve were fashioned to hve m Paradise, and Parad!'e was 
destmed to serve us. Our destiny has been altered; that 
this has also happened with the destiny of Parad15e is not 
stated. 
We were expelled from Parad1Se, but Parad!Se was not 
destroyed In a sense our expulS!on from Paradise was a 
stroke of luck, for had we not been expelled, Paradise 
would have had to be destroyed. 
God said that Adam would have to die on the day he ate 
of the Tree of Knowledge. According to God, the 
instantaneous result of eating of the Tree of Knowledge 
would be death; according to the serpent (at least it can 
be understood so), it would be equality with God Both 
were wrong in similar ways. Men did not die, but became 
mortal; they did not become like God, but received the 
md1Spensable capacity to become so Both were nght m 
similar ways. Man did not die, but the paradisiacal man 
did; men did not become God, but divine knowledge. 
He is a free and secure citizen of the world, for he is 
fettered to a chain which is long巴noughto give him the 
freedom of al earthly space, and yet only so long that 
nothing can drag him past the frontiers of the world. But 
S1multaneously he is a free and secure citizen of Heaven 
"' well, for he is also fettered by a simil町lydesigned 
heavenly cham. So that tf he heads,.say, for the earth, his 
heavenly collar throttles him, and if he heads for Heaven, 
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his earthly one does the same. And yet al the possibilities 
are his, and he feels it; more, he actually refuses to 
account for the deadlock by an error in the original 
fettering. 
Since the Fall we have been essentially equal in our 
capacity to recognize good and evil, nonetheless 1t is iust 
here that we seek to show our individual superiority. But 
the real differences begin beyond that knowledge. The 
叩positeilusion may be explamed thus: nobody can remain 
content with the mere knowledge of good and evil in 
Itself, but must endeavor as well to act m accordance with 
it. The strength to do so, however, is not likewise given 
him, consequently he must destroy himself trying to do 
so, at the risk of not achieving the necessary strength 
even then, yet there remams nothmg for him but this 
fmal attempt. (That is moreover the meaning of the threat 
of death attached to eating of the Tree of Knowledge; 
perhaps too it was the original meaning of natural death.) 
Now, faced with this attempt, man is filed with fear; he 
prefers to annul his knowledge of good and evil (the term, 
“the fal of ma札” maybe traced back to that fear); yet 
the accomplished cannot be annulled, but only confused. It 
was for this purpose that our rat1onahrntions were 
created. The whole world is ful of them, indeed the whole 
visible world is perhaps nothing more than the rationaliza 
tlon of a man who wants to fmd peace for a moment An 
attempt to falsify the actuality of knowledge, to regard 
knowledge as a goal stil to be reached. 
(Kafka, Franz: Parables and Paradoxes, Bilingual edition, 
New York, Schocken Books, 1961), pp.29-33. 
Ol Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things (New York, Vintage Books, Random 
House, 1970), p.326. (The French text was published by Gallimard, Paris, 1966.) 
01 Kierkegaard, Soren: Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy 
(Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1944), p.29. (The Danish text was 
published in 1844 at Copenhagen.) 
白日 It is too early to see the ful meaning and implications and to assess the 
immediate and long-term rmpact of the fal and dismemberment of the Union of 
Soviet Republics. A successful counter revolution, a throwback of one kind or 
Mox、Veb"•nd the End of Comte•n Sodolngy 93 
anothec to the fallen system, cannot be mled out - at least not so qwekly One oc 
two things, howevec, seem faidy cleac to me Whatevec be the futuce of the pcesent 
powecful cesucgence of sovece1gn nation-states, the falsely so-called second wodd is 
dead whethec oc not a geo pohUcally umhed Eurn-Amencan smgle wodd emecges 
Thece can now be no ideological double oc divided wil as lac as the impedal mission 
of Eurnpeamsauon-moderntsaUon of the Eacth ts concerned The economics and 
politics of the Asian, African and Latin Amecican nation states would tend to be les 
complicated. The pcesent developments may pechaps quicken and intensify the 
“development”and moderntsat1on of nnn-Eurn-Amedcan people, also, thts new phase 
of“post colomal”moderntsat1on may see the stcengthenmg of puce colomsation of 
non-Eurnpean peoples and nations Revolutmnacy and scientific socialism discoucse 
may now be on the way out. I also fel that the false consciousness and the masking 
stcategies of social刷scientific”thoughtmay be densec and gam moce powec now m 
both the impedal and th巴 colonialcountnes. 
自由 ”Science as a Vocationぺin Gecth and Mills (tc. and eds.)' op. cit., pp. 147-48. 
間 Freund,Julien' The Sociology of Max Weber, New York, Pantheon Books, 1968, 
p.25. 
側 Freund,op. cit., p.2; Weber; "Science as a Vocation", in Gerth and Mills (tr. and 
eds.); op. cit., passim. 
M Freund, op. cit .p.25. 
自由 Habermas, Jurgen; Reason and the Rationalization of Soぽiety(Vol. I of his two 
volume work, The Theory of Communicative Action), Boston, Beacon Press, 1984, 
p.241. 
削“ReligiousRejections of the World and Their Directions”， in Gerth and Mills (tr. 
and eds.); op. cit., p.355. 
曲目 Habermas; op. cit., p.242. 
申車 Ibid., p.243. 
帥 Ibid.,p.243. 
i~ Ibid., p.243. 
0岬 Ibid. p.399. 
的 lsaid that the concept of value would be untenable unlm itwere understood as 
the finite's orientation to the Infinite, as the human knower’s awe and wonder before 
the Unknowable, as the backshining of Eternity. This would be acceptable to Weber, 
I suggested. I quoted no te札 mywarrant was deductive. What about the following; 
“Economics, as an explanatory and analytical science is mt.,national, but as soon as 
econom巴sexpreS<es values. 1t becomes bound up with the substance of our hfe as a 
natmn The economtc pohcy of a German state as likewise the value standard of a 
German economic theorist, can therefore, only be German”（Mayer, J.L.; Max Web" 
and German Politics, London, Faber & Faber, 1944, p.41). In what sense is Weber 
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using 'value’here? Dees he mean by it any end to which one is committed irrationally 
on the bas.s of h" personal or group interest' Cons.der the fo!lnwmg“Here we reach 
the frontiers of the human rea回n(8'viffw.,mo gen), and we enter a totally new 
world, where quite a d>fferent part of our mmd pronounces Judgments about eth>cs, 
and every one knows that its Judgments, though not based on reason, are certain and 
clear as any logical conclusion at which reason may arrive”（Weber’s letter to Emmy 
Baumgarten, quoted in Mayer, J.L., op. cit .p.35). 
The totally new world is certainly not the world of nature, of affective life or of 
irrationality defined either as a defect or fadure of reason or residually. It is, as 
Weber says, a world beyond the frontiers of human reason. It is discontinuous with 
reason, even >I reason is, as K>er女egaardnotes, 'passwnately・seekmgIt The new 
world of value m th<S sense " the source both of man’s character and conv.chon aロd
of his fear as well. Traditionally, it凶theworld of total risk, not in spite of clear and 
certam Judgements It hands down, but prec<Sely because of th凶 clantyand certamty 
It is the inability or unwillingnrn to take such risk, and bear the life of fear and 
trembling that perverts man’s orientatwn to the Immeasurable into fanaticism and 
paronh>ahsm に
自由 Scrima, Andre: “The He•ychastic Tradition”， in Traditional Modes of 
Contemplation and Action, edited by Yusuf !b<Sh and P.L. Wilson, Tehran, Imperial 
Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977, p.167. 
帥“ReligiousRejections of the World and Their Directions”， in Gerth and Mills (tr. 
and eds.) op. cit .p.359. 
側 Seenote 27 infra. 
ω“Sc>ence as a Vocation", in Gerth and Mills (tr. and eds.) op. cit .p.155 
The text of the dedicatory ep<Stle comes from the English version of Michel 
Foucault: This is Not a Pipe with illustrations and letters by Rene Magritte 
(translated and edited by James Harkness: Los Angeles, University of Califorma 
Pres直， 1983),p.58. The dedicatory epistle reproduces the first two paragraphs of Renる
Magritte’s second letter (of June 4, 1966) to Michel Foucault. 
“What was surely the most unexpected and most cherished of the responses 
Foucault received to the publication of Les mots et les choses (1966) was a letter from 
Rene Magntte, m wh>ch the pamter comments on the use of the terms 'resemblance’ 
and ’s.m>htude’Foucault rephed and a few days later recmed a second letter from 
Magritte. In 1973, Foucault published a short fascinating study of Magntte entitled, 
after the artist's own works, Ceci n' est pas une pipe. The two letters from Magritte 
to Foucault are included in an appendix to that book”（Sheridan, Alan: Michel 
Foulcault: The Will to Truth, London, Tavistock Publications, 1980, p.88: parenthes.s 
added) 
Mox ¥Vobe< •nd tho End of Comte.n Soc ology 95 
The source of the epigraph is An•nda Kentish Coomarnswamy's H同duismand 
Buddhism (New York, Philosophic•] Libracy, 1943), p.26. The words“or others" 
occumng m parenthesis at the end of the ],t sentence of the fust paragraph are an 
addition by the author of the present paper to indic•te that it would be the "me 
whether one was acting to please oneself or to please others 
The Epilogue comes from Simone Weil (Sef.cted Essays, 1934-43, London, Oxford 
University Prrn, 1962) 
An early text of th凶 paperwas pubhshed in The International Journaf of Critical 
Sociology (Volume One, Number Two, Spring, 1977). ft has been considerably revised 
and enlarged for the present pubfication. The second part and almost al the major 
notes have been wntten especially for this new ve目ion
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教j，「科学と価値」，「科学と歴史」，「科学と社会学」の四つの側面から検
討する。
第二部では，ウエーパーの問題意識の中核をなす「非合理性jの問題に
焦点をあて，「合理性」が自らと双生児である「非合理的なるものJ，「他者
(the Other）」を解消することの不可能なことを論ずる。ウェーパー以降
の主流社会学の特質である，こうした「他者jの還元・周縁化・残基化
(residualisation）は，根源的ジレンマの覆い隠しに過ぎず，現代の暴力的
現実を「平凡化（trivialise）」せんとする恐るべき「知的感受性の欠如」を
表わしている，と指摘する。とりわけ，ウエーパーの「合理性」の類型論
をめぐる，ユノレゲン・ハーハマスの議論を批判的に吟味する。
